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Abstract
\
This thesis provides a critique of, and an alternative to, the Realist school of International 
Relations theory. Rejecting the Realist starting point of the condition of anarchy among states, 
it argues instead for the importance of wider social structures in determining the social form of 
geopolitical systems. The method used is the historical materialism of Marx - in particular his 
injunction to examine how 'the direct relationship of the owners of the conditions of 
production to the direct producers' underlies the form of the state. Following an opening 
interrogation of Realism, this method is used to explore several premodem geopolitical 
systems. In each case, attention is drawn to the correspondence between the form of the 
geopolitical system and the character of the societies composing it. This correspondence is 
then used to mount historical explanations which contrast strongly with those supplied by a 
Realist treatment. The tools forged in these historical explorations are next turned onto the 
contemporaiy international system. Two main conclusions result. First, the distinctive 
properties of the sovereign states-system are to be understood by examining their 
correspondence to 'the direct relationship of the owners of the conditions of production to the 
direct producers' in the leading capitalist societies which dominate the system. This argument 
includes a formal redefinition of the two core categories of Realist theory. 'Sovereignty is 
redefined as the abstracted political form of the state under capitalism, while 'anarchy' is 
rediscovered as the form of social connectedness peculiar to capitalism which Marx describes 
as 'personal independence based on dependence mediated by things'. The second conclusion is 
that the history of the emergence of the modem international system is to be found in those 
historical processes of social change which generalized the capital-labour relation - processes 
focussed above all on the expropriation of the direct producer.
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Introduction
The story is told of a Cambridge college, some years ago, which was presided over by a very 
conservative Master:
It so happened that the College had just elected into a Fellowship a young man 
who ... had the temerity to propose, at the first Fellows' meeting in which he 
took part, a number of measures concerning College policy. The Master 
listened ffowningly, and when the novice had finished, he said: 'Interesting... 
but it would seem to me that your suggestions are a little contradictory to the 
tradition of the College'. *Not at all, Master,' replied the aspiring reformer, 'I 
have studied the history of the College and I can assure you that my proposals 
are perfectly in keeping with the ways of the College over the last three 
hundred years.' 'This may well be', said the Master, *but wouldn't you agree that 
the last three hundred years have been, to say the least of them, rather 
exceptional?'*
And of course he was right. There is something about the last three hundred years which sets 
them apart from all other epochs in human history. In the field of international relations this is 
especially obvious since these centuries see for the first time the emergence of a states-system 
which covers the entire planet. But it is obvious everywhere else too. In fact, whenever we use 
the term 'modernity' we reiterate the claim that there is a huge gulf - a structural discontinuity - 
which separates the way the world used to be from the way it is now.
What is this discontinuity? This is arguably the first question of all social science - that is, of all 
attempts to develop a systematic understanding of the contemporary social world. And it 
preoccupied nearly all the major thinkers of the 18th and 19th centuries now regarded as the 
forerunners and founders of modem social thought - from the Scottish Enlightenment to 
Hegel, from English Political Economy to the post-revolutionary French sociologists. Whether 
they gave their answer in terms of the change from a society based on status to one based on 
contract, or characterized by mechanical relations rather than organic ones, or the replacement 
of militant classes by industrial ones, or feudalism by capitalism - whatever the terms, nearly all 
these attempts to explore the character of the modem world begin by stressing how different it 
is from what went before.
Indeed, for many of them, it is this awareness of how great the change has been which makes 
social science, as distinct from political philosophy, possible at all. It does this by revealing
 ^Erich Heller, The Artist's Journey into the Interior, London 1966, p.3.
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how much of the world they had known was actually not part of a universal natural order of 
things, but was rather the daily outcome of historically specific social relations characterizing a 
particular kind of society. Augustine Thierry, writing in the aftermath of the French 
Revolution is very eloquent on this point:
There is not one amongst us children of the 19th century, who does not know 
more on the score of rebellion and conquests, of the dismemberment of 
empires, of the fall and restoration of monarchies, of popular revolution and the 
consequent reactions, than did Velly, Mably, or even Voltaire himself.
...the events of the last fifty years, events hitherto unheard of, have taught us to 
understand the revolutions of the Middle Ages, to perceive the spirit beneath 
the letter of the chronicler, to draw from the writings of the Benedictines that 
which those learned men never saw, or saw only partially, without suspecting 
its significance. They lacked the comprehension and sentiment of great social 
transformations. They have studied with curiosity the laws, public acts, judicial 
formulae, private contracts, etc.;... but the political sense, all that was living 
beneath the dead letter, the perception of society and its various elements... 
escapes them... This perception, we have acquired through our experience; we 
owe it to the prodigious changes of power and society, which have taken place 
before us.^
And of course, once this point is grasped with reference to the past, it cannot help but make 
one think about contemporary social forms which we take for granted - for example the 
market, the state, and indeed the individual - in terms of historically specific social relations 
characteristic of a particular kind of society.
Depending perhaps on one's politics, that is either a very strong argument for bringing history 
and sociology together, or a very strong argument for keeping them apart. But either way, it is 
a striking feature of these early theorists of modernity that they did not think in terms of the 
partitioning of the social world between academic disciplines which we take for granted today. 
Smith can no more be squeezed into neoclassical economics with its relentless externalizing of 
all 'non-economic' factors than Marx can be accommodated within orthodox sociology. The 
reason for this is that the way the disciplines divide up social reality itself involves taking as 
natural (and therefore missing) certain basic things about the modern world which to both 
Smith and Marx seemed novel and needful of explanation.
^ Cited in G. Therbom, Science, Class and Society, London 1976: 172-3
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The clearest example of this is the disciplinary separation of politics and economics. This 
formal separation is now a century old, dating from the birth of pure economics in the 
aftermath of the so-called Marginalist revolution of the 1870s. Realist International Relations 
(IR) is one of several academic disciplines which is founded upon it, constituting itself as the 
study of political relations between states. Over the years, many commentators (including, for 
example, E.H. Carrp have pointed out that this division of labour can be unhelpful in trying to 
understand the real world. After all, states routinely intervene to regulate and constrain 
markets, and markets produce effects that influence the behaviour of states. More recently, 
this has led to the emergence of a new field of International Political Economy which focuses 
precisely on the causal interaction of international politics and international economics. This is 
seen as an innovation which presses hard against the disciplinary boundaries of IR and 
economics.
Well, perhaps it does. And certainly the question 'What is the relationship between states and 
markets?' is an interesting and important one. But it still takes as its starting point the 
observation that the international system comprises distinct institutional realms of politics and 
economics. Perhaps this starting point seems self-evident. In fact an historical review would 
show that it is more or less unique to the modem world.^ And if these social forms really are 
new, then this points to a further question: exactly why does the modem international system 
assume the distinctive form that it does - namely, states and markets? And since this question 
cannot be answered in terms of the irreducible properties of states and markets, we are led to 
ask what is surely a more fundamental question: in what kind of society do distinct 
institutional spheres of politics and economics open out in this way and why? What is really 
going on when this occurs? Answering these questions, as I hope to show later on, might tell 
us things about modem forms of social power which we could never see so long as we took 
states and economies to be the basic components of social reality.
For now, however, the point is simply that in order to pose this deeper question at all, we need 
to step outside the existing disciplines and think as the earlier social theorists did in terms of 
the social world as a whole - as a social totality. We have to do this because it turns out that 
the disciplinary division of labour between the modem social sciences itself reflects uncritically 
and thereby naturalizes the distinctive social forms of modernity. States, markets, individuals - 
precisely the things we need to explain - are already assumed to be natural starting points. By 
conceptualizing particular structures of modem social relations in isolation from each other, 
this division of labour tends to reify them into self-sufficient actors with their own distinctive
^The Twenty Years' Crisis, London 1946, p. 116.
^However natural it may appear to us to make that assumption, it is unjustified: market economy is an institutional 
structure which, as we all too easily forget, has been present at no time except our own...' Karl Polanyi, The Great 
Transformation, Boston 1957, p.37.
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properties - hiding both the historical novelty of these forms and the specific social relations 
which constitute them. And it almost goes without saying that this also effects an ideological 
closure, a drawing in of the horizons of collective human possibility.
It is as if the modem social world arrived in Europe with a tremendous thundering and 
crashing which was unmistakeable (even if not necessarily comprehensible) to those living 
there at the time - and then proceeded to cover up its tracks.
And one could argue that the real task of social science is not to be complicit in this process, 
but rather the opposite: to denaturalize the world around us by showing how different it is 
from earlier societies; to dissolve the reified social forms of state and market back into the 
historically specific social relations between people which constitute them; and finally, to 
retrace our steps in order to rediscover the emergence and development of our modem social 
world as the history of these social relations between ’real, living individuals'. ^
Now, if we define this as the labour of the social sciences as a whole, is there any reason why 
IR should be distinct methodologically in the exploration of its own subject matter? For many 
writers working in the still-dominant Realist tradition, there most certainly is.
In their eyes, IR is premised on the recognition of a fundamental disjuncture between internal 
political life which is carried on under the co-ordinating and pacifying sovereignty of the state, 
and external politics which is governed by the irresistible logic of anarchy. Exploring this logic 
of anarchy is held to be the distinctive task of IR theory - a task which must be kept more or 
less rigidly separate from the study of domestic politics which is governed by fundamentally 
different principles. And attempts to explain international outcomes by reference to 
characteristics of the societies involved are (often rightly) seen as a crude reductionism which 
is blind to the operation of external factors. For these reasons, it has become almost axiomatic 
that whatever may be required in any empirical reconstruction, it is no part of IR theory to
^The German Ideology, New York 1947, p. 15. This vocation should not be confused with the practical transcending of 
these social relations, which are sustained by material relations of power. However much one may wish to affirm the 
emancipatory potential of human self-understanding, it clearly does not follow that structures of power can be dissolved 
simply through a cognitive reappropriation of alienated social forms. This fallacy is something of an occupational hazard 
for political intellectuals, but seems most seriously to afflict sociologists of a phenomenological disposition and Hegelian 
Marxists. The latter case - which perhaps includes the epistemological obsessions of some contemporary 'critical theory1 - 
is especially puzzling given the merciless satire deployed against the 'innocent and child-like fancies' of the 'critical critics' 
in the opening pages of The German Ideology. Marx caricatures the Young Hegelians as follows: The phantoms of [men's] 
brains have gained the mastery over them... Let us revolt against the rule of thoughts. Let us teach men, says one, to 
exchange these imaginations for thoughts which correspond to the essence of man; says the second, to take up a critical 
attitude to them; says the third, to knock them out of their heads; and -existing reality will collapse.' [The German 
Ideology, R. Pascal, ed., New York 1947, p.l.] For Marx, 'commodity fetishism' is the perceptual component of a real 
process of alienation of human agency arising out of a specific configuration of social relations. Consciousness can 
apprehend this; it cannot, by itself, undo it. As Sayer puts it: 'Reification is a social process, not a mere category error1. 
[Capitalism and Modernity, London 1991, p.65]
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trace the connections between geopolitical systems and 'internal' social structures. As Kenneth 
Waltz has put it:
Students of international politics will do well to concentrate on separate 
theories of internal and external politics until someone figures out a way to 
unite them.^
The problem with this is that once the theory of external politics is cut adrift in this way, it 
becomes literally impossible to avoid the reification of social forms discussed above, because 
the social relations which compose them have been excluded from view under the heading of 
'internal politics'. By definition, a separate theory of external politics must take states as its 
starting point.
The damage might be partially reversible if one were able to compare different geopolitical 
systems in history and see just how different they really were. For example, it is difficult to 
imagine how anyone would explain the role of dynastic diplomacy in feudal geopolitics - or its 
absence in the modem world - without reference to the internal character of the societies 
involved. But this review is blocked off by a remarkable neglect of historical contrast, which 
renders invisible the very modernity we ought to be trying to explain. Waltz is perhaps more 
extreme than most. He says:
The enduring character of international politics accounts for the striking 
sameness in the quality of international life through the millennia, a statement 
that will meet with wide assent7
It is not unusual to see the Italian and Greek city states-systems cited as examples of the 
timelessness of the balance of power.
As a result, critics often observe that Realist IR ends up by reifying modem geopolitics, 
neglecting historical contrast, and producing a model of the states-system which is literally 
incapable of seeing historical change except as the rise and fall of great powers.
^Keohane [ed], Neorealism and its Critics, 1986, p.340.
7Keohane [ed], Neorealism and its Critics, 1986, p.53. Robert Gilpin asserted that the nature of international relations has 
not changed fundamentally over the millennia'. [War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge 1981, p.211] And Martin 
Wight held this to be the answer to the question Why is there no international theory?: 'If Sir Thomas More or Henry IV... 
were to [contemplate]... the international scene [of 1960] it is more likely that they would be struck by resemblances to 
what they remembered... The stage would have become much wider, the actors fewer, their weapons more alarming, but 
the play would be the same old melodrama. International politics is the realm of recurrence and repitition; it is the field in 
which political action is most regularly necessitous.' [Diplomatic Investigations, p.26]
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The aim of this thesis is to contribute to the reorientation of IR as a discipline in line with the 
common vocation of the social sciences as set out on page 7 above. That is, it seeks (a) to 
identify the ways in which the modem international system is different from all other 
geopolitical systems in history, (b) to integrate this contrast into a broader understanding of 
the dominant social structures of the modem world, and (c) to indicate how such a perspective 
might change the way we seek to recover the history of the international system, past and 
continuing. Each of these purposes requires a critical engagement with the Realist orthodoxy 
at a slightly different point; but if there is a unifying theme to all three, it is the simple claim 
that geopolitical systems are not constituted independently of, and cannot be understood in 
isolation from the wider structures of the production and reproduction of social life.
The argument of the thesis is divided into three principal parts, each comprising two chapters. 
The first part mounts a theoretical critique of the dominant theory in the academic study of 
international relations, namely Realism. Chapter One uses three of the most influential texts 
of the school in order to focus successively on its descriptive, prescriptive and social 
theoretical articulations. Key weaknesses are identified in the unhistorical and 'presociologicaT 
character of Realist theory, and two categories in particular - sovereignty and anarchy - are 
marked out for future redefinition. Chapter Two develops these points further: beginning 
with an example of how Realist theory constricts any attempt to think historically about the 
international system, it argues that the unhistorical problematic of anarchy needs to be 
displaced by an alternative, sociological problematic of modernity. To this end, it reviews 
some key issues in contemporary social theory, outlines a broad historical materialist 
framework for analysis, and then challenges the Realist axiom that the geopolitical core of the 
discipline’s subject matter is ontologically distinct from the wider structures of social 
reproduction.
In line with this, the second part of the argument comprises a series of historical explorations 
of the ways in which social structures have been implicated in geopolitical systems. Chapter 
Three takes up the notion of the autonomy of the state, a notion central to the realist assertion 
of a separate geopolitical realm. By contrasting the modem capitalist states-system with those 
of Renaissance Italy and Classical Greece, it attempts to show that the surface similarities 
between them cannot be understood without seeing how in each case the form of the state is 
specific to a particular kind of society. This is an interrelation which also has important 
consequences for both the character of inter-state power and the developmental trajectory of 
the geopolitical system as a whole. The conventional use of these examples to argue for 
transhistorical continuities between states-systems sui generis is directly challenged. In 
Chapter Four, the argument turns to some premodem equivalents of the contemporary world 
market - namely the structures of exchange-relations and forms of imperial expansion which
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characterized the Portuguese and Spanish empires of the Absolutist period. Here it is 
demonstrated (in the Portuguese case) that the precapitalist character of the metropolitan 
society underpinned a set of exchange-relations sharply contrasting with those of the modem 
world economy, while (in the Spanish case) both the dynamics of expansion and the forms of 
colonization bore the stamp of the originating social structures.
The third part of the argument returns finally to the contemporary epoch, and seeks to develop 
Marx’s social theory of capitalist society into an alternative, non-Realist framework for 
understanding the modem international system. In particular, the two core categories of the 
discipline earlier marked out for redefinition - sovereignty and anarchy - are now re-examined 
in the light of the foregoing historical and theoretical studies. In Realist hands these categories 
had sealed the separation of the discipline from the broader social sciences; here they are 
reworked with the opposite intention - that is, to illuminate the ways in which the modem 
international system is unmistakably of a piece with the capitalist social structures which 
compose its leading constituent national societies. Chapter Five redefines the concept of 
'sovereignty' in the light of Marx's discussion of the abstraction of the state in capitalist 
society, and then goes on to suggest that Marx also provides an unremarked theory of 
'anarchy' as the characteristic social form of capitalist modernity. Finally, Chapter Six 
develops Marx's category of'so-called primitive accumulation' to indicate an agenda of further 
historical research. This agenda points to a radically different historical narrative of the 
emergence and development of the international system to that assumed in the orthodox 
discipline.
*  *  *
Such strengths as the conception sketched above may possess owe a huge amount to the 
criticism, stimulation and advice of others. In particular, two individuals have been involved 
with this project from the outset, and deserve a special mention here. It was the example of 
Fred Halliday which first enticed me into the discipline of International Relations. That 
example, and the warm encouragement given to this project, have been an inspiration ever 
since. Meanwhile, Simon Bromley has, at every stage, given unstintingly of his time, patience 
and formidable intellectual powers. I have drawn shamelessly on all of these, and happily 
acknowledge the debt. Had it not been for his support, the outcome would have been a very 
different, and a much poorer thesis. In addition, I am grateful to Margot Light, who stepped in 
without warning to assist in the final stages of its preparation. Her many editorial suggestions 
gave the final version a readability it would not otherwise have had. Such weaknesses and 
ommissions as remain are my own.
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I The Trouble with Realism
1.1 Introduction
International Relations (IR), as an academic discipline, is not known for its strength in the 
area of theory. It has no immediate equivalent to the rich contrasts of perspective generated 
in Sociology by the legacy of Max Weber, Marx and Durkheim. So much so, that Martin 
Wight once wrote a paper called Why is there no International Theory?’* His own answer 
was, in part, that there is nothing further to theorise after the discovery of the repetitive 
mechanisms of the balance of power. This was a sad conclusion for such an acute and 
creative mind to reach. But it does illustrate a central feature of IR theory. For the balance of 
power, it can be argued, is the limit of any Realist theory of international relations. And 
Wight's conclusion was perhaps more an index of the dominance of IR by a Realist 
orthodoxy, than a reflection of the inherent properties o f’the international’ as an object of 
study.
What then does it mean to speak of a Realist school of ER theory? In the postwar period the 
term Realism has come to indicate a series of propositions underlying a distinctive approach 
to the study of international politics. These may be abbreviated as follows:
1. International politics is to be understood predominantly as the realm of 
interaction between sovereign authorities - a realm which is separate 
from that of domestic politics.
2. The distinctive character of this realm is given by the condition of 
'anarchy' - meaning that a competitive pursuit of determinate 'national 
interests' takes place in the absence of regulation by a superordinate 
authority.
3. The result is a set of compulsions generic to relations between states 
which works, through the fulcral institution of the *balance of power', 
to determine how states behave internationally. To understand the 
balance of power is therefore also to explain international politics.
This chapter explores the adequacy of these premises as a starting point for understanding 
international relations. The exploration is divided into three sections, in which works by E. H. 
Carr, Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz are discussed as examples of (respectively) 
descriptive, axiomatic and theoretical articulations of Realism.2 It is argued that as
1 Martin Wight, Why is There No International Theory?, in Diplomatic Investigations, Butterfield & Wight eds., London 
1966.
2Each of these texts enjoys the status of a classic within the discipline. Carr’s The Twenty Years' Crisis, first published on
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description, Realism leaves too much out; as a set of prescriptive axioms it lets too much in; 
and as social theory - well, that it is not a social theoiy at all: rather it is an operator's manual 
posing as one. This technical assessment is followed by an ideological characterisation of 
Realism, and some preliminary suggestions as to how an abandonment of its core categories 
might alter the scope of IR theory.
1.2 Descriptive Realism: E H Carr and the State's-Eye-View
The formulation of Realism given above points immediately to a curious and suggestive 
paradox. Anyone seeking to reconstruct Realism as a school might reasonably expect, on 
turning to its classic texts, to find these tenets argued for and grounded in a broader 
conception of political science - or at least stated in prepositional form. Yet such is not the 
case. Indeed, if we begin by turning to Carr, we discover not only a total absence of any 
defence of'state-centrism', but also a discussion of realism^ in which the latter is not even 
implicit.
In the first half of The Twenty Years' Crisis Carr develops the idea of realism as an 
intellectual tool especially suited to unmasking the ideological determination of political 
thought, a purpose to which he sets it in his impressive critique of the hopes of'peace 
through law'. Time and again he demonstrates how liberal cosmopolitan values and the 
assertion of a fundamental harmony of interests are successively the luxury, rationale and 
fatal delusion of material and political preponderance. The utility of realism for this critique is 
evidenced in its leading assumptions, as derived by Carr from Machiavelli. [63-4]4 First, it 
conceives the historical process as a sequence of rationally discoverable cause and effect. 
Second, it holds that thought is not a faculty independent of the pragmatic needs of action: 
theory arises out of practice and can be analysed as a function of the latter. Third, inasmuch 
as ethics depends upon the expectation of reciprocity between actors, a reciprocity secured 
only by the presence of coercive authority, morality is a function of power and should be 
judged in that light.
the eve of the Second World War, remains the most celebrated and powerful indictment of the 'peace through law1 school 
of thought (also known to its Realist critics as Idealist' and 'utopian') which had pinned its hopes on the League of 
Nations and vainly imagined that the role of war in relations between states could be superseded by international law and 
arbitration. Hans Morgenthau's Politics Among Nations (1948) was the work of a German emigree to the US who sought 
to counter the depreciation of political power1 and the excessive idealism of US foreign policy which, in his view, 
threatened to interfere with a responsible pursuit of the national interest. This work, in its many editions, remained the 
the leading textbook on IR in US colleges for several decades. Finally, Kenneth Waltz's Man, the State and War (1959) is 
perhaps the best-known attempt to distill the essence of Realist thought (anarchy/the balance of power) and to 
reconstitute it in the idiom of a deductive proof. For a fine historical survey of the Realist school, see M. Smith, Realist 
Thought from Weber to Kissinger, Louisiana UP 1986.
^In what follows I shall use 'realism' to indicate the critical mode of thought discussed by Carr, and 'Realism' to indicate 
the specific assumptions listed above.
^In this section, numbers in square brackets indicate page references to The Twenty Years'Crisis.
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There is no visible commitment to a state-centric analysis here. Indeed, having added the later 
assertion of an immanent historical dynamic of progress as a fourth ingredient, Carr happily 
describes Marx as a modern realist.5 [65] And in his own dissection of utopian ideology he 
assimilates illustrations relating to international rivalry and others derived from the domestic 
conflict of capital and labour under a single rubric:
Just as the ruling class in a community prays for domestic peace, which 
guarantees its own security and predominance, and denounces class-war, 
which might threaten them, so international peace becomes a special vested 
interest of predominant Powers. [82]^
At this critical distance from the concerns of policy-making there is no overwhelming sense 
that, for example, power is constituted solely in the agency of the state.
How then is Carr a Realist in our sense? Here the curiosity deepens; for by the time (in the 
second half of the book) he comes to construct his own understanding of international 
politics, the full panoply of Realist assumptions has arrived unannounced.
Most immediately it is a question of perspective. Carr shared the urgent policy-orientation of 
the 'Idealists' he was criticising: if their utopianism was an involuntary recoil from 1914, his 
own realist corrective was equally an injunction to learn the lessons of the 1930s. This is not 
surprising since he was himself an ex-diplomat.7 But as a result, Carr's is from the outset a 
discourse of raison d ’etat: as prescription, it is committed to a view of the state as subject; 
consequently as explanation its energies are directed to the illumination of international 
history as the half-mastered practice and partly staggered outcomes of state policy. Thus 
theoretically, the agency of the state remains an irreducible category - not in the complexity 
of the challenges which it faces (Carr does not claim to offer easy policy answers), but very 
much with respect to the interweaving of international and transnational processes within 
which it is constituted: in short, the 'science of international politics' poses questions not o f 
the state but implicitly on its behalf. And this is of course a signature of Realism. Its deepest 
assumptions are grounded in the ideological needs of the social practice - namely diplomacy - 
whose norms it articulates.
Conceptions of progress in international relations are generally assigned to 'idealist' theory.
^ At the same time, however, he maintains a tacit separation of domestic political and international phenomena: for 
example, fascism (whatever additional analysis he may provide elsewhere) is here understood as an illustration of the 
behaviour of an unsatisfied power.
^The Twenty Years' Crisis was conceived in the months following Can's resignation from a diplomatic career at the 
Foreign Office in 1936.
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Returning to The Twenty Years' Crisis, throughout the book, power forms the polemical 
antithesis to morality as a principle of order and change. It arises out of'the dual character of 
political society' [96] where the need for coercion to bolster consensus makes it both a 
necessary feature of the state and the permanent resource of ruling interest-groups. At the 
international level it governs the relations between nation-states, being simultaneously the 
instrument and the ineluctable determinant of state strategies. And although it comprises 
diverse military, economic and ideological components, it is expressed and measured in 
generic (fungible) form as the (nationally constituted) capability of a state to influence 
international outcomes.**
Probably the first of these unannounced assumptions then, is that political agency in the 
international system is concentrated almost exclusively in the state. (Historical agency is 
almost always reducible in Realist writings to policy.) It therefore seems natural when he 
comes to define social power, that Carr discusses it quite narrowly as the instrument or 
constraint of state policy. And although he allows that state power comprises diverse 
ideological, economic and military components, he insists that it is measured and expressed in 
generic form as the nationally-constituted capability of a state to influence international 
outcomes.
Now, we do not have to jump very far ahead to see the theoretical implication of this 
conception of power. If military, economic and ideological factors are seen as tributaries of a 
generic power (wielded by the state) which casts the pattern of international relations, if they 
attain significant international reach only through being mobilised as instruments of state 
policy, then the structure of relations between nation-states is not merely a specific moment 
of the international order: it actually defines the dynamics of that order. And the business of 
understanding world politics indeed resolves itself into the familiar Realist task of describing 
the balance of power.
Well, we do need to understand economic, social, military and political power structures as 
parts of a global whole: arguably, that is the distinctive task of IR theory. But can it really be 
done simply by collapsing them all into a model of politico-military competition between 
states? Can we give an adequate account of what international politics is about in these 
terms? This is what Carr attempts, and we should look at some examples of why this is 
unsatisfying.
For reasons which are evident, (and which would have been especially pressing in 1939), 'the
^See Carr 1939, p. 108: 'power...is organised nationally... In its essence, power is an indivisible whole. "The laws of 
social dynamics", a recent critic has said, "are laws which can only be stated in terms of power, not in terms of this or 
that form of power."'
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military instrument' appears to offer least resistance in this respect. If international politics is 
understood as the struggle for power between states and self-help is ultimately the only 
effective regulation of that struggle, then military power poses the quality of international 
competition most starkly, is directly controlled by states and most nearly conforms to the 
realist account of power. Thus it is here that Carr illustrates best the autonomy and specificity 
of the zero-sum mechanisms of international power politics: the prisoners' dilemma 
underlying 'the appetite for more p o w e r ' 9 ,  and the fragile complexity of the balance of 
power.
However, the attempt to treat economic power along the same lines rapidly comes up against 
serious problems. Carr begins by observing correctly that financial resources are a 
prerequisite of military power and that for this reason (among others) states conceive a 
strong interest in promoting economic growth. Building on this, and noting the historical 
expansion of government intervention in national economies, he proposes 'a general return to 
the term "political economy"'. [116]
Now the utility of this phrase for thinking about international relations is that it suggests two 
vital perspectives simultaneously: an economics of political competition (exploring the role of 
the state in ordering, directing and taxing economic activity within its borders as a means of 
extending its power beyond) and a politics of the world economy (suggesting a set of shifting 
global economic relationships which traverse political boundaries and shape, via the 
international processes of uneven development, the forms and scope of political action). 
Evidently, we need both of these. Similarly, when Carr adds that 'the science of economics 
presupposes a given political order...' [117] this does not only signal the existence in every 
empirical instance of a ruling political elite which mobilises economic resources; it also raises 
the theoretical question of the institutional relation of the state and state system to the 
national and international economy.
Unfortunately, because he is considering 'economic weapons... for use in the interests of 
national policy', [115] Carr's account is in both cases skewed heavily towards the former 
sense, with mercantilism presented as something like an ideal-type of economic policy. This is 
a problem with a Realist description, which can perceive that the modem state seeks to 
mobilise the economy, but not that the economy is also part of a transnational whole which 
produces important political effects independently of the agency of the state. Two examples
^’[T]he exercise of power always appears to beget the appetite for more power. There is, as Dr Niebuhr says, "no 
possibility of drawing a sharp line between the will-to-live and the will-to-power"'. p. 112.
^T n  1914, Austria sent an ultimatum to Servia [s/c] because she believed that Servians were planning the downfall of 
the Dual Monarchy, Russia feared that Austria-Hungary, if she defeated Servia, would be strong enough to menace her, 
Germany feared...etc.' p. 111.
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may clarify this point.
Carr argues that the 19th Century doctrine of Free Trade posited a specious 'separation of 
economics from politics' which was not only belied by the reality of Imperialism, but was later 
rudely shattered by unprecedented state control of the economy during the Great War: 'We 
have now returned therefore, after the important, but abnormal laissez-faire interlude of the 
19th Century, to the position where economics can be frankly recognised as a part of 
politics'. [116] Within a pure Realist perspective we do seem to have come full circle, nothing 
fundamental having altered since the closing years of European Absolutism: states still 
compete for power in the international arena, mustering such economic and military resources 
as they can press into the service of policy (conceived generically as 'power maximising'). In 
this, surely, Carr the ex-diplomat, who gauges the authenticity of political insight by its 
reconstruction of the dilemmas 'which are always present to the minds of those who have to 
solve problems of foreign policy in real life', [111] has got the better of Carr the historian.
And we have a glimpse too of how Realism, though heir to a huge fund of historical (or more 
accurately, diplomatic) anecdote, is curiously insensitive to the processes of historical change.
For the implied image of the circle really does miss the wood for the trees. To picture the 
historical continuity of the Nineteenth Century we need at least to envision a spiral motion 
which incorporates the expansion of industrial capitalism as an international system as well as 
the related consolidation of the nation-state. If we ignore this transformation then 'the 
separation of economics from politics' will inevitably appear as simply the ideology of the 
status quo, and Free Trade as 'the mercantilism of the strongest'. Posed in a more familiar 
form, however, the separation of the political and the economic indicates precisely the central 
institutional linkage between the capitalist economy and the nation-state: that is, the legal 
structure of property rights which removes market relationships from direct political control 
or contestation and allows the flow of investment capital across national boundaries.11 Carr is 
right to point to the state's use of economic resources for foreign policy purposes; but the 
economy is not, as military power is assumed to be, entirely a nationally constituted 
instrument ready at the disposal of the state.
The second example illustrates what is lost by regarding it in this way: Carr treats the export 
of capital solely as an instrument of state policy. No doubt there are many politicians on both 
sides of the Atlantic (and the Pacific) today who fervently wish that international capital flows 
could indeed be under the control of governments. However, private capital follows the
TnitAute o t
highest returns; and when a currency appreciates-due-the international competitiveness of the
11 In fact, Carr was perfectly aware of these themes and their significance. See, lor example, his penetrating discussion of 
the linkage between the 19th world market and the possibility of a world of nation-states, in Nationalism and After, p.6- 
17. Our concern here, however, is with The Twenty Years' Crisis because of its status as a Realist classic.
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domestic economy, capital flows out in pursuit of the resultant cheap investment 
opportunities. Governments may seek to help or hinder this process, but the underlying 
mechanism is a fact about capitalism, not about states. And thus to construe the export of 
capital simply as an instrument of state policy is to place the international operation of the 
world economy and its complex interaction with the political order of nation-states outside 
the purview of his analysis.
A similar constriction arises from considering ideological aspects of international politics in 
terms of what Carr calls 'power over opinion'. Here the target of Carr's polemic is the liberal 
anticipation that international public opinion could become both judge and sanction in 
disputes between states. He is therefore concerned to show that universalist ideologies 
achieve effective power only when taken up by an interested national state, that public 
opinion is increasingly the tool of modem states, and that therefore 'international public 
opinion' may signal a temporary convergence of several national interests but cannot 
constitute itself as an autonomous agent in international affairs. All this is well-argued and 
well taken. But this hardly closes the issue: for even the Free Trade credo which Carr dubs 
the ideology of the economically strong state hardly emerged as the contrived instrument of 
foreign policy. On the contrary, it evolved as the centrepiece of the domestic political and 
international economic aspirations of a self-conscious c la ss^  project. And its adoption by 
the state signalled both the victory of those interests and, yes, the ascendancy of British 
economic power: but who is the agent now?
Also, if international relations are about states and public opinion is something states 
manipulate to fortify their power, what are we to say about social revolutions and their 
prominence in international conflict? The point of this is not to construct an autonomy of 
'public opinion' or deny the routine manipulation of nationalist currents by the state. It is 
simply to indicate how much remains unsaid about social ideology (even nationalism) as a 
dimension of international politics if it is conceived in purely instrumental terms.
So Realism has serious defects when offered as an description of the dynamics of the 
international system. But its primary mode, as already suggested, is axiomatic: that is it 
presents itself as a guide to policy-makers. How does it fare in this?
term which Cobden had no scruples in using to describe his involvement in the Free Trade movement: 'most of us 
entered upon this struggle with the belief that we had some distinct class interest in the question'. Paul Adelman, 
Victorian Radicalism, London 1984, p.3.
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1.3 Axiomatic Realism: Morgenthau's Laws of Politics
It was suggested above that if we turn to The Twenty Years' Crisis for an exposition of the 
tenets of Realism we find instead a realist critique of utopianism followed by a proto-Realist 
account of world politics. Our search for theoretical origins ends at the point where Carr 
(instinctively, it seems) collapses his discussion into the two-dimensional frame of the state's- 
eye-view. And his guiding assumptions then become visible only in the light of subsequent 
criticism. This seems to illustrate a general feature of Realism which becomes increasingly 
apparent as we review later attempts first to expound and then to theorise the precepts of 
raison d'etat.
The observation that the deepest premises of Realism are grounded in the ideological needs 
of the social practice - diplomacy - which it articulates does not imply a uniform development 
of the school. On the contrary, it underlines the importance of considering the particular 
national contexts in which it has flourished. Thus, the British heirs of Carr developed his 
legacy in a quite different direction to that taken by Realism in the United States, (though 
both retained as central the state's-eye-view which defines the 'primacy of the international'). 
In Britain, Martin Wight elaborated a varied historical taxonomy of the behaviour of states; 
Hedley Bull weighed the possibilities of reforming the anarchy of the system of sovereign 
powers in his legal-political exploration of its formal and informal institutions. And others, 
such as F H Hinsley, earlier traced the historical evolution of those institutions as an 
expression of the European Balance of Power.13 It is often remarked^ that this 'English 
school' is characterised by an emphasis on the possibility of'international society'. But another 
significant contrast with American Realism is the absence of a comparable sense of the 
pressure to build theories which make it possible to pronounce and predict on issues of 
contemporary foreign policy. Clearly this feature of the American Realism after the Second 
World War needs to be understood in terms of the particular conditions of the time.
There is a well-known article by Stanley Hoffman which seeks to provide a sociological 
diagnosis of the intellectual symptoms of postwar US Realist thought. ^  Hoffman considers
13The so-called English School of IR comprised that group of scholars associated with the British Committee 
on the Theoiy of International Politics which was set up in 1958 with financial support from the Rockerfeller 
Foundation. Over the twenty or so years which followed, the changing membership of the group elaborated, 
albeit erratically, a distinctive problematic centred on the question of order and legitimacy in a culturally 
diversified states-system - a concern perhaps not wholly unrelated to the retreat from empire which formed its 
historical context. The principle works included Diplomatic Investigations [essays edited by Herbert 
Butterfield and Martin Wight, 1966], Power Politics and Systems o f  States [by Martin Wight - both published 
posthumously] and The Anarchical Society [by Hedley Bull, 1977].
'^See for example, Christopher Hill, The Study of International Relations in the United Kingdom', in Millenium,
Summer 1987.
1 ^ Stanley Hoffman, 'An American Social Science: International Relations', Daedalus, Summer 1977.
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(among other things) the sources of financial support for IR research, its close institutional 
connections with foreign policy-making during the global expansion of US power, and the 
prevailing positivist orthodoxy in the wider social sciences. And he argues that it was these 
which directed the American study of IR towards the search for general theories of world 
politics whose ’usefulness' would be measured by their ability to guide and predict policy.
And this perhaps explains why Hans Morgenthau's Politics Among Nations, to a much 
greater extent than The Twenty Years' Crisis, is frankly a diplomats' manual of statecraft, 
which seeks in one extended argument to move from the assertion of laws of human nature to 
the elaboration of the Nine Rules of Diplomacy.
It is important to be clear how and why Morgenthau's attempt to derive axioms of political 
conduct from the premises of Realism is ensnared from the start in circular arguments.16 For 
the truth is, Realism can legitimate just about any course of action.
Morgenthau's repeated insistence on 'human nature as it actually is' forms more than a 
polemical allusion to the irresponsibility of Idealist thought. For it is central to his account of 
the possibility of a 'science of international politics' that the empirically observable 
continuities of history point to objective causal laws of a universal and timeless kind. 
'[Pjolitics... is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature'. [4 ]^  
Enquiry into this nature reveals 'those elemental bio-psychological drives by which in turn 
society is created. The drives to live, to propagate, and to dominate are common to all men'. 
[39] And because the constitutive relation between human nature and the social world is one­
way only, ('social forces are the product of human nature in action' [20]), certain basic laws 
of political behaviour will persist throughout history.
It is on the existence of such laws that Morgenthau bases his claim for Realist theory as 
scientific - and, relatedly, as both predictive and a sound guide to policy. What does he mean 
by a scientific theory? '[T]he natural aim of all scientific undertakings is to discover the forces 
underlying social phenomena and the mode of their operation'. [18] In order to achieve this 
discovery, he advocates a broad positivist methodology: a rational hypothesis is constructed, 
positing a determinate causal relation between the social phenomena isolated; this is used to 
generate predictions which can then be tested against empirical evidence - and which, if
^  It might be argued (as indeed it was, by ’modernists’ such as Kaplan) that Morgenthau's positivism is erratic and 
inconsistent, and that therefore it is not a fair instance for evaluation. I would suggest that precisely because he was a 
traditionalist', the broad positivist conception of theory which Morgenthau is driven to adopt by his search for 'scientific' 
statements and prediction tells us more about the compulsions of American Realism than do the models of those to whom 
it apparently came naturally to compare the international system to the human brain. (According to Kaplan, the classic 
statement of systems theory is to be found in the work of W. Ross Ashby on the human brain. See Dougherty & 
Pfaltzgraff, p. 156.)
^ In  this section, numbers in square brackets indicate page references to Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations,
New York 1985 (Sixth edition).
19
successful, may be held to validate the original hypothesis. That is to say, the theory holds if 
it is 'consistent with the facts and within itself [3], Morgenthau does not go so far explicitly 
as R. N. Rosecrance, for whom 'history is a laboratory in which our generalisations about 
international politics can be tested';^ but the same assumptions are entailed.
The well-known core of Morgenthau's theory is that states are by nature 'power maximisers'. 
They exist in a discrete world of'the political', the latter being defined by its concern with 
power. In turn, power denotes 'anything that establishes and maintains the control of man 
over man'. [11] Because each state conceives its interests in terms of the indefinite 
enhancement of this control, each is potentially predator or prey to any other. Moreover, the 
fact that, in the nature of this competition, states must ultimately look to self-help for their 
survival means that the contrivance of a favourable military position is the foremost concern 
of every state. Any group of states which persists as a plurality of sovereignties does so by 
virtue of what he calls 'a general social principle to which all societies composed of a number 
of autonomous units owe the autonomy of their component parts' [187] - namely, the 
Balance of Power. By this shifting equilibrium of multiple alliances, the independence of the 
units is preserved against the excessive accumulation of power at any one pole of the system.
Given this, sound policy can proceed only from a recognition of the power struggle at the 
heart of international life, and consists in using it to balance interests and alliances in the 
achievement of given ends. Too much power will call forth opponents in equal proportion; 
too little will make it impossible to uphold national interests - and may even invite aggression. 
Moral fastidiousness and moral fervour are equally inappropriate and dangerous to the 
rational calculation of interests and balances. Similarly, the study of politics must be grounded 
in the same recognition, its leading categories suitable for the isolation and description of the 
dynamics of the power struggle. This is the claim made for the central assertion of Politics 
Among Nations: 'We assume that statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as 
power, and the evidence of history bears that assumption out'. [5]
What does this tell us? We should turn again to the vexed issue of power. Viewed as a 
means, power takes myriad forms, depending on the type of political order, the nature of the 
ends to which it is directed and the particular social forces mobilised. Similarly, as a routinely 
exercised property of formalised relations of domination between individuals and 
collectivities, 'power' points our attention again to key social institutions specific to 
particular historical societies - obligations of fealty, the capitalist wage-labour contract, the 
sovereign authority of the state and so on. In each case the meaning of the term power, 
beyond broad generalisations about control, is given by the context and the ends involved.
l^Cited in Approaches and Theory in International Relations, ed. Taylor, p. 125.
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But the offer of historical explanation based on power considered as an end in itself is 
altogether more difficult to make sense of. If, on a weak reading, it is taken to mean that all 
political agents must seek power (as a short-term end) in order to achieve their goals, then it 
is of little explanatory value for it must cover anything and everything. Morgenthau, however, 
also intends a stronger reading. For he argues (and this is of course necessary to the positivist 
goal of prediction) that the behaviour of states and the outcome of relations between them 
can be understood sui generis in terms of the fixed dynamics of power grouped around the 
compulsions originating in the Balance.
Now, there are aspects of political and other forms of competition which are given by the 
number of competitors, the stakes, the means available and the degree of regulation involved. 
And states do perforce routinely pursue strategies in the international arena which must take 
into account the interests and behaviour of other states. It will therefore always be possible to 
point to interstate conflicts in history and describe this strategic dimension in terms of a 
Tjalance of power*. But the autonomy of the political is, like all autonomy in the social world, 
a relative autonomy. And while it is both possible and important to distinguish analytically the 
irreducible aspects of state autonomy, this does not yield a model capable of prediction: for 
every empirical instance of its operation is heavily overdetermined by other factors.
In order, then, to pose the mechanism of the balance of power as the core of explanation of 
international politics at least two further assumptions must be made. First, it must be assumed 
that the international scene is defined exclusively as a plurality of states conceived as unitary 
agents, each adjusting its power drive to the opportunities and dangers of the external 
environment. A consequence of this is that domestic political issues and the domestic 
configuration of power do not (or should not) shape foreign policy. If we seek to peer 'inside' 
the state we find not the complex of a society presided over by a political institution which 
faces both ways; instead we are returned to the image of the statesman, his gaze turned 
steadily outwards, calculating the external advantage of the ship o f state, chafing at the 
querulous interference of'public opinion' which threatens to distract from rational judgement. 
Only by sealing off the internal from the external in this way can the 'primacy of the 
international' (which simplifies the task of prediction by reducing the number of variables) be 
secured. Of course, most of the resources which the statesman brings to the negotiating table 
derive internally - but they are held to affect only the strength of his hand, not the rules of the 
game. Morgenthau does not offer to explain the processes by which powers attain and lose 
greatness, only how they will behave once they have arrived and (in the blunt imputation of a 
universal drive to dominate) what fuels the overall competition.
Secondly, the balance of power is of course a military balance. Its prominence is given by the
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self-help character of international anarchy . To define international politics in terms of the 
balance of power therefore involves posing a hierarchy of issues facing states internationally 
of which only those connected or potentially connected with the use of force qualify as 
(power) political. Hence the statement: 'a nation is not normally engaged in international 
politics when it concludes an extradition treaty with another nation, when it exchanges goods 
and services with other nations...’ [32]
By this stage however, the argument has become irretrievably circular: if power in a state 
system is ultimately military power, and the statesman is "doing politics" only when attending 
to security-related issues, then the hypothesis that 'the statesman thinks and acts in terms of 
interest defined as power' becomes unfalsifiable.
Once the scope of political facts has been circumscribed in this way, the prediction that 
international politics is about 'interest defined as power* traces a great circle through history 
from Thucydides through Machiavelli to Kissinger and back again, skimming the tops of 
successive strategic climaxes and recovering the moral. For example: Charles V, Napoleon, 
Wilhelm II and Hitler all sought to dominate Europe and met the same fate. Moral: imperial 
ambitions in a state system generate overwhelming opposing coalitions. Another example: 
from the early 16th Century to the mid 20th Century, Britain repeatedly changed sides in the 
Franco-Germanic rivalry for control of the Continent. Moral: apparent fickleness in a nation's 
foreign policy may mask an underlying continuity given by its identity as 'holder of the 
balance'. Diplomatic relations in Europe since 1945 have remained in a fixed pattern given by 
the overarching Soviet-American confrontation:19 the conditions of a multipolar and a bipolar 
system differ in the scope of diplomatic mobility possible. Morgenthau gives a whole list of 
these examples; and they are held to illustrate the operation of the balance of power - but 
what has been explained about international politics?
The Realist perspective highlights the similarities between Charles V, Napoleon, Wilhelm II 
and Hitler by superimposing on widely contrasting historical periods the logic of military 
competition in a state system. But in doing so it prejudges the form taken by political power, 
reducing it to its military climax, and thereby suppresses the differences. This is perfectly 
acceptable as a very general proposition about unregulated competition. But announcing it as 
a political explanation makes it reductionist. Further, because these events are explained by 
unchanging 'objective laws that have their roots in human nature'[4], the essence of 
international politics is unhistorical: there is only the unending accumulation of empirical 
instances reproducing the same range of scenarios with different participants. Yet while the 
Realist is busy watching the statesmen playing the hands dealt them by the balance of power,
19Morgenthau did not live to see the collapse of this order at the end of the 1980s.
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those same international struggles are mediating a wholesale transformation of the form and 
conditions of social power in the world. Of course there will always be a military dimension; 
but one has only to consider the last hundred years and the relationship between imperial 
rivalries, the globalising of a transnational capitalist economy and the emergence of a world 
nation-state system: it ought to be obvious that something more has been afoot 
internationally than can be captured in the maxims of Thucydides.
Thus what is perhaps the most widely debated and animating question in the broader social 
sciences, namely how we are to characterise the enormous and continuing historical 
transformations grouped, for want of any agreed explanation, under the heading of 
'modernity', finds no echo at all in Morgenthau's Realism. (A local and isolated exception to 
this is his recognition that the invention of nuclear weapons has complicated the use of force 
in the postwar world - but this remains an empirical observation.) As Thompson puts it: 'The 
price one has to pay for identifying the 'timeless features' of the political landscape is the 
sacrifice of understanding the processes of change in world a f f a i r s ' .
This is not just an unfortunate omission. It is a fundamental failure to grasp what an adequate 
social explanation would consist in. And the cause of this deficiency is traceable fairly directly 
to the doctrinal Realist separation of domestic and international politics itself. For ignoring 
domestic non-state processes renders their actual transnational extension invisible. This in 
turn makes it impossible (or irrelevant) to conceive other global structures apart from the 
political -because the only visible agents are other states. And with so much of the substance 
of international politics cancelled at a stroke, it is little wonder that theories of indiscriminate 
power-maximising and the endless security needs of anarchy step into the breach: what, 
otherwise, has all the fighting been about?
Returning to Morgenthau, the restrictive definition of the international is undertaken in an 
attempt to distill the purely political in order to make scientific statements. What then 
becomes of the goal of prescription? If the hypothesis about power is valid - and Morgenthau 
clearly believes that [in broad positivist terms] it is - then testing it against a wider and wider 
body of empirical data will progressively trace the outline of the laws of politics. Indeed, not 
only will it explain the past behaviour of the statesman: it may also provide 'the clue by which 
to predict his foreign policies' [6], As if this were not enough, Realism is simultaneously a 
normative and a practical guide for the diplomat: since the responsibilities of government 
demand an ethic of prudence, and since only disaster awaits those who try to work against 
the forces determining political oucomes, the statesman is both morally and professionally 
obliged to pursue the national interest defined as power.
^Kenneth Thompson, 1960, p. 35.
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The problem, of course, is that a definition of power which produces an unfalsifiable 
hypothesis about the past is capable of legitimating an unlimited range of practical 
suggestions as to present policy. Morgenthau's later attempt to spell out the foreign policy 
implications of Realism by distinguishing between 'the necessary and variable elements of the 
national interest'll leads no further than a rather pathetic appeal for 'rational scrutiny' in 
order to identify and separate these. A similar attitude informs the gloss on the Fourth 
Fundamental Rule of Diplomacy: 'For minds not beclouded by the crusading zeal of a political 
religion and capable of viewing the national interests of both sides with objectivity, the 
delimitation of these vital interests should not prove too difficult.' [588] Not only are the 
criteria for distinguishing these categories precisely what is contested - as his own later 
isolation on the issue of Vietnam was to indicate; even when it is commonly accepted that 
vital interests are at stake, the injunction to 'pursue the national interest' has no substantive 
content. Which statesperson, after all, ever thought he or she was doing anything but 
upholding the national interest? Certainly not the 'appeasers' of the 1930s, those whipping- 
boys of later Realist writers. As Kennedy remarks of British foreign policy in the interwar 
years:
... these were the actions of a country with nothing to gain, and much to lose, 
by being involved in war. Peace, in such circumstances, was the greatest of 
national interests. 22
And indeed the first edition of The Twenty Years' Crisis described Chamberlain's policy of 
appeasement as 'a reaction of realism against u to p ia n is m '.23 This is an important point 
because it is part of the ideological self-definition of postwar Realism to contrast itself with a 
supposed prewar Idealist ascendancy in foreign policy-making which led inevitably to the 
shame of Munich and disaster beyond.24 This is of course pure myth. Every Realist consensus 
is, like the Roman Catholic distinction between the Church Spiritual and the Church 
Temporal, post factum. And while Realism likes to think that it guides foreign policy, 
actually, it has often ended by simply legitimating it: its 'usefulness' has been of a rather
See 'Another "Great Debate": The National Interest of the US', reprinted in Smith et al., 1981, p. 52.
22paul Kennedy, The Realities Behind Diplomacy, Fontana 1981, p. 257.
^London 1939, p. 14n.
24It is surely conceding too much to accept, as Trevor Taylor appears to do, that Idealism actually held sway over public 
policy in this period. Taylor writes of Utopian theory, whose application would (and did) lead to policy disaster1. 
[Approaches and Theory in International Relations p.124] Wight's observation that '...when diplomacy is violent and 
unscrupulous, international law soars into the regions of natural law...' is surely more apt [Diplomatic Investigations, 
p.29]. Even the claim for a purely intellectual ascendancy has been questioned. William Olsen noted of the Realist- 
Idealist debate: 'In retrospect, one sometimes wonders... just how much of a debate it ever really was and how many of the 
academic analysts of international relations, in contrast to vocal advocates of pacifism in its many versions, were actually 
•utopian'. How many of them really allowed their desire for peace to override their scholarship? The Aberystwyth Papers: 
International Politics 1919-1969, p.23.
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different kind to what it had hoped.
This raises the interesting question: If Idealism did not exist, would Realism have to invent it? 
Any serious contention that a particular aspect of political life is (reductively) its 'dominant 
level' needs to be armed with some means of explaining behaviour and outcomes which do 
not conform to its expectations. If international relations are patterned by the mechanical 
logic of the balance of power, if this shapes the thought and behaviour of the statesman, why 
does the latter need to be exhorted to hold fast to its lines? Morgenthau blithely resolves this 
difficulty by proposing 'a counter-theory of irrational politics' [7-9] of which the peace- 
through-law school is one e x p r e s s io n .  25 (it will be recalled that George Kennan too cast the 
net of Idealist tendencies very wide, linking crusading with the moral approach.26) But the 
source of the difficulty remains all too apparent: Realism inveterately confuses its own urgent 
desire for attention to the irreducible strategic aspects of interstate r e l a t i o n s ^  with an 
explanation of international outcomes. And Idealism then comes to represent anything which 
distracts from concentration on those pitfalls of the system which are deducible a priori, any 
concern with other issues which could lead to strategic errors. But of course it does not 
follow that those other factors are 'irrational'; they may simply derive from other, connected 
realms of activity and determination in which the state is involved; they may involve, for 
example, domestic expenditures or foreign adventures conceived as necessary to the internal 
legitimacy of the state, or obligations which result from the regulative role played by the state 
in the international system, and so on.
For this reason there is, as has been widely remarked, considerable uncertainty attaching to 
Morgenthau's account of the status of'interest defined as power': does it indicate an objective 
law of politics which determines political behaviour? This is certainly what he argues in 
describing it as a 'signpost' which 'reflects... these objective laws' and enables prediction. Or is 
it rather an ideal-type concept which intuits (verstehen) the meaning to the agent of political 
action and registers its distortion by irrational or accidental factors? Again, this is how he 
defends against the charge that 'a perfect balance of power policy will scarcely be found in 
reality'. [10] Or is it, finally, a normative precept whose achievement is quite contingent and 
for which statesmen are morally obliged to strive: 'foreign policy ought to be rational in view 
of its own moral and practical purposes'? Now it simply cannot be all three. The construction 
of ideal-types is part of an interpretive, not a predictive, methodology; indeed, Weber 
premissed his use of them precisely on the denial of objective causal laws of human
^ M . J. Smith records that 'Whenever he faced strong disagreement with his approach and recommendations, Morgenthau 
called his opponents prisoners of sentiment or moralistic illusion...' op. cit. p. 160.
26See American Diplomacy 1900-1950, London 1952.
^'Political realism wants the photographic picture of the political world to resemble as much as possible its painted
portrait'. [10]
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behaviour. Conversely, a deterministic account of human behaviour cannot be rescued from 
the judgement of historical inaccuracy by fa counter-theory of irrational politics'. [7] And 
moral exhortation, a voluntarist intruder into the world of objective laws, is not 
accommodated easily within a concept which is claimed to show the world 'as it actually
is'.28
This, arguably, is the result of applying a reductionist positivism to the investigation of human 
social phenomena and then attempting to rectify by local adjustment and caveat the wilder 
distortions which it introduces.The effect in this case is to pile contradiction upon confusion. 
In Chapter 1 Morgenthau stresses the importance to a theory of being 'consistent with the 
facts as they are' [3]; such a theory 'allows us to retrace and anticipate, as it were, the steps a 
statesman - past, present or future -has taken or will take on the political scene' [5]; it models 
itself on the achievements of the science of economics and seeks 'to contribute to a similar 
development in the field of politics' [16], By contrast, Chapter 2 dwells on 'the ambiguity of 
the facts of international politics' [23]; the 'first lesson' of international politics is that 
'trustworthy prophecies [are] impossible'; and there is a general lament for the failure of the 
predictive power of economics.29
1.4 Waltz's Theoretical Realism: Accidents Will Happen
Morgenthau's edifice of political Realism was crumbling right from the start. Why Politics 
Among Nations remained the leading textbook for so long is indeed a sociological rather than 
an intellectual question.30 Yet the bulk of the criticism directed at Morgenthau was concerned 
not with attacking his Realist premises, but rather with rescuing them from the idiosyncrasies 
of his Weltanschauung.31 Morgenthau, it will be recalled, had some rather unflattering and 
unsophisticated views on human nature, and an embarrassing habit of parading them as the 
philosophical basis of Realism. It must have been rather unsettling for diplomats to be told 
that the basis of postwar US foreign policy was not so much about the defence of democracy 
as the pursuit of an 'elemental bio-psychological drive... to dominate' [39], a drive which they
^T hus Noam Chomsky cites Morgenthau complaining that revisionist critics of US policy 'confound die abuse of reality 
with reality itself. Chomsky unravels this conundrum after his usual fashion: It is the unachieved "national purpose", 
revealed by "the evidence of history as our minds reflect it", which is the reality; the actual historical record is merely the 
abuse of reality.' Intellectuals and the State', reprinted in Towards a New Cold War, 1982, p. 74.
^^Not the least remarkable aspect of this confusion is that chapter one was written after chapter two.
30For an account of die centrality of Politics Among Nations in the postwar evolution of the American discipline, see J. 
Vasquez, The Power o f Power Politics, London 1983, p. 17.
31This applies not only to Waltz's work, considered below, but also to the so-called 'behaviourial revolt' of the 1960s 
which introduced the methodologies of systems theory into IR. As Vasquez suggested: The behavioural revolt challenged 
not the picture of the world that the realists had provided but the realist conception of what constitutes an adequate 
scientific theory and the procedures used to 'verify that theory, op. cit. p.23.
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might have in common with 'monkeys and chickens'. [39n] And among the second generation 
of US Realists, Kenneth Waltz, in his book Man, the State and War, undertook to secure the 
theoretical underpinnings of the concept of the balance of power by deriving it a priori in the 
more palatable form of a rational-choice model.32 should also be said that Waltz has an 
impressively clear grasp of what Realism logically entails, and he therefore provides its most 
concise theoretical formulation.
Man, the State and War is not a general theory of international politics; it is an extended 
discussion of the 'level of analysis problem' which arises in attempting to explain the 
occurrance of war between states. And Waltz's principle criticism of Morgenthau is a tactical 
one: by deriving the international power struggle from human nature, Morgenthau conflates 
the instrument used by agents in an unregulated competition over a range of goods with a 
supposed, inherent will to power. This opens liabilities on two fronts. It suffers the general 
flaw of arguments from human nature, that they cannot account for variation in the 
phenomena which they seek to explain - in this instance, why war is not a constant and 
pervasive feature of human life. [2 9 ]3 3  In addition it has difficulty confining its implications 
to the realm of explanation and invites ethical challenges which distract it from its analytical 
purpose. [37] By contrast, Waltz's alternative derivation of the balance of power from the 
(Third Image) properties of the international system enjoys the rigour and moral neutrality of 
a logical necessity grounded in mathematically-given dilemmas of rational choice. This 
sanitizing of Morgenthau raises the invevitable question: in theorising the precepts of Realism 
does Waltz advance our understanding of international politics; or does he simply reproduce 
the assumptions and weaknesses of raison d'etat at a higher level of abstraction?
Waltz's argument falls into three parts. First he derives the general principle that conflict is 
inscribed in any social system which lacks overarching authority. Next he assesses how far 
states may be taken as discrete units involved in such a system. Finally, he establishes the 
connection between conflicts of interest and war, and reconstructs the balance of power as a 
function of an anarchical, international social structure.
For the first part, Waltz uses a parable by Rousseau concerning 5 men in the presocial state 
of nature who are driven by hunger to co-operate in a stag-hunt. As they are on the point of 
trapping their quarry - which would be sufficient to feed all of them - a hare (which could 
feed only one) runs within their reach. One of the hunters lunges at the hare, a movement
^ In  my treatment of Waltz here, I do not give explicit consideration to his later Theory o f  International Politics (1979). 
However, insofar as Waltz in 1979 was still exercising the same probmematic as in 1959, albeit at a slightly higher level 
of abstraction, the same fundamental criticisms apply. In this respect, I would certainly maintain that Theory o f  
International Politics is not a theoretical advance on AIan, the State and War. The latter, however, has achieved the 
status of a classic text within International Relations, and is widely used in the teaching of the discipline.
•^In this section, numbers in sqare brackets indicate references to Man, the State and War, 1959.
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which puts the stag to flight.
The moral of this is taken by Waltz to be that in a condition of anarchy, co-operation between 
individuals each seeking his or her own interest is only contingently rational. Each must base 
his or her calculations on the possible actions of others, but without a common authority to 
guarantee agreements none can calculate with certainty what those actions will be. Therefore 
none can afford to be absolutely dependable. And the response of the hunter who disrupts the 
stag-hunt by seizing the hare cannot be called irrational since he had no means of knowing 
that he was not simply pre-empting his fellows. Rational self-interest would have dictated 
restraint only if the fidelity of his partners had been assured. And since it is precisely this 
which is ruled out by anarchy, the latter may be said to yield antinomies of political reason 
which, establish the conflict between collective and individual interests as an inescapable 
feature of co-operation itself - so long as there is no authority to enforce contracts.
How far does the condition of states in the modem international system resemble the 
predicament of the hunters in Rousseau's parable? Clearly they interact without any common 
political authority. As to whether they constitute and behave as unitary agents, Waltz 
suggests that this condition is satisfied so long as someone is in charge. And since the state 
would not exist were this not the case, it necessarily holds for all states. It is irrelevant to this 
part of Waltz's argument that states are internally conflict-ridden, or that contingency and 
miscalculation are rife in politics. The question is simply whether those in power face 
conflicts of particular and general interest in their foreign policy-making which result from the 
effects of anarchy. To which the answer must of course be yes. Hence Rousseau's famous 
conclusion '...it is not impossible that a Republic, though in itself well-governed, should enter 
upon an unjust war'. [181-2] And this in turn underlies the logical core of Waltz's argument: 
'That among particularities accidents will occur is not accidental but necessary. ...in anarchy 
there is no automatic harmony'. [182] Moreover, since discord grows with interdependence, 
violence will be greatest in those situations where co-operation is necessary but supervening 
control and arbitration of the resultant conflicts is not available. This, says Rousseau [184] 
(and Waltz) corresponds to the political structure of the international system. To this extent, 
Waltz argues, the social structure itself plays a crucial causal role in producing collectively 
sub-optimal outcomes from an aggregate of individually rational choices.
The logic of the balance of power is then derived simply by interpolating into this anarchical 
structure an assumed desire by the state to maintain its own physical security. The means of 
achieving-of this goal are constrained by the condition of anarchy in that each state must 
provide for itself, and, as in a game of poker, 'Everybody's strategy depends on everybody 
else's'. [201] Putting this maxim into practice necessarily involves at least a tacit reliance on a
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particular kind of behaviour from certain other agents - even if it does not issue formally in an 
alliance. Usually, however, where three or more units are involved, temporary coalitions 
inevitably result.
This much Waltz takes from the game theory of Von Neumann and Morgenstern. However, 
he is quite clear that in order for laws derived from such models to be applicable to states, 
they must be twice qualified. First, the game produced by the competitive pursuit of security 
is not necessarily defined in purely zero-sum terms. It may become a 'general' game in which 
one side's gain does not dictate the other's loss. There may even be times when the common 
goal becomes the maximisation of collective security. (And the reasons why it may switch 
between these modes are not given within the rules of the game.) Secondly, states 
simultaneously play other games, both internally and externally which compete for the 
political priority and the material resources accorded to the security game. This is an 
enormous caveat, for it concedes that within certain limits (which in practice turn out to be 
very wide indeed) the impact of anarchy on the behaviour of states varies according to 
determinations quite outside the purview of a Realist theory. A state may choose or be forced 
to behave quite otherwise than predicted by the logic of the balance of power: it may be 
prepared to countenance large-scale retreat internationally in order to release resources for 
urgent domestic goals; it may undertake the military defence of a transnational socio­
economic system which leads it routinely to exceed the requirements of the visible 'national 
interest'; in extreme cases, where it contends with serious internal challenges, it may even fail 
properly to resist an external aggressor. More routinely, certain security interests may simply 
be overridden because their pursuit is judged too costly in either domestic or international 
terms. But even if all the games which all the states play are governed by anarchical rules, we 
could still not predict the outcomes a priori, since the relative importance to each state of 
each game at any one time is contingent. And insofar as that is the case, both the predictive 
and the normative claims of Realism virtually disappear; for Realism does not pretend to 
possess the criteria for divining when pure balance of power considerations will be or should 
be overridden by other concerns: 'no set of rules can specify how important the [security] 
game should be considered!'. [206] Waltz is quite explicit about the consequences of this:
The reference to game theory does not imply that there is available a
technique by which international politics can be approached mathematically.
Balance-of-power politics, however, can profitably be described using the
concepts of von Neumann and Morgenstern... [20 In]
The implication is clearly that a theory of the balance of power is not a theory of international 
politics. And hence, no hard and fast rules may be drawn from it. In fact, we 'cannot say in
29
the abstract that for peace a country must arm, or disarm, or compromise, or stand firm*. 
[222]
What then is the explanatory scope of the theory? Paradoxically, Waltz's 'strong' realism is 
actually very weak in the scope of its claims. It purports to account for why war persists in 
the international system without any claim to explain why any particular war occurs. It 
isolates a permissive, as opposed to the efficient causes of war. It is a contradiction of 
perpetual peace rather than a theory of international politics. And the purpose is simply to 
establish that there is a dimension of international politics, given by the absence of 
government, which conforms to Rousseau's parable: where knowledge of others' intentions is 
imperfect, and the use of force is not ruled out, (these being the two immediate consequences 
of anarchy), rational calculation by any individual cannot afford to assume (and therefore 
cannot actualise) an assured harmony of interests. Ergo, the balance.
It is difficult not to feel that the mountain has laboured, and brought forth a molehill. Having 
rightly dispensed with the reductionism of Morgenthau, Waltz's theoretical Realism is little 
more than a banality: o f course states face recurrent Prisoners' Dilemmas in their attempts to 
manage their relations with other states - in all fields, particularly that of security. Truisms 
such as this, as the Realists themselves like to point out, have been available to statesmen for 
millennia.
But there is perhaps a more significant question: is this as far as Realism can go at the 
theoretical level - a barren choice between reductionism and banality? The question can be 
explored further by considering again what is involved in the Realist assertion of the unitary 
agency of the state. For the latter is clearly connected with the belief that understanding the 
core of international politics is a matter of re-enacting the dilemmas faced by statesmen and 
tracing the recurrent techniques in the fitting of means to ends. This is especially clear in 
Waltz's use of the stag-hunter parable, where he allows the fiction of presocial individuals to 
persist even after he has supposedly debunked other fallacies of'the state of nature'. Now, 
within such a perspective social structure is pictured as a set of external constraints which 
derive from the aggregate of individual, reciprocally-calculated rational choices - that, after 
all, is supposedly how it is experienced by the politician. But such a model will take us no 
further than a charting of the mechanics of realpolitik. How calculations within the system 
are reckoned (ideally) by practitioners, and how determinations are set out in the model are 
identical: this is nothing more than a systematising of raison d'etat. (And of course, giving a 
logical proof of the Prisoner's Dilemma is also a normative legitimation of raison d'etat.)
It is precisely in this mechanical notion of structure that the inherent weaknesses of Realism
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are most transparent. In particular, it is perhaps easier to see at this level how two key 
concepts, change and power, become deeply problematical. What is it then that accounts for 
Realism's obliviousness to historical change?
The reason, it may be suggested, is that in order to conceive the state as a unit responding 
purely to the balance of power it must implicitly define it as ontologically anterior to the 
international system: and if the system is simply a set of external restraints given by the 
number and relative strength of the individual units comprising it, what could change mean 
beyond (reversible) variation in the numbers involved and the distribution of weight among 
them - where the mathematical possibilities are all given a priori? But this of course is not 
what we mean by historical change. The shift from weak, territorially disaggregated fiefdoms 
in which the monarchical state shared authority and jurisdiction with Church and nobility to 
the modem, bordered, sovereign nation-state cannot be registered in these terms. Nor can the 
key role played in that shift by the convulsive interaction of domestic revolution and the 
international system. To conceive these it would be necessary to supply what cannot be 
derived from a rational-choice model: namely an account of those conditions of social power 
within a system which result not from balancing the numbers involved but from the 
reproduction of the core institutions which reflect its historical character, which position the 
individuals in terms of access to resources and which define the terrain of interaction. And it 
involves the same 'state of nature' fallacy already referred to above to assume that there ever 
were social systems in which power could be understood without recognising this dimension. 
(Waltz has not felt it necessary in his subsequent work to address these issues; nor, more 
surprisingly, and with the exception of Richard Ashley, have his critics. )34
Waltz would presumably answer that the system of states is the one exception: such core 
institutions as property rights, the liberty of the person and the suppression of routine 
violence rely for their domestic reproduction on the availability of coercive authority in the 
hands of the civil state; but internationally, who will coerce the coercers? Short of World 
Government, Waltz argues, no-one. Since each state is therefore ultimately cast back solely 
on its own resources, a mechanical conception of structure is uniquely appropriate to the 
description of the society of states, however much it may need to be overlain by recognition 
of other, transnational processes in any historical study.
But here we are back to the fallacy of collapsing our understanding of power into a military 
definition of international relations, since that is the only realm in which it is claimed that this 
mechanical structure applies. And once again, the argument has become circular.
^  See his The Poverty of Neorealism' in Neorealism and its Critics, Keohane ed., Columbia 1986.
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1.5 Realism as Ideology
These recurrent circularities point to the need for an extra dimension, beyond a purely 
technical assessment, to any explanation of the part played by Realism in IR. Something else, 
remarked near the start of this chapter, also points in the same direction: namely the startling 
difference between the self-definition of Realism and the properties which become visible 
only in the light of subsequent criticism. (As already suggested, the clarity of Waltz's 
exposition is exceptional.) And an intellectual position whose very propositional form is 
fiercely contested cannot help but invite consideration as an ideology.
To come to the point, there is something awry with the foundation myth of Realism, the claim 
that the historical triumph over Idealism involved something like an 'epistemological break' 
which marked the inauguration of the discipline. There is indeed a sleight of hand being 
practised in the repetitive and apparently compulsive Realist self-definition in contrast to 
Idealism. Certainly, in rehearsing this Great Debate, opposing lists of assumptions are duly 
presented: there is the marshalling of is against ought, and power against morality; but what 
remain covert (because uncontested by either side) are those premises which are structured 
by the fact that fundamentally this is a policy debate. And as such it tacitly reproduces the 
premises of the unitary agency of the state, the international 'state of nature' and the insulated 
autonomy of the political taken over from the tradition of normative political theory. In 
important ways, Realism never did break with Idealism, which partly explains why its central 
premises remain unannounced. For this reason the question of how to theorise the state 
within a broader understanding of world politics, surely the central question facing IR theory, 
simply does not arise as an issue for Realism because it stands squarely in the common 
ground it shares with Idealism.
Realism, then, is not simply a focusing of attention on the state-political aspect of inter­
national relations. It is a determinate construction of political reality which entails a series of 
hidden propositions and symptomatic silences.
Realism is the conservative ideology of the exercise of state power: it provides a terminology 
of international relations which dramatises the dilemmas, legitimises the priorities and 
rehearses the means of realpolitik. (Liberal, socialist and revolutionary governments also use 
Realist arguments to justify unpopular state policies; but they do not, if they can help it, 
embrace Realism as overall explanation. For it clashes with their alternative ideology, the 
'society-centred', instrumentalist conception of the state.)
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Fundamental to this role is the articulation of a discrete environment o f’the international' in 
which the behaviour of states can be explained sni generis - requiring the insulation of the 
international from the domestic. This is what enables 'the autonomy of the political' - whether 
the latter is conceived as a self-sufficient explanation of outcomes (as in Morgenthau) or 
alteratively as the bare framework (and sole possible theory) of world politics (as in Waltz). 
The borders and landscape of this environment are set and policed by the twin concepts of 
sovereignty and anarchy. Quite restrictive definitions of these are needed to keep the 
environment sealed and its contents 'spare'. The Realist concept of sovereignty wavers 
between a military fact, a legal claim and a theoretical category; but in each case its 
'indivisibility' defines societies as bounded entities whose interaction is channelled through the 
agency of the state. It does not, however, thereby become a window onto the society over 
which the state presides: on the contrary, by assuming the state to be co-extensive with the 
society for the purposes of foreign policy, this conception of sovereignty must factor out the 
operation of socio-economic forces which are not convertible into state power.
The fact that in the logic of Realism this sovereignty of the state precedes the theoretical 
formulation of its interaction with other states is of considerable importance. Under the 
plausible cover of conforming to the experience of the statesman, it achieves two things. It 
poses the state as a completed social order such that its foreign interests are constituted 
entirely internationally - thereby removing interpretation of the 'national interest' from 
domestic political contestation. And it clears the field for a purely interstate theory - since any 
other global structures or international agents which might complicate the picture could only 
be the result of the transnational extension of (domestic) sub-state socio-economic relations, 
which are not recognised. If sovereignty were not anterior in this way, and in addition were 
seen as a form of rule particular to the societies whose governments dominate the states- 
system, then the role of that system in upholding domestic social orders would come into 
view and the use of the term 'anarchy' to denote its overriding 'structural principle' would 
have to be reworked. As it is, for the purposes of international politics, states are seen to 
have only each other to deal with; and the theoretical atomism entailed by their analytical 
priority as completed orders dictates a mechanical conception of structure. And so on.
For these reasons, we shall make the explicit redefinition of these categories of sovereignty 
and anarchy central to our construction of a non-realist perspective in the last third of this 
thesis.
Why then does Realism have such 'staying power' as an ideology? Four major reasons may be 
suggested. First, although the discrete realm of'the international' is a fiction, there is
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nonetheless a generic dimension to the form of the modem state which relates to its sovereign 
legal, territorial and violent aspects. And this does indeed have to be addressed theoretically. 
The historical fact of the differentiation of the state from civil society, and the specificity of 
the sovereign state-form which resulted from this cannot be understood by 'reducing' it to 
economic factors, any more than it can be understood by conceiving it in isolation from the 
rest of society. Further, the fact of its coercive monopoly does make the modem state the site 
for the mobilisation of special forms of authoritative power whose use has repeatedly 
staggered the outcomes of transformative political projects which attempted to use it as an 
inert instrument. Realism may end by misconstruing the specificity of the state; but it does at 
least gesture at something of considerable importance.
Second, Realism sounds plausible because it articulates commonly held, common-sense 
assumptions about world politics. This is not surprising since it mimics the vocabulary of the 
state's rationalisation of its own behaviour, and forms in that sense a ruling ideology par 
excellence. Its conception of the unitary, sovereign agency of the state sits easily with the 
popular nationalist identification with the 'home' state which comprises most individuals' 
participation in the international system. This is a notion which is reinforced from all sides in 
public discussion of the international scene, through the media presentation of'news' and the 
regular commentary of diplomats and politicians. And Realism's celebration of the 
professionalism of diplomacy chimes with the nationalist premise that there exists a 
permanent 'national interest', and that the conduct of international relations is therefore 
predominantly about the techniques and the means (not the political ends) of the operator:
...although I appreciated the idealism of those who march and demonstrate for 
'peace', my admiration is reserved for that community of grey, inconspicuous, 
overworked men and women of all nations - bureaucrats, diplomats, lawyers, 
businessmen and political leaders, sitting behind desks overflowing with paper 
- whose boring work, prudent foresight and hard-won mutual understanding 
across cultural barriers actually preserves it. 35
Third, to the extent that IR remains, in terms of the sheer weight of numbers, resources and 
publications 'an American Social Science', the persistence of Realism seems assured. This is 
so mainly as a result of the interaction and mutual reinforcement of three factors which 
distinguish the American discipline: the demand for policy-relevant studies which provides 
the financial supports of the discipline and thereby installs the state's-eye-view as the natural 
perspective; the unique role played by the American state which requires special justification 
in the light of its extensive global interventions at all levels of the system; and the positivist
35Michael Howard, The Concept of Peace', Encounter, vol. 61, No. 4 (December 1983) p.24.
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methodologies, adopted in the effort to emulate the 'usefulness* of other sciences, which tend 
to accept uncritically the received categories of Realist common sense - provided by the state.
The fourth major strength of Realism is what Waltz might term a 'permissive cause': it 
consists in the absence of any recognised alternative conceptualisation of the political 
structure of the global system to the one extrapolated from normative political theory, and 
the (related) behaviour of the critics of Realism. It has become a commonplace in recent 
years to remark the 'absence in liberal sociology and in Marx's writings... of a systematic 
interpretation of the rise of the territorially bounded nation-state and its association with 
military power'.36 whatever the reasons for this, the contrast with the plethora of theories of 
the domestic activity of the state is striking: there appears to be no parallel as yet within IR to 
the way in which the tradition of normative political theory was overtaken by political 
sociology. On the day that IR scholars too break with the Hobbesian problematic of'why 
must we support the coercive activities of the state', and ask instead 'how are we to 
understand the state as a political organisation, both in its generic aspects and in its 
interaction with other moments of international and domestic social orders' - on that day the 
stranglehold of Realism on IR as a social science will begin to loosen.
For the moment, however, the commanding position of Realism - reproduced also through 
the broader ideology of nationalism, the language of the media and the testimony of 
practitioners - continues to have a disorganising effect on its critics. Indeed, one could almost 
say that Realism has been able to organise them into certain familiar areas of contestation 
which reinforce its own dominance. At any rate the persistence of forms of anti-Realist 
argument which are clearly self-defeating is an index of how far Realism is still able to set the 
terms of debate within the discipline. Among these forms, two stand out in particular. First, 
there is the outright denial of any specificity to either the political behaviour or the 
institutional form of the state. In the case of political behaviour, a clear instance is the ringing 
pronouncement of Jenkins & Minnerup:
Conflicts between states are in reality not conflicts between states at all, but 
conflicts between specific social and class interests using those states for their 
purposes... Stripped of its class content as defined by its ruling class, the 
nation-state is no more than a shell, a form, an organising principle of political 
sovereignty: a unit in the vertical division of humankind, devoid of any 
inherent dynamic which would set one against the other, and as compatible 
with federal association 'above' as with decentralising devolution 'below' it.3?
•^Anthony Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence, Polity Press 1985, p. 26.
^B rian Jenkins & Gunther Minnerup, Citizens and Comrades, Pluto 1984, pp. 146-7.
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Plenty of similar examples could be drawn from the longer history of liberal internationalism. 
As for the state's institutional form, calls for the democratisation and even dissolution of 
centralised controls of the means of violence and the distinct foreign-policy making arm of 
government have an equally long history; they range across a broad political spectrum, from 
Cobden's slogan of'No Foreign Policies!', through Lenin's (and Engels') anticipation of'a self- 
acting armed organisation of the population' to the more recent advocacy in parts of the 
peace movement of'detente from below' as a means of reducing international tensions. In 
each case the outright denial of'the autonomy of the political' conflates what may be generic 
to the exercise of state power internationally with the interests of those in power. This entails 
a reductionism which both visibly demonstrates the need for an assertion of a distinct level of 
the political and, (by refusing to provide an alternative conceptualisation), perpetuates the 
Realist claim to sole occupancy.
A second form of polemical suicide in the face of Realist orthodoxy involves endorsing the 
notion of a discrete political realm but challenging Realist prescriptions on ethical grounds. 
Moral attacks on the untroubled acceptance of power politics, on the rationale of arms 
racing, on the use of military force and war - all these, when unsupported by analytical 
criticisms, are so much bread and butter to Realism: for they legitimate the contrast of'is' and 
'ought' which is so central to its ideological self-definition. And the louder the moral protest, 
the more attention is diverted from the two most dubious claims of Realism: that its 
conception of power has any significant explanatory (as opposed to rhetorical) force; and that 
it rests on a value-free empiricism. Both this and the previous type of criticism unwittingly 
rehearse the 'Great Debate', and thereby automatically reproduce the terms of the Realist 
ascendancy. More generally, of course, because it is the intellectual orthodoxy, any criticism 
which does not provide a replacement confirms its centrality.
1.6 Conclusions: What's Missing?
It was suggested above that the interlocking of the emphasis on anarchy with the restrictive 
definition of sovereignty forms a kind of stranglehold on the development of IR theory. It 
remains therefore to give some preliminary indication of what new perspectives come into 
view when this grip is prised open.
Let us take the question of anarchy first. As we have seen, a rigorously interstate theory of 
the international pushes the issue of anarchy to the fore, and blocks consideration of how
36
much interstate behaviour is determined by - and is concerned with managing -other, 
domestic political processes. It is not just that the international offers an arena for exploits to 
bolster domestic legitimacy. Rather, the description of the state, of its position within the 
global political order - and hence the overall character of that order too - is simply distorted 
without the recognition that the same agent is simultaneously central to the constitution and 
management of international and domestic politics.
One of the clearest and most important illustrations of this claim concerns the phenomenon of 
revolution. On a strict Realist view there is no necessary reason why domestic revolution 
should impact significantly on the international system. If any instability is introduced into the 
balance of power it must be associated with the weakening of the state concerned; hence 
revolutionary states should calculate a strong interest in peace with their neighbours. 
Obviously, this is not the case. The foreign policies of revolutionary states are generally 
hostile to foreign ruling establishments, which are perceived as representing the same 
oppressive social forces as have been overthrown domestically; they are unwilling (for the 
same reason) to recognise the legitimacy of conventional diplomatic channels; and they 
frequently seek to export the revolution via transnational links and assistance to insurgents in 
other countries. Generally too, the social conflict which they seek to export is taken up at the 
interstate level by counterrevolutionary alliances of other states, often prepared to intervene 
directly or indirectly to restore 'order'. But a counterrevolutionary foreign policy is rarely just 
a foreign policy. To a degree which varies with individual cases it is also directed inwards, a 
nationalist identification of certain programmes of domestic political change with a foreign 
threat. The Cold War, for example, always partook of this three-dimensionality.
All this might seem innocuous enough to the Realist until it is recalled just how much of the 
history of the state-system has been distracted by such internationalisation of social conflict - 
e.g. through how much of the history of'international' conflict it is necessary to speak of the 
states involved as mediating the agency of social forces. Martin Wight found '256 years of 
international revolution to 212 urn-evolutionary* since 1492 - and that calculation was made in 
1960. So, however much states are compelled to prepare against the possible behaviour of 
other states, 'the international' has also been very much about the management of change in 
domestic political orders. In the aftermath of great wars this aspect generally needs to be 
reasserted: Wight noted that '[sjince Bismark's time, every war between great powers has 
ended with a revolution on the losing s i d e . . . '38 And of course both World Wars were 
followed by a period of sustained, internationally concerted counterrevolution. (Nor has the 
state system acted uniformly as a brake on social change; in many instances it has done the 
opposite: witness the drastic impact of European imperialism, or the imposition from outside
•^Martin Wight, Power Politics, Harmondsworth (Second Edition) 1986, p. 92n.
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of liberal democracy in Germany and Japan.)
Yet the obverse is also true. When we approach the state from the perspective of 
transnational political (and other) movements and forces, the materiality of its power is of 
enormous significance. Revolutionaries in power moderate their support for comrades abroad 
in accordance with raison d'etat. When they do attempt to carry the revolution beyond their 
borders by force of arms, they stir up currents of nationalist resistance which contradict their 
solidarist doctrine. And indeed the very process of'liberation' is an extension of the power of 
the revolutionary state, which is generally appropriated in nationalist terms. The attempt to 
use the agency of the state in the promotion of the transnational spread of revolution has 
proved endlessly problematic.
However, the important point here is that in both cases what is specific to the state, the 
manner in which its role overdetermines other political projects and conflicts, is not visible if 
the state is conceived as a 'national-territorial totality'-  ^^  responding purely to external 
determinations in the shape of other states. 'Domestic' and 'international' are continuously 
exploding and collapsing into each other. And while a plurality of sovereignties is indeed a 
fundamental aspect of the modem world system, it simply does not follow that anarchy forms 
its core identity. The truth, if only at the empirical level addressed here, is more complex, 
more exciting and far more politically controversial.
Turning then to the issue of sovereignty, Morgenthau explains that
sovereignty points to a political fact. That fact is the existence of a person or a 
group of persons who, within the limits of a given territory, are more powerful 
than any competing person or group of persons and whose power, 
institutionalised as it must be in order to last, manifests itself as the supreme 
authority to enact and enforce legal rules within that territory. [335]
There have been states which were not sovereign - medieval monarchs had to share 
jurisdiction with Church and nobility. (Though in Waltz's atomistic version of Realism, even 
this does not mar the conception of the international. ) To this extent, sovereignty is 
recognised as an historically contingent fact which in turn enables us to date the modem 
state-system. But it remains a quantitative measure of authority, rather than a qualitative 
characterisation of a specific form of rule. Moreover, it is an all-or-nothing fact: either it 
obtains or it does not; and if it does, the Realist conception of the international is held to be
■^A phrase coined by Fred Halliday: 'State & Society in International Relations: A Second Agenda', Millennium Summer 
1987.
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relevant. Hence the ease of recourse to Thucydides.
Again, what is missing is any sense that the history of the state-system is more than the 
accumulation of successive power-struggles, that those competitions between great powers 
have mediated the continuing evolution, geographical expansion and global consolidation of a 
world political structure which in many ways is continuous with the changing domestic form, 
legitimacy and powers of the state: that the meaning of sovereignty itself is historically 
specific.
The long decline of British (and European) ascendancy was associated with the military 
occupation of almost every stretch of territory not already claimed by one of the European 
states or settler-colonies. The subsequent rise of American world power coincided in turn 
with the creation of a hundred-odd new states. Evidently, the Europeans did not carve up the 
planet in order to extend the state-system. But they did of course install the colonial state 
apparatuses for their own purposes of exploitation and control; these did shape and become 
the focus of nationalist resistance; and the mobilisation for independence was supplemented 
from the outside by American pressure for unrestricted economic access, clothed in a rhetoric 
of freedom and self-determination. For their part, US planners recognised in the early 1940s 
that 'the British Empire... will never reappear and that the United States may have to take its 
place', that in the light of growing nationalism there was a need to 'avoid conventional forms 
of imperialism' and that new institutions of international management, such as a United 
Nations organisation, should be developed to meet this need.40 The point being made here is 
that US hegemony (like British hegemony before it) has reflected and consolidated the forms, 
possibilities and constraints of international power in a specific historical phase of the 
development of the world political-economy. So, for example, playing the directive role in a 
global nation-state system is already hugely removed from policing a colonial periphery - and 
what either of them has in common with Thucydides' Athens is something of a distraction.
In short, if we displace for the moment the Realist concern with anarchy, we see that the 
history of the state-system has a live political content; a moment's glance at this content, and 
it is apparent that to understand the realm of the political we need a conception of historical 
agency as a dispersed property of human societies which state organisations will always 
attempt to mobilise, but which is never reducible to state policy. If, secondly, we redefine 
sovereignty in the manner suggested, we start to make sense of power as a category because 
we specify it as a determinate historical configuration of social relations. This in turn throws 
into relief the changing institutional form of the state, and with it the essential novelty of
^Quotations are from members of the Council on Foreign Relations, cited in Holly Sklar ed., Trilateralism, Boston 
1980, pp. 146 & 149.
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’international' power. And at a certain point in this overall process of reformulation, 
something else comes into view which Realism is incapable of showing us: the emergence and 
consolidation of a global nation-state system as the universal form of political power in the 
modem world. What has Realism to tell us about the differentia specifica of this 
unprecedented development? And yet where else is its significance to be registered if not in 
International Relations theory?
40
II Social Structures and Geopolitical Systems
2.1 Introduction
Since we are proposing to develop an alternative theoretical perspective for thinking about 
international relations, it might help to reflect a little upon both the nature of our subject 
matter and the tools available to us for constructing social theories. The considerations which 
follow are guided by two related assumptions. On the one hand, if we are to avoid the pitfalls 
of anachronism, the theoretical categories which we develop in order to understand 
geopolitical systems must also be historical categories. On the other hand, once this is 
attempted it rapidly becomes clear that such categories cannot be formulated without 
addressing the wider structures of social reproduction whose development over time underlies 
(and explains) the changing historical form of the geopolitical system. Thus any historical 
investigation needs in turn to be informed by a theoretical understanding of social structures in 
general, coupled with some conception of how they might be implicated in the reproduction of 
geopolitical systems in particular. The recurrent inability of Realism to provide such a social 
theory (in either the abstract or the substantive modes just distinguished) has been perhaps the 
single greatest technical obstacle to the development of IR as a non-positivist social science.
The argument of this chapter is set out in four parts. The first part illustrates the pitfalls of 
anachronism by challenging the conventional reading of a celebrated event in IR: the Treaty of 
Utrecht of 1713. This is followed by a brief interrogation of one attempt to think historically 
about the emergence of the modem international system - the failure of which is traced to the 
Realist theoretical assumptions covertly informing it. This failure prompts, in the third part, a 
general theoretical discussion of social structure, followed by a brief discussion of the 
character of historical materialism as a substantive social theory. Finally, and on the basis of 
this, the axiomatic Realist separation of geopolitical system from social structure is questioned 
theoretically, as a prelude to the substantive historical challenges developed in Chapters III 
and IV below.
2.2 Utrecht 1713
Let us begin, then, with our first point: because geopolitical systems change over time, our 
theoretical categories must also be historical categories. In order to illustrate this point, we 
shall take a famous historical example: the Treaty of Utrecht of 1713. Utrecht is generally 
remembered in IR as the first occasion on which the establishment of a balance of power in 
Europe appears as an explicit aim of a peace settlement. As the preamble to the treaty has it,
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the aim was
...to establish an equilibrium between the powers of such a kind as to prevent 
the union of many in a single one, so that the balance of equality, which it is 
desired to assure, could not incline to the advantage of one of these powers to 
the risk and injury of the others. *
Utrecht falls therefore at the tail-end of that venerable procession of treaties held to mediate 
the self-definition of the state-system. Thus: the Peace of Lodi (1454) ’founded the Italian 
Concert and the first system of collective security’;2 the treaty of Augsburg (1555) established 
the principle of cuius regio, ejius religio - a partial secularizing of the states-system, later 
completed at Westphalia (1648) which asserted the sovereign rights of the German princes 
against Pope and Emperor alike.3 By the time of the Congress of Utrecht...' says Wight, 'the 
states-system is there'.4 That is to say: the replacement of Church and Empire by the secular 
sovereign state as the foundation of diplomatic organization is well-established; and the 
diplomatic machinery for the collective self-organization of a plurality of state apparatuses 
stretching across the European continent is available and in periodic use. We are in home 
waters; the modem identity of the system is complete in its essentials. But is it? What was 
Utrecht actually about? How material was the prescription of the balance of power to the 
content of the settlement? A closer look at the terms seems to warrant a degree of skepticism.
The first three items on the list are as follows:5 France agrees to recognize the Protestant 
Succession in England. We shall return to this. Next, Spain cedes to Britain 'the exclusive 
monopoly of the slave trade, or rights of the Asiento;' thirdly, France yields up 'contested 
possessions in America - Hudson's Bay, Newfoundland with Nova Scotia, & St Christopher’. 
Some way further down the list comes the most frequently cited 'balance of power' provision: 
the ban on French fortifications at Dunkirk. What is interesting about this is not simply the 
unearthing of seedy provisions in the small print of a venerable treaty: a Realist might well 
contend that the pursuit of vile lucre is a fairly universal activity, and that territorial 
expansionism as an aspect of strategic competition between states needs no special 
explanation. But monopoly rights to the Asiento were not simply an additional source of
*D. J.Hill, A History o f  Diplomacy in the International Development o f  Europe, 3 vols., London 1906, p.339. See also 
Morgenthau 1985, p. 199, and Wight 1979, p. 174. There are writers who remember Utrecht in rather different terms: cf. 
K. Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, Harmondsworth 1976, p.924: '...at the Peace of Utrecht, England extorted from the Spaniards... 
the privilege of being allowed to ply the slave trade... Liverpool grew fat on the basis of the slave trade...'
^Wight 1977, p . l l l .  For a discussion of the circumstances, see Mattingly 1965, Chapter 8.
3For detailed discussion of Westphalia, see K. Holsti, Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order 1648 - 
1989, Cambridge 1991, Chapter 2.
4Wight 1977, p. 129.
5See Hill 1914: pp.332-4.
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revenue in the manner of an extra territory added to a feudal royal estate.6 They brought 
Britain closer to the levers of a process which had a very specific - and inevitably to modem 
eyes exaggerated -role in the intercontinental system of Absolutist Europe: the production and 
control of bullion. In turn this intercontinental system, this patterning of state and mercantile 
institutions and practices, cannot be understood without reference to the constraints on trade 
imposed by the dominant structural features of European societies.
Failure to recognize the importance of this proviso has sometimes led modem writers to 
dismiss mercantilist doctrine as an intellectual error; even some of the more historically minded 
commentators have argued that it 'grossly misunderstood the true means to and the nature of 
plenty'.7 The zero-sum model of international trade, the obsession with specie and the 
extensive use of military means to create and bolster commercial monopolies - these have been 
seen as indicative of the rude prehistory of the modem science of wealth creation. It might be 
more illuminating, however, to say that they reflect characteristics recognizable in all 
precapitalist trade, and that within the possibilities set by a premodem social order, 'the true 
means to plenty' necessarily entailed strategies very different from free trade, price competition 
and waged labour. In short, whereas much modem capitalist trade connects centres of 
production competitively, increasing the pressure for surplus extraction in the labour process, 
precapitalist trade connects a centre of production with a distant market and reaps windfall 
profits by setting prices monopolistically.8 And because the profits are gleaned in the realm of 
exchange, physical control over the circulation of commodities becomes a precondition of 
profit - and one which, for obvious reasons, tends to necessitate more or less elaborate 
territorial strategies of segregation backed up by direct military force. In practice, these ranged 
from the straightforward English Navigation Acts confining all English and colonial trade to 
English ships and ports,9 to the 16th century Spanish practice of assembling all licit contact 
with the American empire in two annual massed fleets under the supervision of the Casa de 
Contratacion,10 to the extraordinary measures taken by the Dutch East India Company to 
segregate and regulate the production of spices in the Moluccas.11
This being the nature of trade, it made little difference where the 'carrying' was conducted;
^For the following, see E. Wolf, Europe and the People Without History, California 1982, pp. 151 -3.
7Jacob Viner, Power versus Plenty as Objectives of Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries', World 
Politics Vol l ,No 1, 1948, p.10. It must be said that Viner's account provides a striking instance of how'...the pre-bourgois 
forms of the social organization of production are treated by political economy in much the same way as the Fathers of the 
Church treated pre-Christian religions. [Capital, Vol. 1, p. 175]
^These points will be considered in more detail in Chapter 4 below.
^See W. E. Minchinton, The Growth o f  English Overseas Trade in the 17th and 18 th Centuries, London 1969, p. 10-11.
10Wolf 1982, p. 138-9.
11The Dutch method was to occupy an island territory, concentrate production in a single spice, and systematically destroy 
any other cultivation of it within the regions under their control. Thus Amboyna became the clove island, the Bandas the 
mace and nutmeg islands and Ceylon the cinnamon island.' [Braudel, The Perspective o f the World, London 1984, p.218.]
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indeed, Braudel tells us12 that '[t]he greatest source of wealth in the East1 was not the carriage 
of luxury goods to Europe, but rather the cornering of'trade between regions of Asia that 
were economically different from each other and very far apart' - the so-called 'country trade'; 
India consumed double the quantity of fine spices as the whole of Europe. There was, 
however, one important difference: moving into this trade proved difficult for the Europeans 
because of the age-old deficit of East-West trade: 'In the end, the Europeans had to have 
recourse to precious metals, particularly American silver, which was the 'open sesame' of these 
trades.' This partly explains why, in the Caribbean, the Dutch and the English were so eager to 
expand their contraband trade with Spanish settlers on the mainland:
The Dutch and the English were thus able to tap the flow of Spanish silver 
through the open veins of the Caribbean. At the end of the 17th Century, the 
amount of Spanish silver drawn off through the Jamaican trade alone is 
estimated at ...about half the amount of bullion exported annually to the Far 
East by the British East India Company.13
Given that the total volume of world trade was increasing only slowly14 and that the scale of 
production and markets was constrained directly by 'the great frozen ice-cap of the world's 
traditional agrarian systems and rural social relations'15 the equations describing the means of 
expanding surpluses indeed begin to look close to zero-sum. Thus the strategic importance of 
silver in facilitating the expansion of east-west trade, and the particular mechanisms for 
increasing access to that resource (of which the gaining of the Asiento was one), cannot be 
understood on the assumption of the contemporary capitalist world market which does not 
experience the same blockages.
Similar qualifications must be entered with respect to the other terms of Utrecht mentioned 
above. For example, the Anglo-French disputes over North American territories emphatically 
were not instances of a military competition which spilled over into territorial expansionism in 
the periphery in the spirit of George Canning's later boast.16 Quite the reverse: they resulted 
from a commercial competition for control of the fur trade which assumed a strategic 
dimension because of the territorial preconditions of an effective monopoly.17 It was a 
distinctive feature of the fur trade that as the East Coast beaver populations became depleted, 
its quadrangular complex of social and ecological relations (comprising Anglo-French rivalry
17For the following, see Braudel 1984, pp.216-19.
13 Wolf 1982, p. 153
14Koenigsberger 1987, p. 172.
13Hobsbawm 1962, p. 184
^^If France occupied Spain, was it necessary... that we should blockade Cadiz? No. I looked another way - 1 sought 
materials of compensation in another hemisphere... I called the New World into existence to redress the balance of the 
Old.' K, Bourne [ed], The Foreign Policy o f  Victorian England, Oxford 1970 p.210.
17Wolf 1982, p. 172-3
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for commercial relations with those native tribes currently in control of beaver hunting 
territories) moved steadily westward, leapfrogging successive local political fixes and throwing 
up new tribal intermediaries and possibilities for strategic maneuver. The activity of the 
English Hudson Bay Company which benefited directly from Utrecht formed part of just such 
a maneuver. Its purpose was not primarily to accumulate territories; rather, the mobility of the 
extractive social relations it sought to monopolize dictated that strategy.
Finally, the first of the terms mentioned above (French recognition of the Protestant 
Succession) calls to mind the fact that the conflict resolved at Utrecht was the War of Spanish 
Succession. To be sure, one would not argue that the states involved were therefore simply 
feudal organizations in the medieval sense. But the very fact that this principle of political 
legitimacy was still strong enough to determine the moments of danger in the continuity of 
state organizations suggests that it would be premature to speak of sovereignty in any 
completed sense. A full eighty years later, Kant still felt impelled to stipulate in the Preliminary 
Articles of Perpetual Peace: No independent nation, be it large or small, may be acquired by 
another nation by inheritance...'^
Indeed, on reflection, neither the political agencies nor the social processes arbitrated in the 
settlement at Utrecht can be understood in terms of their modem equivalents. We see here 
neither nation-states nor capitalism: we see dynastic and oligarchic state-organizations, in 
collaboration with mercantile groups, deploying territorial strategies to secure monopoly 
control over resources (mostly the trade in luxury goods) to supplement the income from their 
agricultural estates. We see joint-stock companies (in India and the Far East) exercising the 
prerogatives of states, and an extra-European environment in which no separate sovereignty 
was recognized. What does it actually tell us to say that 'the states-system is here'? Do such 
features really characterize our states-system? If not, which states-system is this? IR as a 
discipline begins, it may be suggested, when we move beyond the ahistorical generalizations of 
Realism, and start to map out something like a periodization of the successive institutional 
forms, agents and scope of'international power' which have accompanied the precursors of 
today's global nation-state system.19 Were we to do this, we might stand a better chance of 
seeing what it is that is so different about modem geopolitics. And this in turn would redefine 
what it is that we need to explain.
Historical periodization is a notoriously fraught enterprise which cannot help but cast some 
events and processes into shadow even as it illuminates others. Nevertheless it remains an
^Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace & Other Essays, Ted Humphrey [ed.], Hackett Publishing Company 1983, p. 108.
19The need for such a periodization has been reiterated recently by A. Linklater in Beyond Realism and Marxism etc.
[pl42] It seems, however, that Linklater may not undertake its construction, being more immediately concerned with 
advancing the Habermasian project of Critical Theory in IR. For his definition of this latter task, see ibid. p. 143.
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indispensable tool for defining and testing our understanding of both the historical specificity 
and the key structural mechanisms of the modem social world. What tools are available within 
Realism for the construction of such a periodization?
2.3 Wight and the Limits of Realist History
In the low-key style which marked many of his sharpest insights, Martin Wight once observed 
how closely interdependent were the two tasks of dating the origins of the states-system and 
defining its overall historical identity:
If [the states-system] is seen as beginning after 1648 rather than after 1494... 
[secularized politics, raison d'etat or national interest, and a multiple balance 
of power become the norm, and the ideological strife of the French 
Revolutionary period and the twentieth century an aberration. If we go back to 
1494... we watch the states-system being shaped by the strains of four 
generations of doctrinal conflict, and of a bipolar balance of p o w e r . 2 0
It is therefore of some interest to ask why, when he came to offer his own preferred choice, he 
should have fixed not on the 1730s, nor 1713, nor 1648, 1494 - nor even 1454, but rather on 
7474.21 The argument developed to support this choice has three parts. Wight first defines a 
states-system in terms of six 'internal marks... : sovereign states... their mutual recognition... 
their accepted hierarchy... their means of regular communication... their framework of law and 
their means of defending their common interests'.22 He next observes that these conditions are 
wholly absent before the 15th Century and fully visible by 1713. The intervening three 
centuries therefore bear the transition from the (mythical?) lost union of Christendom to the 
systematised anarchy of high Absolutist Europe. Wight has too much an historian's instincts to 
insist that this transition moves along a single axis in causal terms or is accomplished 
simultaneously in its different aspects. Nonetheless, he accepts the challenge of locating a 
precise turning point; and because the plurality of'national' actors is the key indicator in his
2®The Origins of our states-system: geographical limits', in Systems o f  States, Leicester 1977, p.l 14.
2*F.H. Hinsley insisted that '...a new European states' system emerged in the 18th Century and not at an earlier date' 
[Power and the Pursuit o f  Peace, Cambridge 1963; p. 153]; David Jayne Hill represents the widest consensus in his 
affirmation that in the international development of Europe '...the Peace of Westphalia was the most important... public act 
of modem history, for from it dates the present political system of Europe as a group of independent sovereign states.' 
[p.599]. However, the French invasion of Italy is another commonly cited turning point: for example Dehio: '...the new 
structure came into existence at a quite definite moment, the beginning of the struggle among the great powers over Italy in 
1494.' [The Precarious Balance, London 1963; p.23] Further complications are introduced by the precocious behaviour of 
the major Italian city-states which not only pioneered the use of standing diplomacy but also concluded what can be 
regarded as the first collective security treaty, the Peace of Lodi, 1454. [For a discussion of the latter, see G. Mattingly, 
Renaissance Diplomacy, Harmondsworth 1965, Chapter 8.]
22 Wight 1977, p. 129.
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definition, he is led finally to identify as 'the real break123 the first Church Council to be 
organised along 'national' lines (which was also the last to be presided over by an Emperor):
The modem secular sovereign states-system arose from the ruins of the 
medieval international papal monarchy. The dividing line between the two is 
clearly marked by the Council of Constance...24
The peculiarity of this position may be seen if we turn Wight's implicit question, cited above, 
onto his own dating: what historical character of the states-system is emphasized by this 
periodization? The short answer, explicit already in his six-point definition, is: none - unless it 
be the simple fact of multiple political actors and the progressive legal recognition of their 
separateness. The system exists 'in itself from the moment that Christendom is sundered ('The 
first lamentations about international anarchy are heard' in the first half of the 15th Century), 
though it takes some two centuries for the diplomatic accoutrements of a states-system 'for 
itself to accumulate ('At Westphalia, the states-system does not come into existence: it comes 
of age.')25 The historical manner in which these conditions were contingently realised in 
Europe at this time, their production of and by wider social transformations, is immaterial: the 
periodization is constructed not as an historical explanation of how the modem system arose 
but as a bare dating of when one of its descriptive attributes appears. It might equally have 
appeared in ancient Greece, China in the period of the Warring States or India before the 
Moghul conquests; in fact, it did.26 When a putatively historical definition pans out so readily 
across the centuries, one must perforce reconsider what is being defined, and what relation it 
bears to the attempt to understand the history of the international system.
For the 'internal marks' listed by Wight are in fact external: they indicate merely mutual 
interaction between and regulation of discrete political entities. On this definition (in contrast 
with his speculation cited at the start of this section above), it is impossible to see where 
'doctrinal conflict', the French Revolution or anything like the global struggles of the 20th 
Century could come from. But there is no mystery here: we are firmly locked inside the 
familiar Realist straightjacket. When it contemplates the modern world, Realist theory sees
2^ibid. p. 151.
24ibid. p. 131.
25ibid. p. 151-2.
2^Wight cites these as other examples of the kind of states-system we are concerned with' [22] - though he has doubts 
about the Indian case. And he is by no means alone in identifying the surface effect of separate sovereignties as the core 
indicator in any history of the emergence of the modem international system. Dehio's 1963 study, The Precarious Balance, 
declares the same intention in its opening sentence: It is possible to imagine a history of the Western world that relates all 
events to the two principles of unity and diversity*, [p. 19] (Was he aware that Ibn Khaldun invoked almost the same 
oscillatory dynamic as the theme of the Arab civilization of the Maghreb?) F.H. Hinsley*s work of the same year is 
organized almost exclusively around the slow 'shift of emphasis, from concentration on Europe's unity to concentration on 
the autonomy of its states' [p. 162 ]. Most recently, Alan Watson's Evolution o f  International Society, (1992) offers to 
organize geopolitical systems from ancient Sumer to the present along a single spectrum from independence to empire.
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only what appear to be the timeless mechanics of an anarchical state-system. Consequently, 
(since this is what it takes as the explicandum), when it turns its gaze on the past, it finds at 
most the constitutional history of that system's emergence, a blindness which restricts it to 'a 
juristic survey, innocent of any sociological enquiry'. 2? And of course it is as much a fallacy to 
suggest that the historical rise of the modem international system can be captured in the formal 
shift from Christendom to anarchy (purely by external indicators) as it is to assume that the 
identity of the contemporary international system is given solely by anarchy. Thus Wight's 
essay opens up the prospect of an historical characterization of the international, only to close 
it down again by posing the issue in Realist terms.28
The question then arises: in what alternative terms should the issue be posed? Once the 
orthodox definition of the international as a separate realm governed by the timeless dynamics 
of a state-system is given up, the mere addition of the domestic political scene as an extra 
source of pressures determining the behaviour of states will not suffice.29 For if the 
international is not a separate realm moving according to its own autonomous determinations, 
then it needs to be understood - and theorized - as a level, or dimension, or moment of a 
broader more inclusive social order. And if this is so, then the characterization of a state- 
system itself cannot be contained at the level of the international, because its institutions and 
practices will inevitably reflect the forms of social power given by an historically specific social 
structure. This is a strong claim - though not, perhaps, one that would raise many eyebrows 
outside IR. Giddens is surely not alone in his skepticism:
... the very notion of a distinctive field of international relations, separated 
somehow from what goes on inside nations or 'societies', is in some part 
symptomatic of the limitations in social thought I have described... Although 
there must be divisions of labour and specialism within the social sciences, 
there can be no justification for the theoretical aberrations which this particular 
disciplinary partitioning tends to perpetuate.^
We find, then, that if we dispense with Realism, we have suddenly to address that series of
^Anderson's felicitous phrase, Lineages o f the Absolutist State, p.44n, directed at another work.
^ B u t at least Wight sensed some need to put dates on the state system. Some commentators seem happy to proceed with a 
determined neglect of history, cf. Waltz: The enduring character of international politics accounts for the striking 
sameness in the quality of international through the millennia, a statement that will meet with wide assent.' [Keohane ed. 
1986. p. 53.]
2"The transnationalist' school of thought, which sought among other things to make this addition, did not seek to replace 
Realism. Rather, Keohane & Nye's model [1977] of'complex interdependence' was offered as an additional ideal-type, 
making it possible to register and explain deviations from the Realist ideal-type which remained the underlying norm. See 
p.24: We do not argue... that complex interdependence faithfully reflects world political reality. Quite the contrary: both it 
and the realist portrait are ideal types. Most situations will fall somewhere between these two extremes...' Consistently 
with this, Keohane himself later embraced a 'neorealist' position as the deterioration of East-West relations gave a renewed 
centrality in IR theory to the militarily defined balance of power.
-^Giddens, The Constitution o f  Society, Cambridge 1985: p. 30-1.
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questions which animates the social sciences as a whole. We cannot avoid asking of our state- 
system: what kind of societies are involved? What are the core institutions and practices 
comprised in their material and political reproduction? How specific are the forms of their 
interrelation to this historical identity? And can we therefore distinguish the broad structural 
mechanisms of the modem international? What is it that makes it different from previous 
geopolitical systems?
In short, the break with Realism necessitates not just a different set of answers to the questions 
which have defined the discipline: what are the causes (and justifications) of war? how far do 
(and should) considerations of power govern the behaviour of states? what are the systemic 
properties and institutional needs of an unregulated, multi-actor system? and so on. 31 It 
necessitates something more fundamental: the wholesale transposition of IR theory out of this 
formal/legal problematic which takes the condition of anarchy as its starting point, and into an 
historical problematic whose starting point is the identification of what is distinctive in the 
social forms of modernity. It will, I hope, become clear that in implying a problematic of 
'modernity*, reference is not intended to either the schema of liberal modernization theory or 
the contemporary debates on modernism/postmodernism. Rather it is suggested that what we 
need to recover is that profound awareness of structural transformation and of a radical break 
with the past which stimulated the historical cast of the early social sciences.32
Effecting this transposition would have two major benefits. First, as already indicated, it would 
redefine the historical objects of IR theory and at last render visible that which needs to be 
explained: Wight's conviction that there is no international theory because there is nothing to 
theorize is meaningless outside the Realist problematic.^ Conversely, addressing the 
questions which compose our alternative problematic may reveal that there is a great deal 
more to our states-system than Realism can ever tell us. Second, the assimilation of IR to the 
other social sciences promises to be very fruitful in a more general sense; for not only will it 
make available to us the rich theoretical traditions of political economy and sociology; it also 
challenges us to develop them in new directions, to draw out their implications for thinking 
about international politics. It would probably be an exaggeration to say that the addition of an 
international perspective raises as many questions for political sociology as the recognition of 
sociology does for IR; but a review of some recent historical sociological work on the state 
suggests, at any rate, that we need not fear that we will replicate the work of other
31 This list of questions amalgamates and abbreviates the rival lists advanced by Bull & Kaplan in their philippics of 1966. 
See pp.367 and 10-11 respectively.
3^For a summary of the injection of history into the social sciences' in the early 19th century, see Hobsbawm 1962 
pp.344-7. And for the subsequent </ehistoricising of the same disciplines in the last quarter of the same century, sec 
Hobsbawm 1987, pp.269-75.
33A recent unhibited restatement of this thesis can be found in Alan James, The Realism of Realism', Review of 
International Studies July 1989. The author’s title aptly mirrors the tautology of his central argument.
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disciplines.34 To say that IR should be reconstituted as a social science does not entail that it 
either should or would disappear into Sociology.
2.4 Social Theory and Social Structure
How do we go about understanding historical societies? Giving some answer, however 
preliminary, to this question seems to become unavoidable at this point - if only for 
methodological reasons. We need to formulate some general perception of the relationship 
between social structure and geopolitical systems, a perception which will guide the historical 
work that will come in the chapters to follow. In order to do this, however, we must first say 
what we mean by social structure.
The problems involved in defining social structure in relation to human activity underlie one of 
the key fissures in the literature of social theory.35 However, it is not a debate that seems 
capable of resolution at that level of abstraction where it is formulated sui generis. Thus, for 
example, Giddens' structuration theory - explicitly presented as an attempt to replace the 
dualism of agency and structure with 'the duality of structure' - often amounts to little more 
than a series of (important but not unfamiliar) methodological injunctions about how the 
conduct of knowledgeable human agents may be theorized, woven into a descriptive and 
critical survey of the sociological perspectives in which they a p p ly ;^ 6  since these range from 
the primal constitution of consciousness right through to the articulation of the global political 
system the effect is undeniably impressive. But it cannot actually achieve what it prescribes 
because it is not itself a substantive social theory offering to explain determinate historical 
phenomena: rather, as already suggested, it is a tour of the modalities of human agency and 
social reproduction. In a sense, therefore, the task of defining what we mean by social 
structure is better undertaken at the next level 'down', where the varied use of structural 
explanations entails definite ontological and epistemological premises which can be assessed in
3^It is a curious feature of the revival of interest in the state within historical sociology that it has tended to adopt a 
broadly Realist perspective, seeking to identify irreducible properties and dynamics of state power. Perry Anderson's 
reviews [now gathered in A Zone o f Engagement, 1992] of Mann's and Runciman's works, albeit not rendered in an 
international relations idiom, contain stimulating theoretical criticisms of the 'power political' perspective implicit in their 
historical analyses. Paul Cammack [1989], concentrating on the domestic activities of the state, has delivered a strong 
polemical challenge to the status and coherence of arguments for 'state autonomy*. And within International Relations, 
unease has been expressed over what is seen as the uncritical take-up of Realist arguments by some historical sociologists - 
notably Michael Mann. See A. Jarvis, 1989. For a discussion of Giddens' work which attempts, perhaps unwisely, to 
distinguish its provenance from that of the Bringing the State Back In literature, see J. Rosenberg 1990.
3%or a clear overview of the postwar evolution of social theory, organized around this question, see Craib 1984.
3^The principal texts relating to this discussion of Giddens' work are The Constitution o f  Society [Cambridge 1984], The 
Nation-State and Violence [Cambridge 1985] and A Contemporary Critique o f  Historical Materialism [Basingstoke 1981]. 
Does Giddens recognise the inbuilt limitation mentioned in the text above? Tire concepts of structuration theory, as with 
any competing theoretical perspective, should for many research purposes be regarded as sensitizing devices, nothing 
more.’ 1984, p.326. For a powerful challenge to both the originality and the theoretical efficacy of Giddens' work, see D. 
Sayer, 'Reinventing the Wheel: Anthony Giddens, Karl Marx and Social Change’, in J. Clark et al. [cds] 1991.
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terms of both rational and evidential criteria.
At this level the definition of structure moves beyond the observation that many features of 
social reality both pre-exist and outlive the agency of the individuals through which they are 
reproduced - and the consequent (perhaps futile?) attempt to elaborate an abstract conception 
of structure which does not cancel the agency which it seeks to explain. It concentrates instead 
on specifying the actual social relationships which are reproduced over time - and the social 
practices and distribution of resources which are implicated in their reproduction.
Let us take as an example the relation between feudal lord and serf which obtained as a 
structural principle of rule and material appropriation across some areas of medieval Europe. 
This relation institutionalized a set of rights, obligations and resources governing the 
interaction of rulers and ruled - allocated differentially according to social position. This is 
what 'structure' denotes: a regularized relation between social positions which places 
individuals with respect to determinate resources (of various kinds) - defining simultaneously 
the range of practices compatible with its reproduction. It is an abstraction posed in order to 
illuminate the form and properties of a determinate set of relationships; it is not a law which 
operates from without to manipulate the individuals concerned. Nonetheless it makes it 
possible to define the historical character of a social order. This is done by examining the 
structures of relations involved in its reproduction, by specifying the mechanisms of social 
power, the sites of routine political contestation to which it gives rise, the kinds of social 
development within reach and those ruled out by the existing structuring of material interests 
and so on. For example, it makes little sense to expect medieval mercantile groups to have 
invested their profits in expanding the production of commodities. Not only were they not free 
to buy labour at will, since labour was tied to agrarian property relations; but also their 
interests were in regulating production to maximize profits in a limited market:
The experience of centuries had shown that the highest profits were not to be 
got in technical progress or even in production. They had adapted themselves 
to business activities in the comparatively narrow field which remained for 
them once one left aside the majority of the population of Europe as 
'economically neutral'^?
If anything, given that'they traded agrarian surpluses and luxury goods, they were parasitic on 
the existing aristocratic ascendancy and class relations.
This kind of analysis then, points up how the reproduction of social structures shapes the
^Hobsbawm 1965, p. 18-9. For the debates on the structural location of the early modem market, see Hilton [ed] 1976, 
Aston [ed] 1965, and more generally the work of R. Brenner, especially 1977.
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horizons and behaviour of the individuals concerned. But it does not entail that there is 
anything automatic or self-explanatory about that reproduction: on the contrary, the struggle 
against seigneurial encroachments on common rights was routine - not to mention the 'peasant 
uprisings which reached a crescendo with the intensification of labour services in the context 
of labour shortage in the 14th century'.38 Thus, while all societies promote an ideological 
naturalization of existing social structures, few would pretend that social order lives on 
normative consensus alone. It also involve the enforcement of compliance through routine 
deployment of a range of sanctions by concretely located actors. How these sanctions are 
mobilized, the form they take, the purchase they have on the capacities of those they seek to 
constrain - all these are specific to the structure of relationships involved. The forms of 
legitimate sanction available to a feudal lord differ enormously from those exercised by a 
capitalist employer - which differ fundamentally again from the disciplinary sanctions used by 
works managers in state socialist societies. The difference is not just that between physical 
coercion, redundancy and compulsory relocation. It concerns rather the structured distribution 
of resources between different social groups which gives the sanctions their leverage: 
unemployment held no terrors for the peasantry of medieval Europe, for they were in 
possession of the means of subsistence; 'free' labour is dependent in ways that tied labour 
never was.
But this is to make the obvious point that these sanctions do not activate themselves. Indeed 
sometimes they fail to work because structured relations of power have shifted, yielding a new 
autonomy/impunity to dominated groups. Sometimes it proves impossible to mobilize them at 
all -as when an embattled state organization is faced with a complete evaporation of its 
repressive apparatus. (The Shah's Iran springs to mind). There is a more general point here. 
One of the few explanatory (as opposed to descriptive) 'pay-offs' of Giddens' structuration 
theory is the notion of the 'dialectic of control'. Briefly stated, this refers to a generic feature of 
power relations given by the character of human a g e n c y : ^  short of conditions of mass 
murder, the need of those in power to secure the active compliance of the dominated always 
gives the latter a leverage which can be developed into a counter-sanction. Strikes in the 
capital-labour relation provide the clearest example of this, but it has a much wider scope. As 
a result, strategies of rule are subject to continuous modification in order to maintain their 
effectiveness in the face of struggle, innovation and maneuver.40 The implication is that the 
reproduction of social structures can never be assumed. It always needs to be explained as a
^Merrington in Hilton [ed.], 1976, p. 179
3^To be a human being is to be an agent - although not all agents are human beings - and to be an agent is to have power. 
Power* in this highly generalised sense means transformative capacity*, the capability to intervene in a given set of events 
so as in some way to alter them.' The Nation-State & Violence, Polity 1985, p.7.
^Externally too, one should add, the relations between political relations do not simply tick over: if nothing else, war 
makes their reproduction contingent upon the ability to mobilize effective sanctions.
52
contingent outcome of the practices involved - and of their wider context.41 Perhaps above all, 
then, functionalist forms of explanation are ruled out. Apart from the purely theoretical 
objections to this type of e x p l a n a t i o n ,^  the historical record is full of instances of functional 
requirements which were not met - prompting the need for an alternative form of explanation. 
If ever there was a dire functional requirement confronting a social system, it was epitomized 
in the urgent need of the 18th Century Polish nobility to generate an Absolutist state 
organization in the face of the military threat posed by its neighbours. Instead,
...jealously preserving the individual rights of every squireen against every other, and all 
against any dynasty, the Polish gentry committed suicide. Their pathological fear of a 
central state power institutionalized a nobiliary anarchy. The result was predictable:
Poland was wiped off the map by its neighbours.43
More generally of course, the vast majority of states in history have gone under44 - and our 
own age has witnessed the widespread collapse and transformation of social structures. 
Survival, just as much as dissolution, needs to be explained. History, as Giddens notes45 is not 
to be confused with change.
We have slipped, without explicitly registering the shift, from discussing a single set of 
relationships - a structure - to discussing social orders in the fuller sense - societies. Is this 
legitimate? That is to say, can it be argued that some structures of relationships are more 
deeply 'ontologically embedded' than others - meaning that their reproduction is not only more 
fundamental to the stable reproduction of the social formation as a whole, but also that it is 
consequential for the ordering and form of other social structures, and hence legitimately 
assumes a key role in the explanation of wider social development?^ And if societies are of 
this nature - complex but recognizable totalities - how do we distinguish the 'strategic 
relationships'47 which define their historical identity?.
41 The conditions of reproduction may extend far beyond those aspects of social reality which they invoke directly and 
formally.
47See for example Giddens 1984, pp. 12-13: '...to say that the existence of a social state A needs a social practice B to help 
it to survive in recognizably similar form is to pose a question that then has to be answered; it does not itself answer it.
The relation between A and B is not analogous to the relation that obtains between wants or needs and intentions in the 
individual actor. In the individual, wants that are constitutive of the motivational impulses of the actor generate a dynamic 
relation between motivation and intentionality. This is not the case with social systems, except where actors behave in 
cognizance of what they take to be social needs.' In other words, 'What 'must happen' for certain conditions of system 
reproduction to occur is posed as a counterfactual question, not as a covert version of functionalism.' ibid. p. 191. See also 
Sayer [1987], Chapter 5.
43Anderson 1974b, p.216
44A point reiterated recently by Fred Halliday with reference to Kenneth Waltz's claim that The death rate among states is 
remarkably low1, cf. Theorising the International', Economy & Society. Vol. 18 No. 3, August 1989, p.355.
451984, p.242
4^This formulation follows, as I understand it, the outline of Roy Bhaskai's position, summarised in Craib 1984:20-3.
47Wolf 1982, p. 76
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The answer given by Giddens is, it must be said, too general. It tells us what to look for 
without telling us how to identify it:
'Societies’ then, in sum, are social systems which 'stand out' in bas-relief from a 
background of a range of other systemic relationships in which they are embedded. They 
stand out because definite structural principles serve to produce a specifiable overall 
'clustering of institutions' across time and spaced
Once again, we need to descend to the level of substantive social theory in order to see how 
particular explanatory strategies are assembled, elaborated and applied. An especially clear 
example of this is provided by Eric Wolfs elegant presentation - all the more interesting for 
the anthropological ambiance of his statement of premises - of the modus operandi of 
historical materialism.49
Wolf begins with the linked observations that '[t]he human species is an outgrowth of natural 
processes; at the same time, the species is naturally social'. That is to say, however much 
humans may be defined (on account of their consciousness) over against the natural world, 
they nevertheless subsist materially in and through their interaction with nature; further, this 
interaction is carried on characteristically in groups made up of individuals connected to each 
other. These two facts are linked insofar as the interaction with nature is organised - that is, it 
comprises also a regularized social interaction (or relation) between individuals. There is both 
an analytic and an empirical simultaneity to the processes linked here - one which demands a 
single, dynamic category for its expression. This, says Wolf, is the purpose of the Marxian 
category of 'labour'. Where labour is involved - as distinct from the solitary activity of 'work' 
- the physical act of production by individuals is always at the same time the social act of 
reproduction of the historically specific set of social relations organizing production. Labour, 
and the division of labour, entails co-ordinated social roles, regularized relations of authority 
and subordination, shared cognitive schema and so on.
These observations are, we may say, just that: observations listing the multiple moments
4^1984, p. 164. Incidentally, this formulation does at least avoid the unnecessary embarrassment which some sociologists 
declare at the sense of closure implied in the word 'society1. For example Mann: It may seem an odd position for a 
sociologist to adopt; but if I could, I would abolish the concept of'society altogether.' [1986: 2] It is odd. As Giddens 
suggests [1984: 163] the ambiguity of the term (totality/association) is actually a fruitful one. John Hall [1989] cites the 
rejection of'classical sociolog/s concept of society" as a novel conclusion arising from the work of British historical 
sociology. In fact, there is nothing new in the radical rejection of a notion of'society as the object of sociological enquiry. 
The tradition extends back at least as far as Simmel and arguably includes Weber himself. [See Frisby & Sayer 1986, 
pp.54fr] That there are ways of introducing the necessary qualifications without abandonning the attempt to theorize social 
totalities may be seen from Anderson's weighing of the terms 'society and 'social formation'. [Anderson 1974a, p.22n] And 
Marx himself inveighed against the use of the term 'society as an abstraction. See the selections gathered on p. 19 of Sayer 
fed] 1989.
49For the following, see Wolf 1982, p.73-7
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(cognitive, organizational and physical) of the (social) labour process. The overall point is 
profound, but not controversial: it is a generic point about human agency and its relation to 
social structure which could equally be made about any organised human activity. 50 The fact 
that this activity comprises 'the universal condition for the metabolic interaction between man 
and nature, the everlasting nature-imposed condition of human existence'51 does not at this 
stage of the argument set it apart from any others. But here comes the move we are looking 
out for, the one that transforms descriptive observation into a full-blown substantive claim 
about how to understand and explain historical societies:
The specific economic form in which unpaid surplus labour is pumped out of direct 
producers, determines the relationship of rulers to ruled... It is always the direct 
relationship o f the owners o f the conditions ofproduction to the direct producers... 
which reveals the innermost secret, the hidden basis o f the entire social structure, and 
with it the political form of the relation of sovereignty and dependence, in short the 
corresponding specific forms of the state.52
Wolf calls this the strategic relationship - partly because it is the one where the material, 
political and ideological reproduction of a society are fused in the institutionalized practices of 
individuals: the Svires' connecting together the interaction of the society with the material 
world on the one hand, and the structured interaction of individuals which comprises the 
society on the other, all cross here. But beyond this it is claimed that as a result this relation 
composes a kind of fault-line running through any historical society - because it is the 'place' 
where conflict over the appropriation of surplus labour is routine: destabilize this relation and 
the result - slave rebellion, peasant revolt, general strike - threatens the whole social order. A 
'political' crisis of the mode of surplus extraction is a crisis of the material reproduction of the 
society as a whole because the two are accomplished in the same relation. This is 'the 
innermost secret' to which Marx refers; it is also perhaps the fundamental methodological 
premise of historical materialism.
But how did we get from the incontrovertible fact that labour involves social organization to 
the claim that the way to explain a social order is by studying it as a mode of surplus 
extraction? The second does not follow with logical necessity from the first.53 It is consistent 
with it, but so are many alternative starting points for a substantive social theory. One might
-^Some ethnomethodologists would contest this because of the very use of the notion of structure; but there is no necessary 
conflict between the insistence that all social action is locally* and actively produced by the knowledgeable practice of the 
agents involved and claims for more remote or diffuse forms of social causality. Giddens' assimilation of'practical 
consciousness' to the recursive definition of structure is one way of allowing for this.
51 Marx 1976, p.290.
^M arx, Moscow 1959, p.791, italics added.
^3Sayer discusses this point in Chapter 6  of The Violence o f Abstraction, p. 148.
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for example begin instead with the authoritative dimension involved in all forms of human 
social organization and contrast collectivities in terms of different principles of legitimation 
and co-ordination. It would not be implausible to discuss the work of Max Weber in such 
terms.54 Language and the communication of meanings have on occasion provided yet 
another starting point. In the terminology of the foregoing discussion, these positions could 
almost be understood as contradictory assertions about the ’ontological embeddedness' of the 
particular structure of social relations which each prioritizes - almost, but for the fact that 
Marxism, Weberian sociology and post-structuralism/structural linguistics do not even share 
the common conception of structure which would enable such a disagreement. They have 
already parted company at a theoretically anterior stage of their formulation.
So how do we choose between these premises and the explanatory frameworks they imply? 
How, in other words, do we assess the relative merits of two or more substantive social 
theories making competing claims about social reality? Craib [1984: 26] cites three criteria: 
the propositions comprising a theory should be mutually consistent; the theory 'must in some 
way be measured against evidence; and '[t]he better theory will be able to specify in more 
detail the causal processes at work and the situations in which causal mechanisms come into 
operation'.55
Thus, for our purposes, the adoption of a broad historical materialist framework is not 
axiomatic. It is contingent upon the claim - which remains to be substantiated - that this 
framework allows us to explain in greater detail and more consistently the historical objects 
and processes, causes and outcomes which constitute our field of study. As this formulation 
suggests, such a substantiation can only be retrospective. In the end, the ultimate judgement 
we can make of a substantive social theory is whether it enables us to write better history.
One further proviso may be worth making at this stage. On the understanding of it used in 
these pages, the central claim of historical materialism is emphatically not what it is often taken 
to be, even by many marxists, namely that economic relations determine political relations.56 It
^ F o r  one such treatment, see W. Mommsen, The Age o f  Bureaucracy, Oxford 1974. Beetham also gives some credence to 
this, albeit nuanced differently, p.257.
^C raib  1984, p.26.
^ I t  is a curious feature of the work of Giddens that, despite the initially constructive character of its engagement with 
Marx, it has persistently exhibited this most widespread of caricatures. Indeed, his own generic theory of power, 
elaborated in the two volumes of >4 Contemporary Critique o f  Historical Materialism, is premissed upon the claim that 
historical materialism is incapable of grasping the discrete importance of'authoritative resources' in the reproduction of 
social structures, involuntarily reducing them to the class analysis of'allocative resources' which supposedly defines its 
optic. But Giddens is actually a great hedger on this issue: he will not say what comprises his understanding of the 
potential of historical materialism. He rarely mentions it without adding a rider such as '...if that term be taken to refer to 
the interpretation of history that Marx oulines in the ’Preface’ to A Contribution to the Critique o f  Political Economy 
[1985, p.8 ]. More than once, the term retreats into scare-quotes. [Compare, for example, the usages on pp.xxix, 34, and 
227 of The Constitution o f Society.) Sayer has described certain aspects of Giddens' account of Marx as 'simply laughable' 
[1991b, p.242]
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is important to see this point clearly. If this were the core premise, we could make a nonsense 
out of it immediately. All we would need to do is step outside of the modem West into 
virtually any other historical society, European feudalism for example, and ask: 'Where is the 
economy?' One has only to look at the institution of serfdom and ask 'Is that an economic 
relation or a political relation?', or dynastic diplomacy and ask: 'Is that politics or economics?'
These questions are of course meaningless, because they involve imposing distinctively 
modem categories on a completely different kind of social world. And we do not find Marx 
wasting his time trying to answer them. This is because the central thesis of historical 
materialism is not economic determinism; it is the centrality of those relations which organize 
material production to the wider institutional reproduction of social orders. And exactly what 
those relations are in any given society is always an empirical question. We have to look and 
see. In the Grundrisse it turns out that they can include kinship relations, 'communality of 
blood, language, customs'. ^  7 In fact, it is uniquely in the modem western world that they 
appear to constitute a distinct institutional sphere of'purely economic' relations, separated off 
from the state. We cannot assume the distinctness of'economic' relations and categories in the 
way that ’base-superstructure' models of historical materialism seem to require: on the 
contrary, as we shall see later, their apparent distinctness in modem Western society is part of 
what we have to explain.
2.5 Social Structure and Geopolitical System
Do international relations precede or follow (logically) fundamental social
relations? There can be no doubt that they follow. ^8
It has been argued above that we understand societies by conceiving the set of historically 
specific structures of social relationships involved in their stable reproduction over time. These 
structured social relations do not sustain themselves; they are contingently reproduced by 
concretely located, knowledgeable human agents. However, they do have determinate 
properties, preconditions and consequences which define the mechanisms of social power, the 
distribution of resources and the institutional sites of routine social conflict. By specifying 
these for any particular society, we begin to elaborate its historical identity.
In the case of IR as a discipline, however, there remains one more theoretical question which 
must be addressed before we can begin our historical explorations, namely: what does all this
57Marx 1973, p.472.C Q
Gramsci, Selections from Prison Notebooks, London 1971, p. 176.
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have to do with IR? This question is most appropriately dealt with by turning it around, for the 
burden of proof here lies surely with the other party: is there any reason why we should revise 
this broad methodology when we turn to the subject matter of IR? To put the matter more 
directly: if societies are to be analyzed in terms of determinate structures of social 
relationships, does it make any sense to say that a whole dimension of these societies1 
reproduction - one indeed by virtue of which they comprise part of a wider society - will not 
submit to such an analysis? Why not? Is there an ontological difference between ’societies' and 
'the international system' (even supposing they could be conceived independently of each 
other) in the way that there indubitably is between societies and individual humans on the one 
hand, and humans and inanimate objects on the o th e r ? 5 9  What is the international system but a 
society - meaning not (necessarily) that its formal institutions uphold a normatively 
appropriated community of interest among its m e m b e r s ,60 but rather that it is actively 
reproduced as (and is therefore to be analyzed as) a set of social relationships?
If this is so, then we are now in a position to ask the underlying question of this chapter 
directly: how do we formulate the connection between social structure and the implied 
'structure' of the international? For as already noted above, if we reject the Realist separation 
of domestic and international into two separate spheres, we do not resolve our difficulty by 
substituting a model (however flexible) of a causal relationship between the two sectors and 
postulating ways in which 'the domestic' impacts on 'the international' and vice versa to the //th 
degree of complexity. The search for causal explanation in this form prejudges the issue by 
allowing that the two can be spoken of as if they were constituted separately. Now there are 
plenty of occasions in political and short-run historical analysis where this assumption is not at 
all disabling. For example, we might wish to focus on how separate internal and external 
causes interacted in the build-up to a political crisis. However, given our purpose here - which 
is to identify the structural continuities between domestic and geopolitical - this assumption of 
separateness is precisely what we have to get beyond. The conundrum is actually familiar from 
social theory: we are puzzling over how to theorize a social totality.
If this is the character of our subject matter, then the significance of the abstraction Marx calls
^  What might be a Realist riposte here: that multiple sovereign rights of violence without superordinate regulation 
distinguish fundamentally the character of the international' from that of the domestic? It should hardly need to be spelled 
out that this is not an ontological difference, merely a different form of structured social relationship.
6 ®Hedley Bull [1977: 13-14] sought to distinguish between an international society (showing the features just mentioned) 
and an international system (comprising the bare co-existence and interaction of states which however make no formal 
recognition of common interests and rules of behaviour). In terms of the usage of the term society adopted here, this would 
be to suggest that we could conceive a system that was not a social system. This is clearly a nonsense, and I recognise that 
Bull's usage is different; but in that case it must be challenged on historical grounds: did such geopolitical systems ever 
exist? To reserve the term 'society1 for systems which show formal, bureaucratically ordered institutions is misleading - a 
hangover from a tradition of political theory in which it seems all to easy to mistake the theoretical device of the 'state of 
nature' for the description of a real historical condition. (All this is aside from the fact that such a reservation sets us back 
on course for defining the state-system a la Wight, in terms of its 'internal marks'.)
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'the innermost secret' should be visible (and should have powerful explanatory potential) in any 
formulation of 'the international' as a social totality - or else, alternatively, it will be shown to 
be a far less powerful abstraction than is claimed for it. But how are we to operationalize it 
and find out?
Giddens writes the existence of a nation-state system into his definition of the nation-state.61 
This seems a very wise procedure. (Realism by contrast sees states as first constituted as 
individuals and subsequently moving into interaction with other states - hence its emergent 
conception of the structure of the state system and the exaggerated sway of ahistorical models 
such as those of game theory.) In attempting to elaborate an historical materialist theory of the 
international, let us adopt the same procedure. The difference it makes is simply this. We do 
not pose the issue in the form: ''If state 'x' is a capitalist/feudal/state-socialist state, how will 
this affect the way it behaves in its relations with other states?” That is to presuppose the state 
system as anterior to social structure: that way Realism lies. Rather we ask: "If the dominant 
mode of production of geopolitical system 'x' is capitalist etc., what consequences does this 
have for the form that its political moment*^ will assume, and what kinds of geopolitical 
power will be available/ impossible as a result?" For the character of a geopolitical system is 
no more to be understood as given simply by the plurality of competing units (however 
sophisticated our account of the 'mix' of the 'internal' and 'external' goals and determinations of 
behaviour) than the character of a society in the conventional sense is understood as the 
outcome of a plurality of pre-constituted individuals:*^ in both cases, the social system shows 
structural properties not deducible from the logic of rational choice - properties which 
comprise its historical identity, and whose delineation is an essential precondition of 
explanation. And Marx's claim, a strong one indeed, is that it is these properties which are to 
be understood by observing the dominant form of productive relations. If he is right, then 
when we conceive the modem international system, just as much as when we conceive any 
social formation, we need to understand how the mode of production and reproduction of 
social life is implicated in the institutional form of the political moment - in this case, the 
sovereign states-system itself.
In fact, Marx would be far from alone in making such a stipulation. Sociologists have from the
6 * Giddens 1985: The nation-state, which exists in a complex of other nation-states, is a set of institutional forms of 
governance maintaining an administrative monopoly over a territory with demarcated boundaries (borders), its rule being 
sanctioned by law and direct control of the means of internal and external violence.' [p. 121]
^M eaning the overall apparatus (vertical and lateral) of political rule - not just that aspect comprising lateral relations 
between state-organisations.
63This is why it is very difficult to ask a question like 'Why do states compete? without fortifying proto-Realist 
assumptions about how to explain international politics. Difficult though not impossible: if one were to ask the question 
Why do people compete? two kinds of answer might be returned: a naturalistic answer in terms of human nature; and a 
sociological answer in terms of historically specific institutions and practices. It is important to observe, however, that the 
latter answer, while being more satisfying, does overturn the form of the question.
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earliest posited a constitutive relation between social structure and the character of the 
international system. But this fact has been somewhat obscured by the way in which these 
themes are remembered today. Within Sociology the writings of Comte and St Simon among 
others, associating predatory warfare with a now passing feudal social order have been 
recalled above all in the debates on militarism.^ Yet the primary purpose of the writers 
concerned was to identify the structural specificity of the societies that were emerging around 
them and to understand the difference this would make to the character of the geopolitical 
s y s t e m . 65 And when all is said and done, the Hundred Years' Peace of 19th Century Europe 
still needs explaining - rather than simply being invoked as a contingent and aberrant historical 
circumstance which led the early sociologists into irenic delusions. For it was, as Polanyi 
noted, 'a phenomenon unheard of in the annals of Western Civilization' - and 'certainly not the 
result of an absence of grave causes for conflict.'66
The theoretical conclusions reached in this chapter are of a very general kind. We have 
discussed the conceptualizing of social structure and have drawn out an historical materialist 
guideline for research; we have reviewed briefly the criteria for assessing the adequacy of a 
substantive social theory, and we have asserted the ontological status of our material. We have 
not, however, sought to give a falsifiable answer to the question of exactly what the relation 
between social structure and geopolitical system comprises. The reason is that this is not a 
theoretical question. It is an empirical, historical question. To seek to resolve it at this level 
would be to dehistoricize it. This by no means entails that the question cannot be answered. 
But abstract social theory of this kind can only take us so far on its own. Pressed too far, it 
passes all to easily into theoreticism. Lest we fall into this trap, the rest must be history.
See Berghan 1984, and Mann 1984, 1987.
6 %or a discussion, see Therbom 1976 pp. 168 & 177ff. 
66Polanyi 1957, p.5.
60
Ill Secret Origins of the State: the Structual Basis of Raison D'Etat
3.1 Introduction: the Historical Legitimation of Realism
The Italian city-state system occupies a special place in the canon of orthodox International 
Relations. For, as Martin Wight says,
...it was among the Italian powers that feudal relationships first disappeared and 
the efficient, self-sufficient secular state was evolved, and the Italian powers 
invented the diplomatic system. 1
And of course this was not all they invented. In addition to the earliest modem discourse of 
Realpolitik fMachiavelli1, Carr tells us, 'is the first important political realist'.2), it is in the 
Italian city-states that we find the first routine use of double-entry book-keeping, of publicly 
traded state debt, of marine insurance, of sophisticated instruments of credit (such as the bill of 
exchange), of commercial and banking firms co-ordinating branch activity across the 
continent, and so on. Here too, the citizen militias gave way earliest to the mercenary armies 
that would later characterise European Absolutism; and within the town walls, a population 
given over increasingly to commerce and manufacture elaborated new forms of urban class 
conflict.
The list reads so much like a catalogue of modem institutions that it is almost surprising to 
recall that the cultural self-definition of these polities was bacIcward-\od\dng\ they identified 
themselves with the cities of classical antiquity, and their innovations were framed within a 
yearning '...to walk back into the pure radiance of the past'.-* The similarities between the 
Italian and the Greek cities are indeed striking, by no means restricted to the humanists' 
recovery of the classical heritage. For the ancient cities too had developed a distinctive urban 
political culture and had explored a range of governmental forms - monarchy, oligarchy, 
tyranny, democracy -recognisable in the evolution of the Italian towns. Both systems had high 
rates of civic participation (linked originally in each case with a citizen militia), and both 
experimented with sortition and short terms of office as a means of maintaining the separation 
of private and public interests in the state. In exalting the political community as the highest 
end of public morality, both elaborated secular ideologies which contrasted with the
1 Wight, Power Politics, 1986: 30. This is a fleeting reference. Neither Wight, nor Bull, nor Hinsley gives any systematic 
consideration to the question of what the conditions of this (by their own account) world-historical development might 
have been.
^The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1946, p.63.
^Petrarch, cited in Anderson, Lineages o f the Absolutist State, 1974b, p. 149.
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cosmological self-understanding of the hierarchical political formations which surrounded 
them. Both embraced and depended upon trading networks focused on maritime commerce, 
for which both developed extensive bodies of maritime law. Above all for our purposes, both 
constituted miniature stat e-sy stems. ^  The classical world had no precedent for standing 
diplomacy, but it appears to furnish a wealth of example and reflection - notably in the writings 
of Thucydides - upon the rights and wrongs of state behaviour, the emergent balances of 
geopolitical competition within a multipolar system, and the elaboration of diplomatic 
institutions for regulating interstate conflict in the face of threats from outside the system. It 
was, and remains, the only known historical site of a premodem discourse of raison d'etat5
On the face of it, this paradoxical contrast may be a common enough feature of historical 
change. Marx referred to a 'process of world-historical necromancy':
...just when [people] appear to be engaged in the revolutionary transformation 
of themselves and their material surroundings, in the creation of something 
which does not yet exist, precisely in such epochs of revolutionary crisis they 
timidly conjure up the spirits of the past to help them; they borrow their names, 
slogans and costumes so as to stage the new world-historical scene in this 
venerable disguise and borrowed language. ^
But for students of international relations, the dual identity of the Italian city-states - dawn of 
the modem, echo of the ancient world - necessarily bears an added significance. For it brings 
us face to face with that appearance of transhistorical continuity between state-systems of 
vastly differing social structure which Realism draws upon to support its claims for the 
geopolitical realm as sui generis.
These Realist historical credentials have led something of a charmed life within the discipline. 
They are rarely challenged - perhaps because the 'timelessness' of the Renaissance and 
Classical civilizations is taken so much for granted throughout the humanities. Shakespeare, 
wrote his friend, Ben Jonson, 'was not of an age but for all time!'. And what reader today 
could deny the same of Thucydides? Is not the arresting 'modernity' of his prose precisely 
evidence of a timeless logic of inter-state behaviour which forms the natural and distinctive 
starting point for IR theory? How else is it to be accounted for?
4Less commonly remarked is the reappearance in strength of another prominent classical institution: slavery. Denys Hay 
(Europe in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries, London 1966, pp.374-5) suggests that in Fourteenth century Genoa, 
slaves may have accounted for 10% of the population. However, as Anderson emphasises, these tended to be domestic 
servants, slave labour in production being confined to the overseas sugar plantation and mining colonies. [1974b:151] 
^Wight asks (without finding any answer) whether certain schools of thought in the China of the Warring States could 
provide another example. [Systems o f States, Leicester 1977, p. 39]
”The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte', in Surveys from Exile, p. 149.
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The ease with which these points follow on from each other perhaps explains (and in turn is 
explained by) what seems at first a more puzzling circumstance: namely the paucity within IR 
of actual historical research into these premodem geopolitical systems. Behind the countless 
casual references to the Italian and Greek city-states, there lies no corpus of historical analysis 
and debate within IR. (Elsewhere, of course, there is plenty, but it is mostly not focussed 
theoretically on 'the international question’.) A couple of dry, legalistic surveys by Wight, the 
odd chapter or article here and there on Greek or Italian political theory, two or three dusty 
volumes sleeping peacefully on library shelves marked 'History of International Law' - is this 
really all there is? Whatever other research has been done, it certainly keeps a very low profile. 
This is not a live issue in IR theory. But it ought to be.
What if Northern Italy did not see the genesis of the modem international system? What if 
Thucydides did not offer a balance of power explanation of the Peloponnesian War? And what 
if the existence of an 'autonomous realm of the political', which indeed characterises all three 
cases, can be shown to have rested not on their shared 'external' identity as state-systems but 
rather on an internal (and in each case different) structural configuration of social relations? 
The answer is that this may not be just a little local difficulty with dispensible historical 
precedents: it may bear directly on the adequacy of the dominant Realist theory of the modem 
system. For it would show that this theory lacks the historical definition to which it pretends. 
And ahistorical theories in the social sciences tend to suffer two persistent and debilitating 
liabilities. First, they have no means of testing whether properties assumed to be universal are 
in fact specific to a particular (usually contemporary) epoch. This blots with anachronisms 
their image of the past. Second without an historical depth of field there is always the danger 
of posing as irreducible, essential starting points aspects of the modem world which are 
themselves outcomes requiring explanation. Behind the veil of familiarity, the present too goes 
unexplained. In the case of Realism, historical examples work precisely to stress the 
irreducibility of its starting point (the autonomy of the political/the autonomous state), pre­
empting further analysis by demonstrating its elemental, transhistorical character. As Halliday 
has pointed out, it is 'indeed paradoxical that a concept so central to the whole discipline 
should escape explication as this one has'.? For what if the autonomy of the political is itself a 
contingent historical development? Would that not mean that a crucial dimension of the 
modem system was opaque to Realism? And would we not then stand in pressing need of an 
alternative explanation of the undoubted similarities between the Classical, Renaissance and 
modem systems?
7,State and Society in International Relations: A Second Agenda', Millennium Vol. 16, No.2, p.217.
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The aim of this chapter then, is partly to call the Realist bluff by taking a closer look at these 
premodern geopolitical systems: can we trust the historical references, or are they hiding 
something? It will be argued in this connection that the historical terrain often regarded as the 
stronghold of Realism is actually the site of its most spectacular failures.
The argument is set out in the following manner. First, the early development of the Italian 
city-state system is briefly reviewed, particular attention being given to the emergence of a 
distinct public political sphere. This, it is suggested, was crucially linked with the articulation 
of a discourse of raison d'etat. The next section recalls Marx's discussion of the structural 
conditions of the rise of such a 'purely political state'; and the chapter then turns to consider^ 
how these conditions came to obtain in the Italian case - through processes extending dcase - throug 
into the feudal world surrounding the city-states. This makes it possible to assess broadly the 
supposed Italian origins of the modem system, before moving on to explore the structural 
basis of the 'purely political' sphere in Classical Athens. Here again, the emergence of a 
recognizable discourse of raison d'etat is traced not to the multipolarity of the geopolitical 
order, but to the structural configuration of social relations organizing the material 
reproduction of the society - in particular the remarkable interdependence of democracy and 
slavery. This alternative analysis is then used to challenge the common association of 
Thucydides with the Realist theoiy of the balance of power.
But the primary purpose is constructive. And it should perhaps be stressed again at the outset 
that the final destination of the argument is neither Italy nor Greece but rather our own 
modem international system whose actual historical identity is effaced by the too easy 
rehearsal of transhistorical similarities. For if the generic properties of states-systems will not 
suffice to explain the familiarity of Italy and Greece then, as already suggested, they lose their 
credibility also as a starting point for understanding the modem world. For this reason, 
although the systematic treatment of the sovereign states-system is reserved to Chapter V, the 
perspectives used below to explore the premodem cases are, in the conclusion to this chapter 
turned briefly on to the modem world in order to draw out their preliminary implications for 
IR theory in general. In short, it is not enough to perform the usual expose and walk away. To 
secure the ground we must pursue our methodological critique into the sketching of an 
alternative historical explanation. We must give our own answer to the riddle of historical 
appearances. And it must be a better one.
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3.2 Renaissance Italy
(i) Political Development o f the Commune
The independence of the medieval towns of northern Italy had been secured at a very general 
level by the repulse of two German Imperial attempts to unify the peninsula under feudal 
monarchy. In 1160 the citizen militias of the Lombard League defeated the army of Frederick I 
(Barbarrossa). In the following century his grandson, attacking from Sicily, set in chain the 
events leading to the complete destruction of Hohenstauffen power in Italy. Both these 
campaigns assumed the form of the struggle between Empire and Papacy.** Nonetheless, as 
Anderson suggests, it was a cross-cutting dynamic, the precocious economic development of 
northern Italy, which proved decisive in their outcome. ^  Florence supplied not only troops for 
the papal cause: its merchants raised the enormous loans which funded the Angevin mercenary 
army that destroyed Frederick. In the decades which followed, French rule fractured in the 
south (the Sicilian Vespers of 1282), while the papacy first removed to Avignon (1309), 
returning in 1377 only to disable itself yet further by the Great Schism of the following year. 
Outside intervention and influence in northern Italy by no means ceased at this point, and the 
Ottoman threat in the east grew alarmingly in the following century; but with the drastic 
weakening of both Papacy and Empire in the peninsula, and France distracted by the Hundred 
Years War, the region enjoyed a geopolitical seclusion that would last up until the French 
invasion of 1494. Thereafter, the substantive independence of the city states was submerged 
again, first under French then Hapsburg domination. It was the intervening 'Golden Age' (e.g. 
1378-1494) which saw the innovation, along with much else, of'the system of organising 
interstate relationship^] which Europe later adopted.'^
The complex of political communities which achieved this had of course already undergone an 
extensive process of development by the time of the Great Schism. At the start of the 13 th 
Century there were some two to three hundred more or less independent Communes, towns 
which had shaken off episcopal authority (mostly in the seven decades up to 1150) and 
constituted themselves under the Consular system as self-governing merchant/landowning
^The Communes were by no means united in their hostility to the Empire. Many of them had, after all, sealed their 
independence from episcopal rule by winning Imperial recognition of their autonomy. [See D. Waley, The Italian City- 
Republics, Third Edition, Longman 1988, pp. 32-4] And the Papal-Imperial contest would continue to provide the 
ideological form - though decreasingly the actual content - of both geopolitical and internal factional conflicts for many 
years to come. On the Guelfs and the Ghibellines, see Waley pp. 145-56, who also gives instances where this diplomatic 
partisanship continued to have a very real material basis - e.g. Florentine Guelfism. [p. 148]
^ 1974b, p. 143.
^Garrett Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy, Harmondsworth 1965, p.65.
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oligarchies. 1 * Their numbers had already diminished considerably, as the combined effects of 
internal political instability, competition over rural hinterlands and trade routes, and the 
inability to meet the rising minimal military conditions of survival gave opportunity for 
expansion and absorption. The 12th century in particular saw an accelerated process of 
combined external consolidation (the assertion of communal authority in the contado, or rural 
hinterland) and evolution of internal political institutions.
Under these conditions the city-state system underwent not just a geopolitical reorganisation 
but also a decline of the Consular political form. The Consulates had proved unstable in part 
because the leading merchant families which composed both the commercial and the political 
elites carried their factional rivalry into the institutions of town government already under 
pressure from the small-trader and artisanal class below. The measures taken by the citizens’ 
assemblies to pre-empt the chronic risk involved in this arrangement constitute perhaps the 
single most remarkable - and certainly the most revealing - aspect of the political development 
of the Commune. Terms of office were shortened (sometimes to as little as two months as in 
the case of the priori making up the ruling council in Florence, ^  more usually to six months 
or a year) - with incumbents being ineligible (along with their entire families) for immediate re- 
election. The representative character of key elections was persistently diluted by adding in 
sortition r o u n d s . 13 Legislative initiative was dispersed among a multitude of committees. And 
the highest judicial and military offices - the podesteria (judge) and capitaneria (army 
commander) - were banned to native residents altogether: their terms usually restricted to six 
months, they were filled by candidates from outside who were rigorously vetted for 
remoteness of interest and blood, and then tightly sequestered for the length of their office in 
order to preserve their neutrality. ^
In short, and albeit with considerable variation in detail and extent between individual towns, 
the Communes attempted to insulate government from the private power of individuals, to 
reconstitute the sphere of political life as an autonomous public realm, to separate out the 
state as an institution: the podesta '...was not a ruler, but rather he stood for the rule o f  la w 1. ^
The public realm opened up by these developments was of course a restricted one. Citizenship 
did not extend to the contado, where a subject population was compelled to deliver monies, 
foodstuffs and military service to the Commune. The abolition of serfdom in the contado often
1 *The ruling groups of the early communes were the major landholders; the later rise of trade did not produce a landless 
commercial bourgeoisie (an index perhaps of the very weakness here of seigniorial power). By contrast with the cities of 
northern Europe, the quintessential burgher... is not identifiable' in Italy. [Waley p. 118]
^ G . Holmes, Europe: Hierarchy and Revolt 1320-1450, Fontana 1975, p.81.
* The procedure for the election of the Venetian Doge comprised no less than five  sequent ballots, each one (except the 
last) immediately stymied by a further selection by lot. See Hay, p. 120, and for further examples, Waley p.37.
“ See Waley pp.42-3.
^Waley p.43.
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signalled only the completion of Communal domination; in some ways indeed the towns were 
not so much anti-feudal as 'urban modalities of the general mechanism for surplus extraction 
typical of the age, directed against competing rural practitioners'. ^  But the distinctive 
institutional form of the Commune did nonetheless have significant external aspects. One of 
these is captured in Sereni's observation that '...Italian wars generally assumed the character of 
public wars, that is, of real conflicts between states, while private wars were still very frequent 
in the rest of Europe'.^ What is a public war? Perhaps an acceptable definition would be: one 
undertaken by or on behalf of a community, in which the goals pursued or threats responded 
to concern collective interests. In a public war, the corporate interests of the community 
(however these are ascertained) are assumed in principle to be the highest moral end. It is 
therefore legitimated by raison d'etat in a way that private wars cannot be. And private 
warfare does not refer only to the prosecution of defiance by nobles. Any conflict formally 
undertaken in pursuit of individual material and political aggrandizement is a private war. In 
this sense, even wars between medieval monarchs remained private: their legitimation took the 
form of dynastic claims (often appealing also to religious sanction); and the laws of war 
significantly pertained to the conduct of individuals rather than collectivities such as states. ^  
This gives rise to something of a paradox. In the course of a rivetting passage in Renaissance 
Diplomacy, Garrett Mattingly declares
...in Italy, power was temporal in the strictest sense of the term. It was naked
and free, without even the most tenuous connection with eternity... [The
Communes were] 'the first omnicompetent, amoral, sovereign states'. ^
By 'naked power' he refers mainly to the fact that the internal political constitution of the 
Commune was secular, wearing no sanction of religious legitimacy such as adorned the 
hierarchical structures of the surrounding feudal world. Mattingly is of course right to stress 
the permanent internal instability of the Communes; but the additional suggestion that brute 
force predominated in Italy as the irreplaceable support of illegitimacy is slightly misleading. 
Was noble power in the countryside any less brutal? And in one respect at least, was not the 
religious legitimation of feudal domination required precisely by its private character, which 
otherwise would indeed have appeared more 'naked' (in the sense of arbitrary and 
particularistic) than the internal political structures of the Commune? It is estimated that fully 
one third of the free residents of the Communes may have participated actively in the politics
^Anderson, Passages, p. 192.
Sereni, The Italian Conception o f  International Law, Columbia 1943, p.42.
^'...medieval treaty law was usually contained in the glosses and commentaries on contract law... individuals rather than 
sovereign states were the principal subjects of international law...' J.L. Holgrefe, The Origins of Modem International 
Relations Theory1, Review of International Studies 1989, 15, pp. 13-4.
^op. cit. p.53.
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and administration of their towns each year - a proportion equivalent to that in Athens. 20 
Perhaps then the real point is that the ’naked' power that requires no religious sanction may be 
despotic or usurpatious: or it may be public power, morally self-sufficient because it appeals to 
an arena, real or ideal, of common interest s. 21 One index of this possibility in Italy is the 
vigorous attachment to the rule of law, which also had an external aspect: the cities agreed to 
continue observance of the municipal (cosmopolitan) law of the Empire even after Imperial 
authority waned: 'When the Emperor was no longer recognised as superior, his place was 
taken by the la w '.22 We shall return to these themes below.
The standing embassies of later renown did not arise on a significant scale until the latter half 
of the 15th century, but organised diplomatic interaction between the Communes was 
continuous and intense from the start. So much so, indeed, that Waley suggests that '...the 
Commune of 1200 may be considered essentially the product of such [external] relations.'23 in 
at least one sense this was often literally true: the military efforts required both to suppress 
feudal power in the contado and to secure new boundaries against attack from other 
Communes 'multiplied expenditure, hence revenue' and were '...the main force which matured 
the cities' fiscal institutions'.24 But beyond this, the material and organisational reproduction 
of the Communes was carried on in significant part through their peacetime interaction by 
trade and joint political co-ordination. The growth of traffic between the cities called forth and 
was fostered by treaties extending reciprocal guarantees of the safety of communications, the 
civil rights of foreign merchants and arrangements for extradition. Cities negotiated about 
bilateral tariff concessions, the material facilities (such as warehouses) to be made available to 
each other's traders, the procedures for the settlement of private disputes and so on. This in 
turn promoted an expansion of the apparatus of government in general, and in particular 
required an 'exact determination of the frontiers between the different states', leading often in 
turn to the appointment of 'magistrates charged with maintaining the boundaries'.25 Thus, by 
a symbiotic process familiar to students of later Absolutist Europe, the heightened surveillance 
within communal territories, which produced a sharpening of the territorial form of the state, 
was increasingly both a function and a precondition of intercourse between Communes. 26
2®Waley, op. cit. p.6 8 .
For a brief but pregnant discussion of the operation of religious legitimation in hierarchical modes of domination, see 
Eric Wolf, Europe and the People Without History, Berkeley 1982, p.83.
^^Cited in Sereni, op. cit. p. 14.
2 3 Waley, p.8 8 .
24 Waley, p.49
2 5 A. P. Sereni, The Italian Conception o f  International Law, Columbia University Press 1943, p. 11.
2^Giddens observes the simultaneous and interlinked emergence of domestic and international political structures with 
respect to the rise of the nation-state. See especially, The Nation-State and Violence, Polity 1985, Chapter 4.
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By the start of the 13 th century, ’the podesta had become the rule rather than the exception’.27 
Yet it was from the beginning a precarious settlement. The town nobles continued their violent 
feuding from their towers or from the exile where they were not infrequently despatched in 
large groups. The tensions between the nobles and the popolo could break out into open 
warfare. And to add to the manifold sources of inter-communal hostility, the peninsula as a 
whole was still (for the first half of the century) disturbed by the intervention of Emperor and 
Pope. Many Communes were increasingly obliged to place themselves under the military 
protection of local feudal lords. Even Florence, which retained its republican institutions well 
into the 15th Century, passed in and out of the protection of outside powers no less than three 
times between 1313 and 1 3 4 3 .28 Elsewhere, the result was the rise of the signori - often 
feudal magnates whose access to rural military and agrarian resources supplied the leverage at 
a moment of crisis to transform their tenure of podesteria or capitamria into a permanent 
executive position.
The great republic of Milan fell to the Visconti just before the turn of the century,29 and by 
the 1320s the signori held power throughout most of the system. ^ 0 This development further 
hastened the territorial concentration of the city-states while at the same time arresting their 
political evolution. But it did not represent a straightforward reassertion of rural feudal power: 
the towns were now a curious amalgam of merchant and noble forms. As Salzer put it:
...in the Signoria the two political principles which had so long fought one
another in Italy, Municipalism and Feudalism [were] joined together.^ 1
And to a greater or lesser extent, Signori found that they had to rule through republican 
institutions.^2 in the most remarkable instance of sustained political autonomy, the effective 
rule of Cosimo de Medici over Florence for three decades barely rippled the surface of 
republican government. The private economic power by which he maintained his influence in 
the committees provided the perfect counterpoint to the public sphere which he manipulated 
with such skill.33
22Waley p.42.
2 8 Holmes: 81-2
2^Matteo Visconti secured the Imperial Vicariate in 1294. [Hay, op. cit. p. 167]
Among the exceptions were Venice and Florence, which had expanded sufficiently to secure their own defences.
Cited in Waley, p. 158. For a discussion of the formal survival of republican institutions, see Lauro Martines, Power and 
Imagination: City-States in Renaissance Italy, New York 1979, pp.l02ff.
32Martines observes that Tor all their original violence, signori knew that they could endure only by regularising 
procedures and affecting to side with the rule of law... The major legislative bodies survived in nearly all the cities that fell 
subject to signorial rule.' Power and Imagination: City-States in Renaissance Italy, New York 1979, p. 103.
^^Cosimo held supreme public office for only three two-month terms during the entire period of his ascendancy. [A Short 
History o f  Italy, Hearder & Waley, Cambridge 1963, p.85.
69
(ii) Sources o f Political Autonomy
The word 'autonomous' has been used above to describe the emergence of Communal political 
institutions. This is a loaded term in the literature of IR: what exactly is meant by it here? It 
may help in answering this question to compare Communal institutions with those 
characterising the predominant, seigniorial form of political power. For the most striking 
contrast is precisely that in the latter case economic activity and the exercise of political 
authority are not separated out. The heritable fief typically combines personal rights of 
appropriation over land and productive labour with extensive political jurisdiction. On the one 
hand, the fief is 'owed' to the liege lord not as a public office but as a personally contracted 
possession; on the other, it carries rights of economic exploitation which can be exercised only 
through mechanisms of political command and subordination - serfdom. There are thus no 
distinct 'political' and 'economic' realms. The emergence of a public political sphere is blocked 
by the particularist, private character of'parcellised sovereignty'; and the 'purely economic' 
relationships which constitute the fabric of an 'economy' in the modem sense are precluded by 
the politically unfree status of rural labour.
There is also therefore no state in the modem sense. There is a degree of regulation of the 
noble class provided by royal suzerainty; and there are more or less concerted attempts to 
expand the scope of royal authority through the system of courts and the contesting of 
ecclesiastical prerogative. There are legal codes and attempts to consolidate centralised 
political rule. But '...there is as yet no political constitution as distinct from the actual material 
state or the other content of the life of the n a t io n . ' - ^  Nothing could be more emblematic of 
this fusion than the role assumed by dynastic diplomacy as a mechanism of accumulation and 
expansion in the geopolitics of the age. This institution visibly depends for its operation upon 
the inseparability of personal property and political jurisdiction - depends, that is, on the non­
existence of an autonomous state. Several other resultant peculiarities of feudal 'political' 
power are frequently remarked - the recognition of private rights of w arfare^ the absence of 
a distinct body of public international law and so o n . 36 One might add that in this period the 
very reference of the term 'the state' was different, denoting something closer to 'the civil state' 
later contrasted with 'the state of nature'. The modem sense, a public political organisation 
contrasted with 'civil society' is a much later arrival again.
Marx was from the earliest in no doubt that the social transformations registered in the 
distance between these couplets - e.g. the emergence and reproduction of the 'autonomous'
^M arx, ^Critique of Hegel's Rechtsphilosophiereprinted in Sayer [ed.] Readings from Karl Marx, London 1989, p. 116. 
^S ee  J.L. Holzgrefe, op. cit., p. 12.
^S ee  note 19 above.
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state on the one hand and the 'non-political’ civil society on the other - had to be seen as 
structurally interdependent:
The establishment o f the political state and the dissolution of civil society into 
independent individuals - whose relations with one another depend on law, just 
as the relations of men in the system of estates and guilds depended on 
privilege - is accomplished by one and the same act.37
As Derek Sayer has argued, Marx's early writings repeatedly focus on the links between the 
dominant mechanisms of surplus appropriation characteristic of the new 'civil society' and this 
reconstitution of political power as public a u t h o r i t y .^  In particular, Marx stresses that so long 
as the material reproduction of a social order is organised through institutionalised political 
subjection, 'politics' cannot be disengaged from privilege. Under these conditions,
...the unity of the state, and also the consciousness, will and activity of this 
unity, the general power of the state, are likewise bound to appear as the 
particular affair of a ru ler.39
It is only when 'the political character o f civil society is abolished (substituting non-political 
mechanisms of surplus appropriation) that politics can assume a general, autonomous form in 
the state, replacing the particularist private form of the estates. The overthrow of feudalism
...set free the political spirit, which had been, as it were, split up, partitioned 
and dispersed in the various blind alleys of feudal society. It gathered the 
dispersed parts of the political spirit, freed it from its intermixture with civil life, 
and established it as the sphere of the community, the general concern of the 
nation, ideally independent of those particular elements of civil life.40
Given the widespread assumption in IR (and elsewhere) that Marxism comprises a theory of 
civil society which is incapable of apprehending the state except in instrumentalist or 
reductionist terms, these passages are truly remarkable. For what is being discussed here 
except the very state autonomy which, generalised into a universal feature of political 
organisation, forms the cornerstone of Realist theory? The political spirit' can be nothing other 
than raison d'etat (an idiom indeed foreign to the political discourses of feudalism). And these
37-On the Jewish Question', reprinted in Sayer [ed], Readings From Karl Marx, London 1989, p. 125.
3^See for example, The Critique of Politics and Political Economy: capitalism, communism and the state in Marx's 
writings of the mid-1840s', Sociological Review 33 (2) 1985.
3^Sayer [ed], p. 124.
^ibid.
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phrases - 'the general power of the state... the political state... a real state... the state as such... 
the state [as] a separate entity, beside and outside civil society'^ * - would not seem out of 
place on the lips of E. H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, or any other writer arguing for 'the 
autonomy of the political'. The difference of course is that Marx does not regard this 
autonomy as an attribute of institutions of rule stii generis. Any exercise of government 
includes general social functions and mobilises collective powers; but the emergence of a 
'purely political' sphere is an historical development which rests upon a determinate structural 
configuration of social relations. Furthermore this is not to be understood simplistically as a 
causal autonomy of the state as an organisation. It does not follow that once a public political 
sphere has emerged, some imputed universal properties of statehood could then provide a self- 
sufficient basis of substantive explanation of historical outcomes. On the contrary, this is a 
theory of 'the autonomy of the political' which begins by grounding our analysis of the state in 
a conception of the social totality.
(iii) Italy and Europe
Is this then what was happening inside the walls of the Italian towns - and if so, what were the 
particular historical conditions which made it possible? This question requires that we 
supplement our account of the internal characteristics of the Italian system with some 
observations on its external integration into the wider social formation.
For the temporary geopolitical isolation of northern Italy from feudal Europe in the late 14th 
and 15th centuries does not, of course, mean that the development of the city-state system 
took place in a vacuum. Rather the opposite is true. Any attempt to picture what followed as 
the unfolding of 'a little world by itself, an independent and self-contained system, would be 
drastically misleading.42 For the city-states were at the very hub of the wheel of medieval 
medium- and long-distance commerce. They virtually monopolised East-West trade, in large 
part through their entrepots in the eastern Mediterranean (Venice) and the Black Sea (Genoa). 
And these entrepots were not precarious footholds in a hostile, alien environment. In some 
cases they were substantial territorial possessions in Asia Minor, continuously sanctioned by 
diplomatic recognition within a thriving east Mediterranean state-system.43
For a discussion of the last three of these, drawn from the same texts, see Sayer 1985, pp.230-3.
^H ill's  phrase, A History o f Diplomacy in the International Development ofEurope, Vol. I p.359. Butterfield similarly 
allows that for many commentators '...the states of the Renaissance... formed a neat closed area... an arena of limited size... 
a field of interacting forces such as can be envisaged for the most part in isolation.' [Diplomatic Investigations, Butterfield 
& Wight (eds.), London 1966, p. 133.] Mattingly's gripping history, by concentrating on the emergence of ambassadors, has 
this disadvantage. And viewed from the other side of the Alps, this geopolitical isolation has a similarly deceptive effect: 
Renaissance Italy is one of the stranger silences of Mann's Sources o f  Social Power.
4-1 The lack of a common culture does not appear to have inhibited the growth of a flourishing 'international society1 in the 
eastern Mediterranean at this time: ft must be especially stressed that Italian states attributed more or less the same legal
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Venice had already been the principal conduit of western trade with Byzantium and the Levant 
in the ninth century .44 (Formally still under Byzantine rule, she was far better placed to 
penetrate eastern trade than were her rivals 45) it was, however, the Crusades, with the great 
opportunities they created for carrying and booty, which gave the cities their chance. After the 
First Crusade (1096) Genoa, which had led the way in providing direct naval assistance, 
acquired one third of the city of Caesaria and the right to trade without duties and levies 
throughout the Crusader kingdoms.46 in the century which followed, the Venetian colony of 
merchants in Constantinople grew to number some ten thousand individuals 4? In the latter 
half of the twelfth century however this tremendously lucrative trade was beset with crisis.48 
The combination of increased competition among European carriers at Byzantium and 
Alexandria (forcing up supply prices) with persistent debasement of coinage by the European 
monarchs (reducing the value of sales) produced a gradual squeeze on profits. Saladin restored 
Moslem control over Palestine and Syria - leaving only a narrow coastal strip to the 
Crusaders, (dependent upon Italian naval support), and provoking a further reduction in trade 
due to papal bans on commercial intercourse between Christians and Moslems. Finally, the 
Venetian traders at Constantinople were enduring rising levels of violent resentment from their 
Byzantine competitors as (Greek) Imperial protection weakened.
Relief came with the Fourth Crusade, culminating in the fall of Constantinople in 1204. For the 
leading Italian city-states, the spoils gained by their participation in this operation were nothing 
short of spectacular. Genoa founded the entrepot city of Caffa on the Black Sea and was 
granted in addition Vast neighbouring lands which were veritable colonies'.49 Venice won 
(though, significantly, chose not to take possession of) three eighths of the territory of the 
Byzantine Empire and secured not just monopoly rights but also the indirect rule of 
Constantinople for the next fifty years.50 Venice and Genoa were to fight bitter naval wars 
over the next hundred years for control of the eastern trade. But their prize was itself 
dependent upon a temporary and shifting geopolitical conjuncture. In the following (14th) 
century, direct trading communication with the far East was broken with the collapse of the 
Mongol Khanates. The diversion of this commerce into the hands of moslem seafarers 
produced a further great increase in prices. As the Ottomans extended their sway in Asia
value to agreements concluded with Mohammedan sovereigns as to those concluded with Christian states...’ [Sereni p.28] 
On the contrary, all the cultural and political authority of the Church itself seems to have been unable to suppress Christian 
intercourse with the Moslem world: H us constant repetition of ecclesiastical prohibitions was an indication of the laxity 
with which they were observed*, [ibid]
^W aley p.8 .
^Braudel 1984, p. 109.
^Adelson, Medieval Commerce. Van Nostrand 1962 p. 74.
^Avaley p.23.
^ F o r  the following, see Adelson pp76-7.
^Sereni, p.22.
5 0 ibid. pp. 19-20.
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Minor, (finally capturing Constantinople in 1452), their fiscal demands further depressed an 
East-West traffic which was already contracting due to the ravages of the Black Death 
(apparently brought from Caffa by Genoese sailors) and renewed papal restrictions on trade. A 
further, though temporary, challenge came from the Portuguese, with the opening up of the 
sea-routes to the East: ’In 1504 when the Venetian galleys arrived in Alexandria... they found 
not a single sack of pepper waiting for them.'5 1
And yet the East-West trade was only one of four major axes on which the integration of the 
city-states into the wider European social formation turned. A second was their own 
production of manufactures - most saliently, textiles - for sale both in Northern Europe and in 
the East. The livelihood of the tens of thousands of artisans and labourers depended upon 
concentrating '...the thinly spread demand of an entire continent .'52 And yet it remained the 
case that '[t]he Italians traded in other people's products at least as much as their o w n ' .53 And 
their industrial production itself remained to the end in the service of t r a d e . 5 4  Thus, thirdly, 
colonies of Italian merchants could be found in cities and town all over Europe and the 
Levant. Ralph Davis notes that 'In every considerable trading city south of the Baltic 
coastlands, Italian trading settlements had been established - and there were no corresponding 
northern settlements in I ta ly .'5 5  These merchants were often factors, or branch agents, of 
companies based in Italy which co-ordinated a range of transactions in different parts of the 
continent. (By 1300 the sedentary merchant had come to predominate over his itinerant 
fo r b e a r . 5 6 )  They represented a network of contacts through which large sums of money could 
be raised and financial credits transferred across long distances without requiring the physical 
movement of specie. The bill of exchange, (which could be issued and redeemed in different 
currencies) was the expression of this facility through which '...to a large extent [they] 
dominated European t r a d e .'5 7  There was, fourthly, an additional call on the liquidity available 
through these means: Italian merchants/bankers (especially Florentine) handled the transfers 
involved in the continent-wide activity of the Church, and they lent at interest on a large scale 
to monarchs - usually in connection with the latter's military purposes.
^Braudel 1984, p. 143. The Portuguese, however, never established effective control over supply in the Far East. And, in 
addition, Levantine demand for European products such as copper helped divert the flow of eastern spices back into their 
old caravan routes. [Kristof Glamann, 'European Trade 1500-1750' in C. Cipolla [ed.] The Fonatana Economic History o f  
Europe: The Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, Glasgow 1974, pp.478-9.] Hence, by the middle of the century, the 
Levant trade, measured by volume, had returned to its old levels. See J. H. Parry, The Age o f  Reconnaissance, London 
1973, p.69.
^ T h e  Crisis of the Seventeenth Century1 Eric Hobsbawm, in Crisis in Europe [Trevor Aston ed.] London 1965: p. 16. 
^Holmes: 71.
^Braudel avers of Venice, 'probably the leading industrial centre in Europe', that The primacy of commercial capitalism 
over industrial capitalism until at least the eighteenth century is not seriously challenged'. 1984: 136.
^  Ralph Davis, The Rise o f the Atlantic Economies, London 1973, p.26-7.
S^Waley p.23.
^Holmes: 72. Braudel describes how 'all the international aspects of the Champagne fairs were controlled on the spot or 
at a distance by Italian merchants' [The Perspective o f  the World, London 1984, p. 112], while Davis gives an instance of 
their more long-lived financial dominance: as late as the 16th century, 'At Lyon, the most important financial centre in the 
West, 143 out of 169 leading houses... were Italian.' [op. cit. p.27]
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This last practice involved not inconsiderable risks. When Edward III of England defaulted on 
debts to the Bardi and Peruzzi companies which had been incurred in the course of his French 
wars, the collapse of those companies (which were exposed to the extent of fourteen times 
their share capital) so shook the prosperity of Florence that the town had difficulty maintaining 
its own military expenditure.^ Holmes rightly notes the apparent paradox
...that the financial resources... of two private Florentine companies could 
exercise a decisive influence in the policy of the King of England while, about 
the same time, the commune of Florence placed itself under the government of 
a rather obscure French soldier of fortune, Walter of B r ie n n e .6 9
This is indeed a startling conjunction, and one moreover which is not much illuminated by 
considering the size of the political units involved. If it is true that ’in 1293 the maritime taxes 
of the single port of Genoa yielded 3Vi times the entire royal revenues of the French 
monarchy’,60 then the geopolitical vulnerability of the city-states is not obviously explained by 
saying that they were 'small fry in the world of royal and seigniorial rivalries'll
Any adequate historical explanation must begin instead with the way in which the actual 
political and geopolitical independence of the Italian city-states was articulated with the 
institutional separation o f the processes o f (agrarian) production and (urban) exchange 
within European f e u d a l i s m ^  as a whole.
To the 'territorial states' of the north, land was (almost) everything: productive labour, the 
source of their wealth, was (legally) rooted in it; and the political and military command over 
this labour was the currency of seigniorial power. To the city-states their territorial base was 
(almost) nominal. Of the Venetian it was said: Non arat, non seminal, non vendemiat.63 
While Florence, in the words of a near contemporary, was 'powerful more by the advantage of 
its location, the capacities of its men, and the readiness of its money than by the extent of its 
d o m i n i o n ' .  64 This is not of course to say that the towns did not have to secure the military and 
strategic conditions of their survival; and this almost always necessitated local and foreign 
territorial expansion and, relatedly, the structural 'marriage of convenience’ embodied in the 
rise of the signori. But their real location, the site where they reproduced themselves, was
58Holmes 68-9, Hay 376.
-^Holmes: 9 5 .
Anderson, Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism, London 1974b, p. 193.
61 Holmes, p. 96.
6 ^ Which itself, as Anderson notes, was made possible by the 'parcelisation of sovereignty' characterising the feudal mode 
of production as a whole. [Passages, p. 193.]
6 -^ He ploughs not, he sows not, he reaps not. [Braudel 1984, p. 108.]
6^Francesco Gucciardini, 1536, reprinted in The Portable Renaissance Reader, Harmondsworth 1968, pp.280-1.
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athwart the flows of exchange which serviced European feudalism and which carried their 
citizens into every major town and court of the continent.
Insinuated thus 'into the pores' of seigniorial power, Italian merchants could exercise 
considerable leverage based on their unique access to monetary flows^ - quite apart from the 
use-values which they supplied to the n o r th . 66 And this role was undoubtedly enhanced by 
juridical and political autonomy at the centres of mercantile accumulation. (Italy had its own 
cautionary examples of steep urban decline under the heavy hand of Imperial or Angevin rule; 
and the Champagne fairs themselves met an unnatural end, strangled by the Dukes of 
Burgundy .6?)
But the same feudal separation of production and exchange which facilitated their penetration 
into the heartlands of seigniorial power and allowed them to amass half the traffic of the 
continent under their control without any significant northward territorial expansion - this 
same separation also threatened to prevent the cities from consolidating themselves 
geopolitically. Like the circuits of mercantile capital with which they ringed Europe, the Italian 
cities remained crucially 'penned in the sphere of c ir c u la t io n ' ,68 relying heavily on external 
trade for their material reproduction - and in some cases 'circulating' large sections of their 
population throughout the c o n t in e n t .  69 Thus although they were frequently at war, these wars 
were in general an adjunct to their commercial reproduction, fought to secure the conditions 
and expansion of trade. War was not, as it was for the feudal states, a primary mechanism of 
accumulation:
The State eluded a comparable military definition, because competition in trade 
and manufactures - escorted and enforced by extra-economic coercion, the 
'protection costs' of the age - had become an economic purpose of the
^O n e  of the most dramatic (though slightly later) demonstrations of this came when the merchants of Genoa, which 'was 
constantly surrendering to other powers, either forcibly, voluntarily or out of prudence' {Braudel 1984, p. 158] imposed 
terms on the King of Spain: 'When in 1575, the king of Spain quarrelled with them and decided to do without their 
services, they succeeded in blocking the circulation of gold. The unpaid Spanish troops mutinied and sacked Antwerp in 
November 1576. And the king was eventually obliged to give in.' [ibid. p. 168]
^These included not only textiles and eastern luxuries, but, in the case of Milan especially, a considerable quantity of 
weapons.
67cf. Waley p.92, Adelson pp.74 & 79-80 respectively.
^M arx, Capital Vol. ID, Chapter XX Historical Facts About Merchant Capital', London 1959, p.325. The full sentence is 
worth reproducing: *Since merchant's capital is penned in the sphere of circulation, and since its function consists 
exclusively of promoting the exchange of commodities, it requires no other conditions for its existence - aside from the 
undeveloped forms arising from direct barter - outside those necessary for the simple circulation of commodities and 
money.' This contrasts drastically with modes of production, feudal, capitalist etc. which require very extensive economic 
and political conditions for their existence.
6 ^See Waley, op. cit. p.23, who says that '...the population was certainly not rooted to its home city. In the case of the 
larger cities much involved in long-distance trade... a quite sizeable proportion of the adult male citizens must have been 
away on business.'
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community in its own right: markets and loans were more important than 
prisoners, plunder was secondary to engrossment. ^
Moreover, because of this, because their extreme urban definition was precisely a measure of 
their necessary institutional subtraction from the rural feudalism which they serviced, territorial 
expansion was not a natural avenue of growth, and always carried the danger of providing 
geopolitical stability only at the price of republican autonomy. In practice, predominantly 
urban social orders of this kind, cut off from the wider seigniorial political command over 
resources of productive and military manpower, were historically unstable as independent 
states. Purchasing the military services of local feudatories thus became the prelude to 
accepting the takeover of Communal institutions by a noble landed family.
What was in many ways an intriguingly similar drama was later played out in the United 
Provinces of the 16th Century. There the parts of the Commune, the podesta and the signor 
were played by the Estates-General, the Stadholder and the House of Orange. In any fuller 
study, this would form an important additional case - not least because it provided both (in 
Grotius) the theory of an international rule of law and (somewhat later, in William of Orange) 
a candidate (already schooled in the autonomy of Dutch political institutions) fit to smooth a 
crucial episode in the consolidation of the institutional autonomy of the English state.
Returning, then, to the questions posed in the Introduction above: Was the Italian balance the 
origin of our own international system? Is it true, as Mattingly suggests, that
Italy first found the system of organizing interstate relationship^] which 
Europe later adopted, because Italy, towards the end of the Middle Ages, was 
already becoming what later all Europe became.71
Any such claims would need to be severely qualified. In particular, the appearance of 
continuity with later Europe is in many respects an optical illusion. The image of the modem 
state-system beginning in Italy and then, through the collapse of the local balance of power, 
drawing in other states and thus becoming generalised to Europe as a whole, whence it later 
spread to cover the globe - this image is misleading. It is inadequate even on straightforward 
empirical grounds. There is an important 150 year gap between the resumption of major 
foreign intervention in Italy (1494 - which Dehio marks as the start of the Europe-wide 
system) and the eventual construction of multilateral standing diplomacy at Westphalia in 
1648. Closer inspection of this intervening period shows not only a fitful and restricted take-
^Anderson Lineages, p. 153. 
71 Mattingly, p.65.
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up of the Italian methods, but also a significant regression in the evolution of the diplomatic 
system in the ninety years leading up to Westphalia. 72 in the 'international' sphere, as in the 
development of its distinctive internal constitution, '...the city-state proved a dead-end rather 
than the direct antecedent of the nation-state...'73
This conclusion becomes inescapable when we turn to the structural and historical conditions 
of the Italian episode. The city-states indeed innovated 'purely political' geopolitical networks 
(culminating in standing diplomacy) just as they innovated many 'purely economic' ones (in the 
financial and commercial fields). The conditions of each were the same: a radical institutional 
separation of politics and economics premised upon a form of material reproduction 
dominated by exchange relations, itself contingent upon a geo-commercial/structural location 
within feudalism which enabled the cornering of such flows sufficient to support them. The 
very specificity of this role meant that it could not be generalised to Europe as a whole. To 
rework Mattingly's formulation: for the cities to look like what all Europe would later become, 
they had to be released from the grip of seigniorial and Church power. But there was a clear 
limit to how many Venices and Florences there were room for within Christendom. For 
Europe to undergo its transformation, Christendom had to be destroyed. This process would 
reach its climax in the century and a half which followed, producing a transformative crisis too 
in the underlying structural conditions of existing diplomatic in s t it u t io n s .  74 This is the 
unremarked historical content of the 150 year gap noted above in the continuity of diplomatic 
evolution. And it was not to be the work of merchant capital.
3.3 Classical Greece.
(i) Peculiarities o f the Greeks
The perception of'the Greek city-state system' within IR has been a somewhat confused and 
contradictory one. On the one hand, the causes and prosecution of the Peloponnesian War are 
referred to as a locus classicus of the dynamics of the balance of p o w e r .  75 Thucydides is
^S ee  Mattingly, pp. 186-7 
^W aley, p.xvi.
^Sabine's charge [A History o f  Political Theory, p.352] that Machiavelli misread the spirit of the age insofar as he 
advocated raison d'etat on the eve of the Wars of Religion,is thus not wholly satisfactory: if these conflicts brought religion 
to the fore, it was precisely because they mediated the final collapse of Christtftndom and the rise of the secular state- 
system. Every confessional dispute, by receiving a secular settlement, itself became part of the emergence of the 'political 
state'. Thus Mattingly notes of the new doctrines of extraterritoriality which emerged in the 16th century: Probably the 
largest single factor in preparing men's minds to accept this extraordinary fiction was the embassy chapel question', [p.266] 
Something similar applies to the precept of cuius regio eius religio, another secular principle founded explicitly upon a 
reorganisation of religious authority.
^S ee  for example Waltz's comments reprinted in Neorealism and its Critics, R. Keohane [ed], New York 1986 p. 127.
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credited with being 'the first scientific student of international r e la t io n s ' ,^ 6  'an early student of 
d e c is io n -m a k in g ' ,  ^ ^ and the father of Realism - the latter often on account of his celebrated 
judgement that 'what made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear 
which this caused in S p a rta '.  ^ 8 Furthermore, Thucydides' portrayals of public debates and 
diplomatic exchanges - most famously the Melian D i a l o g u e ^  - pursue with a startling 
faithfulness the logic of Realpolitik familiar from the modern Realist theory of the state- 
system. So much so that in the Melian Dialogue itself - sometimes invoked as the prototypical 
contest of Realism and Idealism - both sides accept explicitly from the start that the issue will 
turn on the public interests of the parties involved.
On the other hand, the exemplary status of the Greeks suffers a dramatic downgrading at the 
hands of writers seeking to draw out their 'modem' character in greater historical detail. Wight 
concludes bluntly:
Just as they had no diplomatic system and no public international law, so they 
had no sense of an equilibrium being the foundation and as it were the 
constitution of international s o c i e t y .  80
To the evident disappointment of the English School, '[t]here was no Greek Grotius'.^l Others 
too have been puzzled by a 'virtual absence of active theorizing about interstate relations' and 
have been led to speculate about treatises lost to posterity or the exhaustion of the collective 
Greek mind following its exertions in other a r e a s . 82 The feebleness of such speculation, and of 
Wight's conclusion too, is readily apparent. 83 But the confusion is after all grounded in a 
genuine paradox. Purnell suggests that the lack of a developed theory of interstate relations is 
partly the result of a 'habit of referring to actual city-states as a body of people rather than a 
named political unit'. This, he argues, 'limited the degree to which they could theorize about 
relations between states as su c h '. 84 But this apparent terminological blockage reflected not a 
theoretical incapacity but rather a widely recognised institutional reality: in classical Greece 
there were no 'states as such1. Anderson says of Athens:
^ R . Gilpin in ibid. p.306.
^Dougherty & PfaltzgrafF, Contending Theories o f  International Relations, New York 1981 p.469.
^H istory o f The Peloponnesian War, Harmondsworth 1972 p.49.
7 9 ibid. pp.400ff. [5,84-115],
^Systems o f States, Leicester 1977, p. 6 6 .
^  Wight, Diplomatic Investigations, London 1966, p. 127.
^7e.g. Robert Purnell, Theoretical Approaches to International Relations: the contribution of the Graeco-Roman World' in 
T. Taylor [ed.] Approaches and Theory in International Relations, Harlow 1978, pp. 19-20.
^ A s  David Hume observed: '...the maxim of preserving the balance of power is founded so much on common sense and 
obvious reasoning that it is impossible it could altogether have escaped antiquity...' 'Of the Balance of Power', reproduced 
in Moorhead Wright [ed.] Theory and Practice o f the Balance o f  Power 1486-1914, London 1975, p. 189.
^o p . cit. p.27-8. Sabine observes similarly: The modem distinction between the state and society is one which no Greek 
thinker made clearly and adequately...' op. cit. p. 109.
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There was scarcely any separate or professional state apparatus in the city, 
whose political structure was essentially defined by its rejection of specialised 
bodies of officials - civilian or military - apart from the ordinary citizenry:
Athenian democracy signified, precisely, the refusal of any such division 
between ’state' and 'society'.
Realpolitik without states? Whence then derives that public discourse of raison d'etat which is 
heard so clearly in the pages of The History o f the Peloponnesian War? And how is it that the 
Greek polis, which in its underlying character could hardly have been more different from the 
Italian city-state of the Middle Ages, nonetheless bears such a striking resemblance to it? If we 
can answer these questions we will begin to penetrate the riddle of appearances on which the 
transhistorical claims of Realism are founded.
The comparison of the Italians with the ancient Greeks has of course been run many times,^6 
and the first and most emphatic contrast to emerge concerns the absence in Greece of the role 
played by trade in medieval Italy. Not that trade was unimportant: among the key mechanisms 
of Athenian imperial power were the enforced use by subject cities of Athenian currency, and 
the maintenance of entrepot.**? But manufactures for the most part 'had a purely internal 
significance, not connected with inter-state affairs';**** and even if one includes the com trade, 
which seems to have accounted for the bulk of mercantile activity, '...the scale and total 
volume were small... even of the most highly urbanised communities like Athens...'**9 
Moreover, the traders and seafarers themselves were for the most part not citizens but 
foreigners and metics, often granted considerable rights of passage and settlement but 
generally excluded from land-ownership. 90 Mercantile and craft activity were held in a low 
regard 'not unconnected with the servile status or ex-servile status of many of the practitioners 
of retail trades'. 91 Plato's ideal state of The Laws would have proscribed the involvement of 
citizens in trade, and Sparta actually did so, delegating its craft production and trading to the 
partly subject poleis of the perioeci.92
^Passages, p.43.
^ F o r example, by Weber at some length in a section of Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft reproduced as The City, Martindale & 
Neuwirth [eds. & trans.], New York 1962, and more concisely by Anderson in Lineages o f  the Absolutist State, pp. 150-6. 
^ F o r the latter, see R.J. Hopper, Trade and Industry in Classical Greece, London 1979, p.74.
^ ib id . p .ll.
^M .I. Finley, The Ancient Greeks, London 1963, p.28. It seems also to be the case that the waves of colonisation in the 
8 th and 7th centuries which created the multipolar Greek system were undertaken not in pursuit of trade but under the 
pressure of demographic and agrarian crisis in the early communities. See Finley, pp.26-7.
^ S ee  Hopper, p. 57. Philip Curtin, Cross-Cultural Trade in World History, Cambridge 1984, suggests that by the 5th 
Century B.C. there were perhaps 10,000 metics in Athens [p.77].
ibid. p.65.
^Finley, p.78.
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Unlike the Italian republics then, the classical city-states remained 'in origin and principle, 
urban congeries of landowners'^^ - forming paradoxically an urban civilisation without an 
urban economy. The material and institutional conditions of this development derived not from 
tapping the flows of inter-regional exchange, but rather from the rural hyper-exploitation of 
captive labour: slavery. Considerable disagreement persists as to the quantitative and 
qualitative weight of slave labour in Greece. While Anderson suggests that slaves 
outnumbered the free in Periclean Athens by 3:2,94 it is also the case that the heaviest 
concentrations were in mining and domestic service, while in agriculture freemen were more 
n u m e r o u s .9 5  Hence '[t]he view of Athens as a community of leisured citizens whose slaves 
greatly outnumbered the free is against the e v id e n c e ' .9 6  This, however, is not quite the point. 
Slavery 'released from any economic concern, or even activity, the men who gave political 
leadership to the state, and, in large measure, the intellectual leadership as well';97 but 
crucially, it did so in a way which did not require the political subjection of fellow-citizens 
whatever polarisation of wealth might occur among them. Thus slavery was not just a source 
of material surpluses; by providing a continuing supply of cheap labour it acted also as a valve 
reducing the pressure on the economic independence of the smallholding class which was the 
precondition of political democracy. Slavery and democracy had in fact grown up together 
following the abolition of debt peonage by the reforming tyrannies of the Sixth Century. 
Fittingly enough, it seems that the first political democracy, Chios, was also the first significant 
importer of s la v e s .9 8  And '[t]he full exploitation of slaves in Hellenic territory fell in the 
blossom-time of d e m o c r a c y . '9 9
One has only to compare the Funeral Oration of Pericles with the speech of the Venetian Doge 
on the resources of his city in 1421 (even granted the different occasions) to sense the 
enormous cultural gulf between the two civilisations, reflecting in turn the contrasted 
structural bases of their pre-eminence. Pericles' speech is a eulogy of public political 
institutions, while 'the most beautiful garden of V e n i c e ' i s  the 2,800,000 ducats of annual 
trade with Lombardy. 191 These fundamental differences can be elaborated to explore a range 
of sharp discontinuities between the Greek and medieval Italian cities: the polis knew nothing
93 Anderson, Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism, London 1974, p. 19.
9 4 ibid. p.2 2 .
^Finley, p.65-6.
96A. R. Bum, The Pelican History o f  Greece, Harmondsworth 1982, p.245.
9^Finley, p.6 6 .
9®See Finley op. cit. p.36, Anderson 1974a p.36.
"W eber, op. cit. p.214.
lOO-phe Doge's speech is reprinted in Adelson, op. cit. p. 188-90.
^  i This comparison is perhaps less arbitrary than at first it appears, inasmuch as there is no evidence that Greek 
equivalents of the Doge's balance-sheet were systematically maintained: It is to be regretted that the Athenians, and indeed 
the Greeks in general, were so uninterested in economic statistics.' [Hopper, op. cit. p.53] Tribute lists were a different 
matter.
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of the structural antagonism of town and country, pursued a militarist logic of accumulation 
alien to Italy and so on.
Where the real institutional similarities nonetheless persist is in the forms of political 
organisation. Pericles lays great stress on the rule of law and the juridical equality which it 
prescribes for the citizen body as an index of the achievement of Athens. 103 He expressed 
pride in the fact that his political influence was mediated by the Assembly, and not exercised 
by virtue of any formal executive a u t h o r i t y .  104 And while the citizen-wide eligibility for office 
did not prevent political power from being largely the vocation of a wealthy, leisured minority, 
the latter were ’increasingly servants of the state, instruments of the law, and not abitrary 
wielders of power*. 105 The language in which they addressed the Assembly was wholly of a 
piece with this:
The interests of the state were always justification enough, whether of war or 
of diplomacy and negotiation or of capitulation (if necessary even to the 
Persians). The choice of instruments in any given situation was arguable only 
on the question of tactics, pragmatically but not morally. 106
Again and again Thucydides gives witness of this in set piece debates - for example the 
Mytilenian Debate on the efficacy of mass capital punishment, where Cleon's opening hard line 
is countered not by moral objection but by Diodotus' subtler expediency. 107 But what is this 
'state' whose interests are invoked as paramount? As we have already noted, it does not have 
any existence other than the political self-organisation of the c i t i z e n r y .  108 it has no 
bureaucratic apparatus to which the decision-making authority of the populace is formally 
alienated and which might provide a basis of'independent' interests and capacities. It is 
anything but autonomous in this restricted empirical sense. And yet it talks like a state! This 
suggests that the underlying consitituents of raison d'etat may lie elsewhere - not in the
l^ S e e  Anderson, Lineages, pp. 150ff, where these points and others are fleshed out.
^Thucydides, p. 145. The Athenians went to the remarkable length of using Scythian slave police '...so that no citizen
might have to lay violent hands upon another'. [Bum op.cit. p.239]
lW seeBum,p.213.
Finley, op. cit. p.33.
^ ib id .  p.56.
^Thucydides, pp.212-23. Diodotus says of the inhabitants of Mytilene whose fate is to be decided following the crushing 
of their revolt against Athens: 1 might prove that they are the most guilty people in the world, but it does not follow that I 
shall propose the death penalty, unless that is in your interests; I might argue that they deserve to be forgiven, but should 
not recommend forgiveness unless that seemed to me the best thing for the state...[TJhis is not a law-court, where we have 
to consider what is fit and just; it is a political assembly, and the question is how Mytilene can be most useful to Athens.' 
[219-20] Compare this with Anderson's observation that in feudalism 'justice... was the ordinary name of power' [Passages, 
p. 153] - i.e. political rule was legitimated and exercised via legal right (*privilege' in the sense used by Marx in the earlier 
discussion above) not common interest and the votes of political equals.
luoThere was no bwaagfagy or civil service and despite the large number of officials, no hierarchy of oflices - everyone 
being responsible solely to the demos itself.' Finley pp.68-9.
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existence of a separate state organisation but in a particular social relation among the 
population.
In Athens this was transparently so. In every sense, the democracy depended upon the 
institutional exclusion from the political sphere of those social relationships of juridical 
inequality (namely slavery and the metic status of trade) by which surplus extraction from 
direct producers and the security of small-holders in the face of commercial wealth were 
maintained. Thus, from the point of view of the population as a whole 'civil society was the 
slave of political society1. Among the citizen body however, the effect was to 'set free the 
political spirit':
...in Greece, the res publica is the real private affair of the citizens, their real
content... the political state qua political state, being the true and only content
of the life and will of the citizens... * ^
For the citizenry, the political realm was, whatever divisions of wealth it encompassed, 
objectively the realm of their deeper common interest - truly a public sphere, albeit one whose 
structural conditions rendered it incapable of extension beyond a minority of the population. 
Within this sphere, a discourse of raison d'etat could flourish because the formal equality of its 
members made it possible for issues to appear in their 'purely political' technical aspect. (This 
is not of course to imply substantive unity within Greek democratic assemblies, which were on 
the contrary, generally riven with the most vigorous factional strife - as indeed is the public 
sphere in 'open' societies today: the point is the existence of a public sphere at all.) But the 
referent and ground of this discourse was not a bureaucratic state organisation; it was the 
nexus of internal and external social relations which produced and reproduced their 
ascendancy in the role of a 'purely political' elite. At the end of our long trail back through 
history in pursuit of the elemental category of Realist theory, we have arrived at an 'autonomy 
of the political' (e.g. the separating out of a distinct sphere of 'the political') without a state.
(ii) Excursus: Causes o f the Peloponnesian War
Before examining the implications of this for our understanding of the modern state, we might 
take this opportunity to assess briefly the claim that Thucydides provides a Realist explanation 
of the Peloponnesian War in terms of the balance of power.
l^M arx, 'Critique of Hegel's Doctrine of the State', Early Writings, Harmondsworth 1975, p. 138.
* ^Same text, different translation: Precapitalist Socio-Economic Formations, Moscow 1979, p.29. For the alternative 
translation, see Early Writings, p.91.
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As Doyle has argued, the Delian and Peloponnesian Leagues ranged against each other 
differed fundamentally in both the political complexion of the poleis involved and the 
mechanisms of interstate control which held them together. Athens had assumed leadership of 
the Delian League in 487BC determined to press forward the expulsion of the Persians 
following the naval victory at Salamis and the freeing of Ionia. In this she was beckoned on 
not only by the opportunities for plunder, enslavement and colonisation which attended each 
engagement; she also sought to secure the sea-routes for the com imports from the Black Sea 
on which she was becoming increasingly dependent. (Athenian leadership took over from that 
of Sparta, which, by contrast, supplied most of its cereal needs from domestic production, and, 
for reasons detailed below, could ill afford large and prolonged military deployment 
abroad.)* 11 The League began as a voluntary association to which eachpolis supplied an 
agreed 'tribute' of ships and men or money. It was transformed into an empire as the Athenians 
forcibly prevented secession (beginning with Naxos in 469), transferred the treasury from 
Delos to Athens (454), suppressed independent naval activity and assumed an ever closer 
supervision of the payment of the tribute. In its most developed form, this was accompanied 
by the arrogation to Athenian courts of all capital trials in member cities as well as the 
proliferation of Athenian currency minted from the silver mines at Laurium, and the 
maintenance of the port of Piraeus as a compulsory entrepot for all Greek imports of com 
from South Russia. The exercise of Athenian power facilitated by these arrangements took 
three principal forms: an effective naval monopoly permitting (in a predominantly coastal 
civilisation) direct military sanctions against recalcitrant poleis., a political hegemony over 
allied democratic factions dependent on Athenian support against oligarchic revanchism; and a 
commercial supremacy which distributed the benefits of reduced piracy and a guaranteed 
currency while concentrating regulative authority. (Hopper observes that Athens 'learnt to use 
[her] control over com and ship timber as instruments of domination over other states'. At the 
same time she could '...virtually close, for an individual, the majority of the Greek ports of 
importance in the eastern Mediterranean'! !2)
It was otherwise in the Peloponnesian League, for reasons closely connected with the internal 
peculiarities of the Spartan polis. After a precocious early political development in the Archaic 
period, the evolution of the Spartan polis had arrested in a rigid oligarchic form which it was 
to retain for over 300 years. This was largely due to the fact that, whereas enslaved 
communities were normally dispersed on capture through the fully commodified slaveiy 
practised by poleis such as Athens, the Spartans had opted to exploit their subject populations 
in Laconia and Messenia in situ. The continuous occupation of these areas placed extreme 
military demands on the citizenry who organised themselves into a permanently mobilised
* * ^See Hopper, op. cit. p.74.
1 ^op. cit. pp. 54 & 58 respectively.
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army - a development finalised following the Second Messenian War of the third quarter of the 
Seventh Century. Thus, enigmatically, Sparta's 'great power' role arose out of her internal 
instability and remained connected with it:
Her first and only unwavering concern was peace at home, in the Peloponnese.
This she never fully achieved, but she came near enough through the 
instrumentality of the Peloponnesian League. 1 ^
This inward orientation of the Spartans' policy, for which they were roundly criticised by their 
allies, * 14 js witnessed also by the fact that the League was not an empire, an interstate and 
'transnational' mechanism for surplus accumulation at the metropole. 1 ^  Thucydides says that
The Spartans did not make their allies pay tribute, but saw to it that they were 
governed by oligarchies who would work in the Spartan interest. 1 ^
Nor was this interest pursued through the imposition of preferential trading arrangements. On 
the contrary, the oligarchies such as Sparta 'sought to avoid commercial contact in order to 
prevent the mobilisation of their democratically inclined middle and lower classes'.1 ^  Spartan 
military prowess, coupled with a fear of being undermined domestically by the influence of the 
politically more advanced poleis to the east - these were the principal forces which held the 
league of oligarchies together and made it the natural pole of attraction for Athens' other rivals 
too. The latter knew well how to play on the underlying conflict of social systems. '[Y]our 
whole way of life is out of date when compared to theirs...' declared the Corinthian delegates, 
goading the Spartan Assembly into war; 'Athens, because of the very variety of her experience, 
is a far more modem state than you are'.1 ^  This was no revelation. Sparta found it difficult 
enough to live with Athens even when the latter was providing friendly military assistance: the 
Athenian army sent in response to Spartan requests for aid in putting down the helot revolt of 
464 was sent home early for fear they might 'become the sponsors of some revolutionary 
policy'.11^
What then was *the real reason for the war'? Was it the perceived tipping of the military and 
geopolitical scales between the two alliances threatened by the Athenian takeovers in Corcyra
H ^ Finley, op. cit. p.80.
11 ^ Notably the Corinthians. See Thucydides, pp. 73-7.
1 l^Doylc, Chapter 2, clearly distinguishes the mechanisms of Athenian and Spartan external power, calling the one 
imperial and the other hegemonic.
1 l®op. c it p.46.
I l^Doyle, op. cit. p.68.
II ^ Thucydides, op. cit. p.77.
1 l^ibid. p.95. See also Bum's treatment of this incident, pp.210-11.
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and P o t id a e a ? 1 2 0  Qr do these incidents, however central to the mechanisms of escalation, 
belong rather among those factors by which ’the real reason’ is 'most likely to be disguised’? 
Was it the wider conflict of social systems which generated incompatible external needs?
Athens was securing her position in many of the subject cities by supporting 
democrats... against former governing classes... Conversely, there were 
unprivileged classes in some mainland states who looked longingly towards 
Athens. It was this which made it difficult for the two power-blocs, 
representing different social systems, to lie down together. *21
of
Or can itjgrasped only by Thucydides' most comprehensive category of historical explanation, 
the 'uneven development' of Greece as a whole, as a result of which 'up to the present day 
much of Hellas still follows the old way of life', *22 with all the strains and intercommunal 
tensions which followed from this?
Whatever the answer, one thing at least must be allowed: when Thucydides describes 'the real 
reason' as 'the growth of Athenian power', he does not, could not, mean geopolitical power on 
the modem realist definition - the fungible, strictly interstate, transhistorically generic medium 
of the *balance of power'. For on his own account, the Athenian threat comprised qualitatively 
distinct forms of influence and control which Sparta could not reproduce, even in smaller 
q u a n t it ie s .  123 Moreover, its external geopolitical advance was inseparable from the 
sociopolitical vulnerability which it compounded within the Spartan polis. In other words, we 
find here neither a common structural definition to the forms of geopolitical power exercised 
by the two alliances, nor a distinct terrain of interstate politics whose dynamics could be 
analysed sui generis. Given this, it becomes difficult to see what 'the balance of power' as an 
explanatory tool (rather than as a piece of descriptive shorthand) could refer to except purely 
military logics of escalation. And no-one, least of all Thucydides, would reduce the causes of 
the Peloponnesion War to those.
Restored to its original context, Thucydides' famous one-liner is emphatically not an instance 
of a substantive Realist explanation. This ought to be evident from the fact that it occurs in 
Book I of his History as the preface to actual historical explanation, not at the end as a 
summary of its content. And in any case, when the meaning of'power' is fleshed out, it violates
120*potjdaea<j the Corinthians protested, ’is the best possible base for any campaign in Thrace, and Corcyra might have 
contributed a very large fleet to the Peloponnesian League', ibid. p.74.
Bum, op. cit. p.261. Of the 150 odd poleis in the Athenian empire, all but three were, or were obliged to become, 
democracies. See Doyle, op. cit. p. 56.
1220p cit. pp. 36 & 38.
123As Doyle puts it: 'Athenian power was not only large relative to any one of its subordinate allies in the Delian League, 
it was also different from that of Sparta and different from, and not just larger than, that of the subordinate allies.' op. cit. 
p.65.
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several of the key premises of Realist method. A balance of power explanation here is either 
substantively incorrect or a mere banality - a double failure which, as has been argued in 
Chapter 1, is the recurrent fate of Realism as a social theory. Despite the chorus of assent, 
there is in fact no warrant to conclude that Thucydides belongs to the Realists...'124
3.4 Conclusions: Structural Conditions of Raison d'Etat
The Greek and Italian city-state systems were both, in their different ways, 'one-off anomalies 
in the run of European history - incapable, despite their tremendous political and cultural 
creativity, of being generalised into a wider system. If the Commune was, as Waley suggests, 
'a dead-end', the polis
required so rare a combination of material and institutional circumstances that 
it... could be approximated only for a very brief period of time;... it had a past, 
a fleeting present and no future. 125
Why then do they appear so familiar to the modem international system which, by contrast, 
has achieved a fully global reach? This question is perhaps best approached via Marx's 
analysis, discussed above, of the structural conditions of the capitalist 'purely political' state.
It will be recalled how Marx (in Volume III of Capital) located the cutting edge of historical 
materialism as a method in historical sociology:
The specific economic form, in which unpaid surplus-labour is pumped out of 
direct producers, determines the relationship of rulers and ruled... It is always 
the direct relationship of the owners of the conditions of production to the 
direct producers... which reveals the innermost secret, the hidden basis of the 
entire social structure, and with it the political form of the relation of 
sovereignty and dependence, in short, the corresponding specific form of the
state. 126
Capitalism is unique as a mode of production in that this relationship assumes a 'purely 
economic' form. That is to say, the 'specific economic form' is profit valorised through a series 
of relations of exchange, rather than tribute (in money or kind) extracted through direct 
political relations of domination. The commodification of labour-power which lies at the heart
124 M. Doyle, Thucydidean Realism', Review of International Studies. 1990, 16, p.237.
12%inley, op. cit. 88.
126m oscow 1959, p.791.
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of this sudden and unprecedented ubiquity of exchange relations ('the market') does not cancel 
the actual subjection of the direct producer. Rather it reconstitutes it, through the structured 
inequality of the labour contract, within a privatised realm of production where it is maintained 
via the direct material dependence of a free (e.g. propertyless and untied) workforce. We 
should therefore be careful not to mistake the formal separation of politics and economics (or 
state and civil society) under capitalism for a substantive evacuation of relations of domination 
from the realm of production. 127 Nevertheless, because this 'strategic relationship1 *28 js held 
in place by private 'economic' sanctions (unemployment) rather than by the exercise of 
jurisdiction (coercively upheld legal rights of exploitation as under feudalism), political 
inequality is not inscribed in the relations of production - whereas it is for all precapitalist 
modes of production. 129 This is why the realm of 'the political' emerges both as institutionally 
discrete, and as potentially the domain of universal interests. In The German Ideology, Marx 
summarised this in an epigrammatic punning formula: 'the modem state... is based on freedom  
o f labour*. *30 Once again, the formal separation should not confuse us - this time into 
thinking that this 'purely political' 'autonomous' state is a self-sufficient, transhistorically viable 
form of rule. It is not:
The abstraction of the state as such belongs only to modem times, because the 
abstraction of private life belongs only to modem times. The abstraction of the 
political state is a modem product. ^  1
But if modem state autonomy is structurally specific to capitalism, what does it retain in 
common with Italy and Greece? Much and little. As we have seen, in all three cases, the 
opening out of a public sphere rests upon a formal political equality among the citizen body. In 
each case too, the condition of this formal equality is the exclusion from the mutual relations 
of the citizenry of political mechanisms of surplus appropriation. It is this which allows the 
emergence of institiutions of political governance which are both potentially autonomous of 
factional interest (e.g. 'purely political') and yet uniquely an expression of the structural and 
historical identity of the society whose determinate conditions of reproduction they can have 
no higher aim than to secure and promote. As the Athenians accurately put it: 'The law is 
king'132 _ meaning both that law rules and that the laws (the constitution) are the highest
l^ S e e  Ellen Wood, The Separation of the Economic and the Political in Capitalism1, New Left Review 127, May/June 
1981, for an illuminating exploration of these pitfalls. Incidentally, it might be argued in this context that Gramsci chased 
the wil'-o'-the-wisp of'power1 back and forth across the modem institutional frontier between state and civil society so 
many times that it finally became unclear whether his intellectual legacy was one of social revolution or social democracy. 
See Anderson's The Antimonies of Antonio Gramsci' New Left Review 100, 1976/7, especially the section entitled 
Illusions of Left Social-Democracy1, pp27-9.
l^ A s  Wolf calls it. [Europe and the People Without History, Berkley 1982, Ch.2.] 
l^ S e e  Anderson's discussion of this in the 'Conclusions' to Lineages.
*3®e.g. 'freedom* in both senses. [Reproduced in Sayer [ed.] p. 122.]
131ibid.p.ll6. 
l^ S e e  Finley, p.49.
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moral end of public life. The Italians averred the same when they upheld the municipal law of 
the Empire even after the repulse of Hohenstauffen power from the peninsula: 'When the 
Emperor was no longer recognised as superior, his place was taken by the law*. 133 But how is 
it that in each of our three cases, political mechanisms of surplus appropriation, which are 
unquestionably the dominant form in human history, are excluded? Here we find a crucial 
difference: for capitalism is the only one in which this condition of the emergence of a discrete 
sphere of'the political' is actually internal to the mode of production.
In capitalism the domain of formal political equality does not need to be a segregated realm of 
privilege resting upon surplus extraction elsewhere in the wider social formation. Or, at any 
rate, this 'elsewhere' is but another dimension of the lives of the same individuals: so far as the 
direct producer is concerned, the capitalist labour contract is free and equal 'on the outside' but 
unfree and unequal within. (Marx's best-known formulation of this is his contrast of the 
'heaven' of political citizenship with the 'earth' of capitalist socio-economic relations.) 134 To 
call the outside 'public/political' and the inside 'private/economic/civil' obscures as much as it 
reveals about the character and interconnection of the social relations involved. As Ellen 
Wood points out,
...the differentiation of the economic and the political in capitalism is, more 
precisely, a differentiation of political functions themselves and their separate 
allocation to the private economic sphere and the public sphere of the state.
This allocation reflects the separation of political functions immediately 
concerned with the extraction and appropriation of surplus labour from those 
with a more general communal purpose. ...the differentiation of the economic is 
in fact a differentiation within the political sphere. *35
This is indeed more accurate than the designation above of the capitalist mechanism of surplus 
appropriation as 'purely economic', a description which is always in danger also of lending 
credence to the misleading definition of capitalism solely in terms of the complex of exchange 
relations which it presents to public (in both technical and ordinary usages) view. Nonetheless 
once these limitations to any discussion of a 'purely political' realm are accepted, it remains 
valid and instructive to note how the conditions of the emergence of the latter in Italy and 
Greece differed from those obtaining in modern capitalist societies.
l-^See Sereni, op. cit. p. 14.
134 See the Critique o f  Hegel's Philosophy o f  Right: '...just as the Christians are equal in heaven, but unequal on earth, so 
the individual members of the nation are equal in the heaven of their political world, but unequal in the earthly existence 
of society.' [Sayer ed. p. 120] In Italy and Greece, heaven' and 'earth' also exist but do not share the same membership. 
Their co-extension in capitalist societies makes modem citizenship problematic in ways quite foreign to Italy or Greece. 
Wood, op. cit. p.82.
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As already suggested, in both earlier cases these conditions arose externally to the political 
community involved. This is most obviously the case with the Italian Commune, where 
interregional trade provided the all-important supplement to local agrarian surpluses. The 
freedoms of the Commune depended on the wider unfreedom of agrarian labour in Europe and 
the east; for, as Marx noted, the targets of interregional mercantile activities in the 
precapitalist period are the surpluses already appropriated and held by superordinate groups in 
the foreign societies between which the traders' activities mediate. 136 (What was specific to 
the city-states was the additional, geopolitical dimension which they lent to this structural 
separation of production and exchange.) Unlike the polis, the Italian city-state evolved a real 
urban economy, but an unrepeatable one resting on its location within the wider agrarian 
formation. Its political antagonism towards the feudal countryside thus did not reflect any 
overall transformative capacity comparable to that of its capitalist successor. But in Greece 
too, it was the admixture of slavery alongside (but institutionally outside) the dominant mode 
of production which provided the basis for 'the separation of political functions immediately 
concerned with the extraction and appropriation of surplus labour from those with a more 
general communal purpose'. 137 Greece too was 'freakish' in this regard; and this makes it 
apparent that in both cases the external conditions enabling the emergence of a distinct 
political sphere themselves set internal structural limits to its expansion and hence 
g e n e r a l i s a b i l i t y . 1 3 8  ^  Italy the public sphere was bordered 'horizontally' by (and depended 
upon) the surrounding feudal rural institutions; in Greece, its delineation was the 'vertical' one 
of citizenship versus slavery. And because in both cases the city was the locus and mechanism 
of the political sphere, the differences between them (and those which set the modem world 
apart again) can be expressed by tracing the modulation in the overall relationship of town and 
country, as indeed Marx indicated in the Grundrissse:
Ancient classical history is the history of cities, but cities based on 
landownership and agriculture... the Middle Ages... starts with the countryside 
as the locus of history, whose further development then proceeds through the 
opposition of town and country; modem (history) is the urbanisation of the 
countryside, not, as among the ancients, the ruralisation of the c i t y .  *39
1 ^ C apital Vol. HI p.331. In this connection, Marx also observed: 'So long as merchant's capital promotes the exchange of 
products between undeveloped societies, commercial profit not only appears as outbargaining and cheating, but also largely 
originates from them.' [ibid. p.330] The Greeks, for their part, mapped out the complex relations involved in a different, 
but hardly less penetrating idiom: Hermes, the god of trade, was also the patron of (among other things) messengers, 
boundary stones - and thieves.
137Wood , op. cit. p.82.
*3^To these structural limits we can also add some more circumstantial, though no less real, impediments to any 
generalisation of the Greek or Italian systems. Among these are the restrictions on geographical and demographic scale due 
to the need for face to face contact in a pre-industrial participatory polity, and relatedly the unique facilitating role of the 
Mediterranean Sea as a medium of communication in both civilisations. These observations should not, however, license a 
fetishising of technology: after all, the emergence of agrarian capitalism in England preceded the Industrial Revolution.
139Precapitalist Economic Formations, London 1964, pp.78-9.
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*We cannot leave this discussion without suggesting briefly what lines of further research are 
indicated for theories of the international system. Two related avenues suggest themselves 
immediately: extending the critique of the Realist theory of the state to cover its conception of 
the state-system; and demystifying the institutional forms of contemporary international 
power. A single example may serve to illuminate what might be involved in both directions.
The Twentieth Century has witnessed, among many other things, both the end of colonialism 
and a significant contraction of the developed, privileged core of the world economy. 
(Hobsbawm, reckoning the latter as a proportion of the world's population, estimates a decline 
from 33% to 15% between 1900 and 1990). 140 At the very least it will be accepted that the 
achievement of formal sovereign equality between states has streaked far ahead of any 
prospect of material equality between populations - even in the provision of basic human 
needs. The United Nations as an organisation is emblematic of this paradox. Is then the 
sovereign equality which it proclaims an indictment of the hollowness of formal political 
rights, or is it a sign of hope - a potential lever of universal future advances? 141 Ultimately, of 
course, this question will admit only of historical answers. But our discussion above does 
enable us to go beyond the despairing cynicism or rootless utopianism which it usually 
provokes. For we can see that sovereign equality and the right of self-determination are 
attended by the same combination of genuine, hard-won achievement and cruel ironies of 
dispossession which has dogged the struggle for the juridical equality and political freedom of 
the individual within the liberal democratic state.
This is because the two realms (domestic and international) manifest common structural 
properties given by their shared capitalist identity: in the international sphere too, the absolute 
character of the political right of self-determination (like the freedom of labour/the individual) 
may be seen to hinge precisely upon its substantive permeability by other, 'non-political' 
mechanisms of surplus appropriation. Capitalism is the only historical system which permits 
the exploitation of productive labour under an alien jurisdiction. But, as we have already seen, 
the 'privatising' of surplus appropriation which allows this is at the same time the 'abstracting' 
of the state as a 'purely political' public institution. The possibility of an international economy 
is thus structurally interdependent with the possibility of a sovereign state-system. At the
1 ^ Goodbye to All That', Marxism Today. October 1990, p.21.
^^One suspects that advocates of the critical turn in international theory1, insofar as they seek to ground their 
anticipations in contemporary political realities, would indicate such a possibility as crucial. This, however, is speculative, 
since these writers persistently shy away from identifying concrete historical agencies of change at the international level. 
See, for example, Linklater's discussion of Habermas in Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International 
Relations, London 1990, especially pp.26-7.
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institutional level, however, this same interdependence manifests itself precisely as a 
separating out of international politics and international e c o n o m ic s .  142
The community of nations too thus has its public ’heaven1 (the sovereign state-system) and its 
private ’earth’ (the transnational global economy). To put it in these terms is not to indicate a 
ready-made causal model capable of automatically producing explanations of historical 
outcomes. The point is not that 'earth determines heaven' in the manner of the vulgar marxist 
formulations which have for so long been the butt of easy criticism. It is that these institutional 
realms are no more capable of being understood separately from each other than are their 
equivalents 'within' the state, discussed in the body of this paper above. Thus if we set out to 
construct a theory of international politics, it is futile to proceed from the Realist idea of a 
generic state-system (studied by IR) on the one hand, and a global economy of market 
relations (studied by Economics) on the other - the two spheres reciprocally linked by a set of 
causal relationships constituting the further field of International Political Economy. Rather, at 
this level too we must explore what is involved in seeing the essence of capitalism not as the 
separation of politics and economics which it presents to view, but as '...a differentiation 
within the political sphere'.
It should be added that to speak of a capitalist state-system is not to foreclose the associated 
historical debates concerning the dynamics and agency of socio-political development and 
transformation, either in early modem Europe or elsewhere. On the contrary, even in England, 
the social relations we have been discussing did not emerge suddenly and fully-fledged but 
rather evolved, often bloodily, in the course of several centuries. And if it makes sense to 
describe the modem international system as capitalist, this is not because all its members are 
assumed to have followed the same path; it is because its dominant institutions have been 
shaped by liberal states in a way that facilitates the international exercise of capitalist social 
power. To explore theoretically the capitalist character of this system is indeed to trace the 
specificity of the dominant modem form of international power. But the contingent historical 
processes by which this sovereign state-system came into being, and by which it continues to 
develop and to be reproduced by real living individuals - these processes remain to be 
recounted and explained. History, (hence the need for historical explanation), does not end. In 
this respect, the conclusions reached here do nothing more than probe the broadest contours 
of an alternative, non-Realist terrain of IR theory.
On the other hand, even at this range they may throw some light on the paradox of universal 
sovereign equality overseeing a global deepening of material inequality - the paradox summed
^Conversely, this suggests why sovereignty could not be admitted as a doctrine of external relations in the feudal world, 
where territorial expansion premised upon labour tied to land was the key mechanism of intra-seigniorial accumulation - 
and why it remained moot and unrealized within the Soviet system.
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up in the United Nations Organisation. For they suggest that to regard the UN either as a 
failure for not actualising substantive international rights (sometimes known as social and 
economic rights), or as in principle limited only by the collective will of its members in its 
potential as an agent of universal interests - that both these conclusions implicitly misread the 
specificity of political institutions under capitalism. For the very possibility of sovereign 
equality is, as we have seen, dependent on the abstraction of the purely political state-system 
which creates the realm of private transnational power (the world market) in which, in turn, 
the material inequality is reproduced.
Thus even if, for the sake of argument, all the world's governments were political democracies 
and the UN constituted a world assembly wielding executive authority determined by majority 
voting, there is no special reason to believe that it would become the irresistible protagonist of 
'economic rights', if this means instituting a planned development which suppresses the 
complex operation of the world market. This kind of thinking once promoted the delusion (on 
both right and left) that capitalism would be overwhelmed by universal suffrage.
This does not mean that progressive international political or redistributive advances cannot be 
achieved via the UN - any more than one would wish undone the political and material benefits 
of social democracy in Western Europe. But if our historical review teaches us anything, it is 
that democracy, slogan of our epoch, has no determinate content until its structural conditions 
are specified. Its historical definition always requires that we extend our focus beyond the self­
definition of the political realm. In the case of our other historical examples, this revealed an 
insurmountable dependence upon forms of political unfreedom elsewhere in the social 
formation. In the case of the modem international system, sovereign equality may be seen to 
rest on conditions ('economic' unfreedoms) which set internal limits that capitalism is 
structurally incapable of tr a n s c e n d in g . 143 Paradoxical this may seem; inexplicable it is not:
The representative system is a very specific product of modern bourgeois 
society which is as inseparable from the latter as is the isolated individual of 
modem times. 144
And this, it should be clear, is not a conspiracy theory, or an 'economic reductionism': it is a 
straightforward argument about the determinacy and effectivity of social structure.
♦  *  *
l^ F o r  a sympathetic critique of one attempt to square this circle (e.g. to promote capitalist representative government as 
the lever of a wider realisation of democracy) see P. Anderson, The Affinities of Nobcrto Bobbio', New Left Review 170, 
July/August 1988.
The German Ideology, reprinted in Sayer [ed.] p. 130.
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At first sight, the remarkable institutional similarities between the Classical, Renaissance and 
modem state-systems do indeed seem to offer the basis for a transhistorical theory of state- 
systems sui generis, which can be elaborated fully at the interstate level in terms of the 
distinctive discourse of raison d'etat common to all three. It is no wonder therefore that many 
Realists look to Italy as the dawn of the modem system and to Classical Greece as evidence of 
the timelessness of those properties which they single out as sui generis and hence the starting 
point of their theory of the modem state-system. On closer inspection, however, this 
transhistorical continuity resolves into a gigantic optical illusion. For it becomes apparent first 
that in reality the three systems are utterly different in character, second that in no case (least 
of all the causes of the Peloponnesian War) can an adequate explanation of actual historical 
outcomes be derived solely at the interstate level, and third that the very appearance of a self- 
sufficient purely political realm itself rests upon an internal (and in each case different) 
structural configuration of social relations. Once these differentia specifica are isolated, they 
provide an alternative and surer starting point from which to explore the historical character of 
the geopolitical systems concerned.
Dispelling an optical illusion is not always a straightforward affair, for it is necessary not only 
to show how reality has been distorted but also to explain why the illusion recurrently arises. 
And the task is still not complete until an alternative explanation is fully elaborated which can 
be seen to illuminate more about the social processes and outcomes under view. But that even 
the preliminary conclusions reached here constitute an advance on Realism is surely not to be 
doubted. For Realism is not only incapable of identifying, let alone explaining, the optical 
illusion: it positively embraces it, and elevates it to the level of a general theory embodying the 
acknowledged common sense of the age. This self-confidence lends Realism a resilience far 
greater than its intellectual credentials could warrant. But then, IR would hardly be the first 
discipline in which basic theoretical advances have needed to be made in the face of common 
sense.
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IV Trade and Expansion in Early Modern Europe
4.1 Introduction
The construction of the 'early modem' intercontinental empires was the first great thrust of a 
geographical expansion of European power which led eventually to the emergence of our 
modem nation-state system. The rapid growth of trade which they promoted (though itself 
dwarfed by what was to follow in the Nineteenth Century) established circuits of exchange 
which ringed the globe for the first time in history, presaging the scope of the modem 
international economy. It is not surprising then that for all three branches of IR theory which 
invoke historical perspectives to validate their image of the modern international system, these 
early empires are associated with decisive turning points in the emergence of the world of 
today.
For Realism, the empires arise as the inevitable geographical extension of the European 
balance of power, interstate competition in Europe spilling over into the New World and the 
Far East almost as soon as these peripheral theatres became available. The annus mirabilis on 
this view is 1713, when the Treaty of Utrecht settled the war of Spanish Succession by 
(among other things) a redistribution of colonial and other territories, for the first time 
formally designed to establish and guarantee a balance of power among the European states. 
For the English School, Francisco de Vitoria, arguing the legal rights of heathen Amerindians 
against Christian conquerors, was perhaps the first theorist of the emerging International 
Society - in both its narrowly legal and broader philosophical senses. Finally, for the World 
Systems Theory of Immanuel Wallerstein, European expansion in the long 16th century was, 
so to speak, the Big Bang which created the expanding universe of the capitalist world- 
economy (CWE). I
So whatever else they may disagree about, Realism, the English School and World Systems 
Theory apparently concur on two points, one methodological and the other historical.^ First, 
all agree that the modem international system is best conceptualised as a single whole, 
differing only on whether its essential unity comprises overarching dynamics of a politico- 
military (state-system), cultural/legal (International Society) or economic (CWE) kind.
lrThe emergence of the European world-economy in the long' sixteenth century (1450-1640) was made possible by an 
historical conjuncture... which created a dilemma that could only be resolved by a geographic expansion of the division of 
labour1. [The Capitalist World Economy, Cambridge 1979.]
^These similarities, which are real and important, should not of course obscure one feature which sets Wallerstein's work 
apart from the others: it is, whatever its faults, a genuine project of historical research. The more orthodox schools of ER 
have nothing to compare with it. Wight might as well have asked *Why is there no international history? For the 
unexpected, but persuasively argued charge that Wight himself was less an historian than a metaphysician, see Roy Jones' 
The English School of international relations: a case for closure', Review of International Studies. 1981,7, especially pp. 9- 
12 .
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Second, all agree that the core institutional mechanism regulating the system as a whole 
(respectively, the balance of power, the secular doctrine of statehood/sovereignty, the world 
market) was consolidated in this period.
In short, irrespective of differing emphases, an underlying consensus synchronises the 
institutional modernity of the international system with its geographical expansion. Is this 
correct? In the case of the modem world economy, such a claim is not only empirically 
controversial,-* it is also heavily loaded with theoretical implications. Let us suppose for a 
moment what historical enquiry alone can confirm or refute: namely that the ’international 
economy' of the Absolutist empires is not structurally commensurate with the modem world 
economy. What would be the consequences for thinking about today's global political- 
economy? Negatively, it would seem to follow that any attempt to assimilate its basic 
structural character to economic relations prevailing by the end of the long 16th century - for 
example by describing both as capitalist - is either missing something important about the 
modem world economy, or else is reading back modem conditions into an earlier social 
system. Both these charges have been levelled against World Systems Theory.
If this diagnosis of World Systems Theory is correct, the very form of the deficiency it 
identifies would point to a remedy. For if it could be argued that the early modem expansion 
of Europe was not capitalist, then the epoch of Absolutism, brief and transitional as it is, 
provides a last fleeting chance before the onrush of capitalist industrialisation to mount a 
comparative historical analysis - to set the contemporary world economy into relief against the 
backdrop of an earlier and different kind of'international economy'. Since this would focus 
precisely the differentia specifica, it would also provide us with theoretical categories to 
develop an historical and structural definition of the modem world economy, and its 
articulation with the international system as a whole.
And this is an historical period rich in example and counter-example. For one of the first 
results of a closer examination of the Absolutist empires is that the image of a composite 
intercontinental economy immediately breaks down into a more variegated pattern. In fact we 
need to speak of (at least) four waves of European expansion in this period, each associated 
with different institutional mechanisms of mercantile extraction and metropolitan 
accumulation. Thus the Portuguese established a seaborne trading empire in the Far East 
unaccompanied (in this period ) by any extensive settlement or territorial consolidation. By 
contrast, the Spanish conquistadors installed themselves as a semi-feudal ruling elite, directly 
exploiting the labour of subject populations. Further north, the English (and French) also
■*See P. O'Brien's 'Europe in the World Economy1 for a powerful, empirically based attack on the very idea of an 
international economy before the 19th century. [Reprinted in The Expansion o f International Society, Bull & Watson [eds.] 
Oxford 1984.]
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settled permanently - but they did not (or could not) incorporate indigenous labour. Finally, 
although the Dutch empire did not spawn settler-colonies of this kind, its regional power 
became more and more territorially defined as it sought to tighten its grip on production and 
supply. And there were, of course, overlaps: the Portuguese claimed a vast territorial empire in 
Brazil; the Dutch sought to plant settler-colonies in North America; and the English eventually 
ran the entire gamut of forms. This deepening historical complexity might be thought to render 
impracticable the structural comparison advocated above. However, it may be the case that the 
institutional differentiation and its broad association with different 'national' metropoles 
actually assists our overall project of clarification. For it means that we have not one but four 
premodem variations of'international trade' to compare with our own, each constituted as a 
distinct historical structure of social relations embodying processes of 'international' 
accumulation.
And there would be perhaps one further benefit to be gained from the format of such an 
enquiry. Orthodox IR does not formally recognise the possibility of a composite marxist 
theory of the international system.^ The ideological mirror which it is pleased to call 'the 
paradigm debate' does, however, include a category of writings known as 'structuralist'. (Other 
designations of these writings apparently include 'global-centric' and 'layer-cake'. )5 The writers 
involved are supposedly linked by a dominant emphasis on classes and economics, and by a 
belief that 'the task of IR' is not so much 'simply to explain what states do' (the concern of 
Realism) or 'to explain all major world events' (the concern of Pluralism) but rather to show 
'why the world contains such appalling contrasts between rich and poor... treating inter-state 
politics as merely a surface phenomenon'.^ Who are these structuralists? The list includes, 
among many other unlikely bedfellows, Karl Marx, Johan Galtung and Immanuel Wallerstein. 
From this threesome alone it must be clear that the 'paradigm debate' is a very confused 
animal. But what concerns us here is the way in which Wallerstein's work has come to stand in 
for Marx in the context of a determined non-engagement with historical materialism beyond 
the often caricatured encounters with Lenin's Imperialism, and the superficially accurate but 
nonetheless misleading claims that Marx and Engels did not elaborate a theory of international 
politics. ^  IR is not wholly alone in this refutation by proxy. In historical sociology,
Wallerstein's supposed marxism has been a key negative reference point in the emergence of 
the 'Bringing the State Back In' school.8 There, however, the association has not gone 
uncontested. And Wallerstein's work has encountered a body of marxist historians both
^For a compelling exploration and diagnosis of this refusal, see F. Halliday, 'Vigilantism in International Relations: 
Kubalkova, Cruickshank and Marxist Theory*, Review of International Studies (1987), 13.
^See M. Banks, The Evolution of International Relations Theory* in The Rise o f  the World Society Perspective... p. 15.
^M. Banks, The Inter-Paradigm Debate',... p. 12-13.
^See for example the claim by Kubalkova and Cruickshank: '...international relations did not particularly interest the two 
founders of marxism* [Marxism and International Relations, p.27.]
8See for example, Skocpol's *Wallerstein's World Capitalist System: A Theoretical and I listorical Critique', (Skocpol,
1977].
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sensitised to the theoretical issues by earlier, similar debates (most notably the Dobb-Sweezy 
debate, the General Crisis of Feudalism debate, and the Brenner debate),^ and fully capable of 
providing the alternative historical explanation which must be the ultimate arbiter of such 
controversies. One looks in vain in IR for the equivalent, historically informed and 
theoretically testing debate on what precisely is indicated by describing the modem 
international system as capitalist. It is perhaps time that some of the clarity and lessons of 
those earlier historiographical and sociological exchanges were imported into IR. For it is not 
until Wallerstein's work is seen for what it is - a wayward Weberian strain, more closely 
related in its theoretical provenance to its critics in the Bringing the State Back In school than 
to any recognisable historical materialism - not until this is seen, will the intellectual and 
disciplinary space for an historical materialist theory of the international be cleared.
Such a full comparative and theoretical exercise lies beyond the scope of this thesis - though 
arguably it remains necessary to any adequate historicizing of the disciplines of IR and 
International Political Economy. Moreover, it would also contribute strongly to any narrative 
of the the international processes involved in the historical emergence of capitalism. For in 
the brief intimations which Marx gives of the latter, the cumulative development of these 
empires is central to what might be termed the process of'international primitive 
accumulation':10
The different moments of primitive accumulation can be assigned in particular 
to Spain, Portugal, Holland, France and England, in more or less chronological 
order. These different moments are systematically combined together at the end 
of the seventeenth century in England....11
Our task here, however, is a far more modest one. In this chapter, we shall explore aspects of 
the Portuguese and Spanish empires in order to develop further the central claim of the thesis: 
namely, that geopolitical systems and processes cannot be adequately understood until their 
analysis is integrated into that of the wider social structures which constitute them. In 
particular, it will be suggested that both the financial mechanisms and the territorial form of 
the Portuguese empire in the East showed features which derive from the different character 
of trade associated with precapitalist social structures. Meanwhile, in the Spanish case we shall 
use similar arguments to illuminate the momentum, form and orientation of the geopolitical 
expansion which engulfed the New World in the West.
^The principal contributions to these debates have been republished in the following volumes: The Transition from  
Feudalism to Capitalism, [R. Hilton ed., Verso 1978], Crisis in Europe 1560-1660, [T. Aston ed., London 1965] and The 
Brenner Debate, T. Aston & C. Philpin eds., Cambridge 1985.
^^This theme will be developed in Chapter 6 below.
l l Marx 1976, p.915.
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4.2 India Portuguesa
(i) Portuguese Expansion
The story of Portuguese naval expansion in the 15th and 16th centuries is that of the first early 
modem wave of Europe's expansion. To its epic poet, however, who sang the heroism of 
Vasco da Gama
It is the story too of a line of kings who kept ever advancing the boundaries of 
faith and empire, spreading havoc among the infidels of Africa and Asia and 
achieving immortality through their illustrious exploits. ^
And once we pass behind the reflected glare of modem mythology - Henry 'the Navigator' 
received his sobriquet from a 19th century English biographer^ - it is these feudal, 
militaristic, crusading strains which sound loudest.
The first advance beyond the shores of Europe was the capture of Ceuta from the Moors in 
1415 - 'itself conceived as part of a crusade which might one day encircle the earth and take 
Islam in the r e a r '.  14 Ceuta was an important port and terminus of caravan trade on the 
Moroccan coast. It was a point of transshipment for the West African gold which at this time 
provided some two thirds of the bullion circulating in the western h e m is p h e r e .  15 The fall of 
Ceuta, by depressing the trans-Saharan gold trade, provided an additional pressure to make 
direct contact with the Guinean source. And this was indeed one of the leading goals of the 
annual voyages of exploration down the West African coastline instituted by Henry in 1421. 
Henry himself, however, scaled down his financial contributions after being routed by the 
Moors at Tangiers in 1437. And after his death in 1460, North African crusading again 
diverted resources from the project of discovery. 1  ^In the reign of Manoel I (1495-1521), 
these efforts continued to preempt a fuller commitment to more distant - and more profitable - 
imperial activities. And Alfonso de Albuquerque himself, under whose viceregal leadership 
(1509-1515) the empire was largely constructed, held on to the end to dreams of an anti-
^From the opening lines of The Lusiads by Luiz Vas de Camoens, extract reproduced in Dan O’Sullivan, The Age o f  
Discovery, Harlow 1984, p. 95.
^ibid. p .ll.
^J.H . Elliott, Imperial Spain 1469-1716. London 1970, p.57.
^E . Wolf, Europe and the People Without History, California 1982, p.38-9.
^S ee O'Sullivan, op. cit. p. 13-14.
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Ottoman alliance with Persia, and a scheme to starve out Egypt by persuading Abyssinian 
allies to divert the waters of the Nile. ^  Thus, as Parry suggests, weighing the overall 
relationship between the spread of the Renaissance and the sudden, dramatic expansion of 
European geographical horizons,
However Renaissance be defined, the Reconnaissance... began independently 
and with medieval motives and assumptions.^
The 'medieval' Portuguese were, however, unusual in at least one regard. For a combination of 
reasons (which included domestic labour shortages after the Black Death and the decimation 
of the 'old nobility' following the war with Castile in 1385)19 the ideological denigration of 
mercantile activities which held sway throughout much of feudal Europe exercised no veto 
over the Portuguese aristocracy. Prince Henry himself drew funds simultaneously from his 
feudal lands, his stewardship of the crusading Order of Christ and his many trading interests - 
which included slaving, fishing, the importation of dyes and sugar, and the control of domestic 
soap production. And later on, the 'mixed social origins of the investors and directors were 
reproduced among those who actually navigated and commanded trading posts'.^ Whether 
this circumstance indicates the political strength of urban trading and shipping interests, or 
precisely the weakness of the indigenous commercial bourgeoisie (hemmed in on its other 
flank by thriving Italian financial communities in Lisbon and Opporto) is a matter of some 
scholarly debate.21 And in the more highly charged idiom of the time it was also debated by 
contemporaries: Dom Manoel styled himself'Lord of the Conquest, Navigation and 
Commerce of Ethiopia, Arabia, Persia and India'; but Francis I, his French neighbour, dubbed 
him simply 'the grocer king'. 22 Without entering too far into this debate, two striking 
circumstances would seem to tell against the claims that have been made for the 'modernity' of 
Portugal. First, the noble domination of much trade and indeed industry (which was exercised 
through the farming out of royal monopolies) did not affect the denigration of non-noble 
merchants. As the mercers of Lisbon complained as late as 1689: '...in the conceit of the 
Portuguese, a merchant is no better than a fish-porter'.23 The same was true, equally 
surprisingly, of'the contempt and dislike with which the mariner's calling was for so long
^O'Sullivan p.22.
^TheA ge o f  Reconnaissance, London 1973, p.55.
l^See Wolf p. 111, and R. Davis, The Rise o f  the Atlantic Economies, London 1973, p.3-4.
20p. Curtin, Cross-Cultural Trade in World History, Cambridge 1984. Vasco da Gama himself Nvas not a professional 
seaman, but a nobleman, a soldier and a diplomat'. [Pany p. 179]
^Compare for example Davis p.3-4 with O'Sullivan p.10 and Wolf p.l 12. Braudel [1984:140] makes the remarkable 
claim that the Aviz dynasty was brought to power in 1385 by 'a "bourgeois" revolution', and adds that 'all things considered, 
[Portugal] was already halfway1 to becoming 'a modem state'. Boxer [The Portuguese Seaborne Empire 1415-1825, 
Harmondsworth 1973, p.4] describes 13th century Portugal as the first of the modem European nation-states'; but he 
appears to indicate by this only the early attainment of the present national borders, following the destruction of the last of 
the Moorish kingdoms in the Algarve in 1249.
^C urtin, p. 139.
2-^Cited in Boxer, op. cit. p.321.
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r e g a r d e d '.  24 indeed, it was not until the 18th century that professional (non-noble) seamen 
came to replace the fidalgos as captains of the ships plying the carreira da India.25 Thus if 
the Portuguese nobility took to trade and the high seas, this signalled more the rampage of an 
unchecked, feudal estate than its enlightened fusion with a rising commercial bourgeoisie. But 
secondly, if the exploring Portuguese were the first of the moderns, how are we to explain the 
trajectory of their subsequent political and cultural development, in which precisely the failure 
to develop 'modem' institutions and sensibilities earned them the epithet 'the kaffirs of 
Europe'?
In September 1499, Vasco Da Gama arrived back in Lisbon with the first cargo of eastern 
spices to reach Europe via the Cape. Within six months, a second fleet had departed. Its 
experience was to confirm the impression of Da Gama's voyage - namely that a peaceful 
takeover of the spice trade was inhibited by two principal factors: the unwillingness of local 
rulers to antagonise the Moslem mercantile interests already entrenched in the region, and the 
inability of the Portuguese to provide European commodities (for the purpose of entering the 
trade by exchange and barter) able to match the quality of what was already available in the 
East. (Da Gama's gifts to the Samorin of Calicut had provoked open laughter when 
unveiled.)26 For this reason, the third trip (1502) comprised a heavily armed fleet of fourteen 
sail which exacted tribute in West Africa (Kilwa), bombarded Calicut from the sea and sank an 
Arab fleet which offered resistance.
The next step might have been to secure port facilities for the permanent stationing of a fleet 
to protect Portuguese shipping exploiting the concessions already obtained. The Portuguese, 
however, had grander designs. Tracking the flows of east-west trade, they perceived that three 
choke-points, corresponding to the three northern exits from the Indian Ocean, formed natural 
entrepots in the overall circulation. In the west, the island of Ormuz in the mouth of the Gulf, 
and the port of Aden at the southern tip of the Red Sea, governed the approaches to Europe. 
In the east, the straits overlooked by Malacca formed the gateway to China. Hence Alfonso 
De Albuquerque's anticipation of the low overhead costs of an eastern trading empire: '...four 
good fortresses and a large, well-armed fleet manned by 3,000 European-born P o r t u g u e s e ' . 2?
In six short years, mostly under Albuquerque's energetic leadership, much of this was 
achieved. Having taken Goa in 1510, the Portuguese captured Malacca in 1511 and Ormuz in 
1515. Major naval battles at opposite ends of the Indian Ocean, where European gunnery 
destroyed Egyptian/Gujarati (Diu 1509) and Javan (Malacca 1513) war fleets, settled the
24ibid. p.215.
25ibid. p.219.
^O 'S ullivan , p.20.
2^Cited in C. R. Boxer, The Portuguese Seaborne Empire 1415-1825, Harmondsworth 1973, p.53.
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dominance of Portuguese sea power. During this time they suffered only one enduring 
setback, the failure to take Aden in 1513 - a goal which, for various reasons, they would never 
achieve. For the rest however, they remained undefeated at sea until two routs by Chinese 
coastguard fleets (1521 and 1522) finally set the eastern bounds of their naval dominium.
The rapidity of this expansion requires some explanation. Boxer^ cites three factors over and 
above the widely remarked technological superiority of European warships. First, he stresses 
the considerable determination of the Portuguese forces, whose capture of Goa, Ormuz and 
Malacca was achieved in each case only after having suffered an initial repulse. Second, the 
strongest Asian polities at this time were land powers, whose rulers were neither threatened by 
nor much interested in the Portuguese advance. Thirdly, the Portuguese were able, by alliance 
and diplomatic manoeuvre, to exploit the frequent disunity within and between the coastal 
trading polities in order to assist their military operations. It might also be added that the 
technological inferiority of the Asian warships is perhaps itself to be explained by the 
institutional character of the Moslem trading system which, as Curtin puts it, 'operated with 
comparatively low protection c o s t s ' : ^  heavily armed merchantmen were not necessary to ply 
an open trade and hence were not available to defend it from external aggression. Finally, it 
should be remembered that Portuguese power, though of vast geographical extent, was almost 
exclusively naval, '...rarely able, even when [it] wished, to take the initiative outside the tiny 
fortress areas under [its] control'. 30
The imperial organisation constructed in the aftermath of these successes rested upon two 
central institutions: the royal monopoly and the cartaz system. The first of these was managed 
by the Casa da India, the royal trading firm based in Lisbon itself, which monopolised trade in 
the most important Asian imports - especially pepper. The 896 vessels which embarked for the 
east between 1500 and 1634 were built, owned and managed on behalf of the Crown. 31 Of 
these, just over half, 470, made it back to L is b o n .  3 2 For the rest 28% were lost at sea, while 
the remainder stayed on in the Indian O c e a n .33 jn the 1560s this trade accounted for roughly 
half of the spices imported into Europe from the east.34 For reasons discussed below, this 
Portuguese share soon diminished as a proportion of the whole - even before the Portuguese 
were dislodged by the Dutch. Over the same period, however, (the latter half of the 16th 
century), Asian production and European demand for spices doubled, while prices may have 
increased t h r e e f o l d .  3 5 Thus, the channelling of the maritime India trade through the Casa da
3®Pany, p.62.
3 ^  Figure calculated from the table on p.381 of Boxer. 
^C urtin p. 143.
33ibid. p. 142.
3^ibid. p. 144.
33Boxer 59.
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India in Lisbon was a source of considerable profit for the Crown. Indeed, Wallerstein 
suggests that as early as 1506 the latter drew over half its revenue from its monopoly of trades 
in West African gold and eastern spices. 3 6
The second great institution of Portuguese imperial power, the Estado da India, was also 
based in Lisbon. In practice, however, its operational and administrative centre was in the port 
of Goa on the western coast of India. For this was the (geographically) vast apparatus of 
protection by which the Portuguese sought not only to secure the passage of the East 
Indiamen, but also to tax all interport mercantile traffic throughout the Indian Ocean. Under 
this system, freedom from Portuguese molestation was purchased in the form of a certificate 
(cartaz) which, though itself moderately priced, required that ships use Portuguese entrepots, 
where a 6% tax was levied on goods unloaded. The turnover of the Estado was even greater 
than that of the Casa da India, including as it did both the receipts from protection and the 
expenses of the Portuguese fleets and garrisons throughout the empire. But rarely did this 
coercive infrastructure yield a profit for the Crown; on the contrary, over the long run it acted 
as a net drain on official resources. Not unlike the Spanish Crown, which declared bankruptcy 
at the very point when silver imports reached their highest levels, the Portugese authorities 
proved strangely unable to benefit from their unique good fortune:
Despite the wide-ranging nature of the Crown's fiscal arm, successive 
Portuguese rulers were never able to enjoy an excess of income over 
expenditure for any length of time... For most of the 16th century, the Crown 
operated to a large extent with money borrowed on onerous terms from 
merchant bankers against the security of future pepper imports... 3?
(ii) Structural Features o f Precapitalist Trade
What was going wrong? To answer this question, we need to enhance our analysis in two 
ways. First, we must map the overall structural character of this form of trading empire: where 
and how were the surpluses which were skimmed off as trading profit generated? By what 
mercantile and other mechanisms were these surpluses brought into circulation and both 
redistributed socially and relayed geographically? What were the wider conditions needing to 
be satisfied in order for these mechanisms to operate effectively? Second, having explored its 
formal structural properties, we need to reconstruct its actual historical insertion into the living
^ T h e  Modem World-System /, Academic Press 1974, p.326.
•^Boxer op. cit. p.324. Boxer goes on to note that TCing John Vs spectacular extravagances were achieved at the cost of 
letting his army, navy and many other essential services decline in penurious neglect’. Royal profligacy by itself, however, 
does not account for the distinctive form  of Portuguese failure outlined below.
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social world of the sixteenth century. How was the attempt to consolidate such a system 
affected by the limited resources of Portugal, the nature and dynamics at that period of the 
societies of the Indian Ocean littoral, the lie of land and sea requiring territorial forms of 
control, the developing state of naval technology and nautical knowledge and so on?
Taking these in order, it is generally agreed that the Portuguese empire, when compared with 
prior European or Asian trade networks, does not stand out by virtue of any significant 
technical, organisational or other institutional innovation. Parry avers that
...all the types of settlement which the Portuguese and other Europeans were to 
establish in the East in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries had their 
precedents in Italian settlements in the later Middle Ages in the Mediterranean 
and the Black Sea.-***
And J.C. van Leur suggests that the empire '...did not introduce a single new economic 
element into the commerce of A s ia '.  39 Moreover '...it is central to the understanding of the 
situation that the Portuguese did not create the trade'^O of the Indian Ocean. Rather they 
captured it (or a part of it) and sought to use it as a complex intercontinental mechanism of 
surplus appropriation.
What then was this pre-existing institutional pattern of mercantile activity which came to be 
reproduced across the vast canvas of India Portugueser? This question brings us to that great 
enigma of early modem Europe: 'merchant capital'. The scare-quotes are important, for it can 
be argued that the historical practices denoted by this term in the work of Wallerstein, the 
Dobb-Sweezy debate, and indeed in Marx's writings too, reflect precisely the distinctive 
character of precapitalist markets and exchange relations. Thus, Eric Wolf cuts through much 
unnecessary confusion when he asserts baldly:
There is no such thing as mercantile or merchant capitalism ...There is only 
mercantile wealth. Capitalism, to be capitalism, must be capitalism-in- 
production.41
This is, of course, a definitional insistence, and its justification, as Dobb who shared this 
perspective recognised, 'must ultimately rest on its successful employment in illuminating the
-^op. cit. p.64.
^C ited  in Wallerstein 1974, p.331. Something similar applied to slave-dominated sugar production in Brazil, in which 
'the Portuguese transferred to the New World an agricultural complex of long standing in the European Mediterranean'. 
[Wolf op. cit. p. 149.]
^Wallerstein, ibid. p. 328.
^Europe and the People Without History, Berkeley 1982, p.79.
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actual process of historical d e v e lo p m e n t ’. ^  For the moment, however, these points are raised 
simply to assist in a clearer presentation of the discussion which follows.
/
With these caveats in mind, let us proceed to examine the character of'merchant capital’. Marx 
observes in the famous Chapter XX of Volume III of Capital that
Prima facie, a pure and independent commercial profit seems impossible so 
long as products are sold at their v a lu e  43
And since, in the carrying trade particularly, mercantile profits appear at the end of a series of 
transactions which mediate the circulation of commodities without visibly adding to their 
value, the association of commerce with swindling is natural enough. Luther protested that
princes should punish such unjust bargains with due rigour and take care that 
their subjects shall not be so outrageously abused by merchants [who] ...daily 
rob the whole world... and steal with greater assurance than all o t h e r s .4 4
Nor was the calmer analysis provided by the 14th century Moslem ’sociologist', Ibn Khaldun, 
any more reassuring on this score:
...commerce is the search for gain by increasing the initial fund when one buys 
commodities at a favourable price and resells them at a higher price... This 
increase is called profit. This profit is obtained by storing the commodity and 
awaiting a fluctuation in the tendency of the market to rise, which produces a 
great profit; or by transporting the commodity mentioned to another region 
where the demand for it is stronger, which also produces a great p r o f i t .45
Speculation and the manipulation of market imperfections - was this the worm-eaten core of 
premodem mercantile practice? Certainly the Dutch would later find in pepper the perfect 
commodity for both of these: available only from remote sources, a high value/weight ratio, 
minutely and easily divisible, and able to be stored for long periods at low cost. The 
temptations were irresistible, and some cargoes of pepper are known to have been detained in 
storage for over thirty years, awaiting le moment ju s te d
Studies in the Development o f Capitalism, New York 1963, p.8.
43p.329.
^c ited  in ibid. p.331n.
43Ibn Khaldun, cited in Wolf 1982, p. 120.
^K ristof Glamann, 'European Trade 1500-1750' in Carlo Cipolla [ed.] The Fontana Economic History o f Europe: The 
Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, Glasgow 1974, p.475.
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At the same time, however, the Dutch were also plying and dominating an open trade, partly 
in bulky, perishable staples, across the Baltic which offered less spectacular opportunities for 
artificial profits. By the mid 17th century, the Dutch 'carried perhaps ten times as much out of 
the Baltic as any competitor'.4? And yet this was not a militarily enforced monopoly. Dutch 
commercial supremacy here rested on a real competitive edge resulting largely from 'cheap 
freights and the control of a sufficient supply of silver for export'. As a result 'Dutch merchants 
could sell Baltic goods in England more cheaply than English merchants could'.48
The real point about precapitalist markets, then, is not that they were protected, artificial 
monopolies - though many of them were. The real point concerns the underlying structural 
reason for this latter circumstance: the mechanism of mercantile surplus accumulation which 
was being fought over lay in control of the circulation of commodities (not their production); 
and competition of all kinds - military, technological, organisational - therefore concentrated in 
that realm. In a dramatic illustration of this, Louis XIVs finance minister, Colbert, suggested 
in 1669 that France could secure dominance of the trade of Europe by capturing the Dutch 
share of the 20,000 ships in which it was c a r r i e d .49 The plan ended in defeat. But if it seems 
outlandish, it should be remembered that at this very time, others were pursuing similar 
policies with great success: 'enormous numbers [of Dutch vessels] were captured by the 
English during their three wars with the Dutch between 1652 and 1673, largely restocking the 
English merchant f l e e t . '^0 o f  course, if control over the processes of circulation, or an 
acceptable share of them, could be achieved by non-military means, thus lowering protection 
costs, so much the better.
The source of the wealth which the merchants sought to tap was in the hands of the surplus- 
takers, the land-owners who continued to command the vast bulk of material production. If 
the merchants themselves became involved in production - say urban craft production - they 
did so in order to accelerate the wheels of circulation and not to gain an income from the 
direct competitive exploitation of productive labour. Why is this distinction so important?
This question needs to be addressed in greater historical and theoretical depth. For the 
moment however, some brief indications must suffice to point up the specificity of premodem 
trade in comparison with its equivalent today. And perhaps the most useful starting point is 
Marx's suggestion that
^R alph Davis, The Rise o f the Atlantic Economies, London 1973, p. 181.
^Wallerstein, The Modem World-System, Vol. II, London 1980, p.52,53. The Dutch were also able to exploit their 
geographical position to facilitate and engross the exchange of Portuguese spices for Baltic grain. See Glamann op. cit. 
p.446.
^See, H.G. Koenigsberger, Early Modem Europe 1500-1789, Harlow 1987, p. 171-3.
^R alph Davis, The Rise o f the Atlantic Economies, London 1973, p. 190-1. The Dutch had themselves, over the previous 
half-century, prised the Portuguese out of the spice trade by a combination of financial and military manoevres and 
assaults. See Braudel 1984, pp.211-213.
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In the precapitalist stages of society commerce ruled industry. In modem 
society the reverse is true.^ 1
The first half of this we have already noted above. From the point of view of mercantile 
accumulation, urban (and, increasingly, rural) manufactures were promoted in order to fuel 
trade. They were one among a number of weapons used in the struggle for control of lucrative 
exchange relations. But what does it mean to say that today industry rules commerce? In the 
premodem era, trade composed a process in which producers could exchange surpluses, but in 
which the contingent relation of prices to the costs of production (a relation muddied by the 
non-commodified status of labour exploited outsided the market) was governed above all by 
factors affecting circulation, where the mechanisms of mercantile profit therefore lay. Not so 
today: for trade now is predominantly the realm in which surpluses generated by the 
competitive exploitation of commodified labour in the sphere of production are realised as 
exchange-value. Hence
...the production process has... absorbed circulation as a mere phase of 
production... The production process rests wholly upon circulation, and 
circulation is a mere transitional phase of production...^
There is a great deal more than this to be said. But the key point is that what we have here are 
not simply two different alignments of production and exchange relations within an overall 
political economy which remains unaltered but for a shift of quantitative weight between pre­
existing commercial and industrial sectors. Rather, we have two dramatically different kinds of 
market - different with regard to their mechanisms of accumulation, their conditions of 
reproduction, their dynamic structural properties, their articulation within the wider social 
formation, and the determinate forms of social power which they promote. For the category 
'the market' (hence also 'the world market'), whatever general features it might correctly 
identify, is, just like 'the state' (and 'the state-system'), a hopelessly blunt instrument of social 
explanation until it is sharpened up by historical and structural definition.
One further observation may be made before we continue. The distinction roughly sketched 
above between capitalist and precapitalist markets may or may not be a useful one: that 
remains to be tested by deploying it in the construction of actual historical explanations. But, 
reverting to our earlier discussion of definitions, it is not one that is available as a theoretical 
tool (or therefore visible as an historical contrast or discontinuity) so long as we operate with
^op . cit. p.330. 
^M arx op. cit. p.328.
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a market definition of capitalism. 53 For if capitalism is understood as rational calculative 
activity with regard to 'the market1 (Weber) or production oriented to 'the market'
(Wallerstein) without specifying what kind of market, then its historical specificity (as opposed 
to its quantitative weight within a given society) is simply not an issue. Throughout history 
there have always been markets and, by dint of urban consumption, there has always been 
market-oriented production. Weber recognised this and happily wrote of capitalist interests in 
imperial R o m e .  54 But then, for Weber the concept of capitalism was not primary in the 
definition of modernity.
(Hi) The Mercantile Practice o f the Portuguese
Since mercantile profits depended upon control of the processes of circulation, it was 
imperative that the Portuguese should keep as tight a grip as possible on these, in order to 
exploit the India trade to the full. This involved a number of preconditions.
Perhaps the most basic precondition was the preservation of the secrecy of the Cape route 
itself. For, as Curtin notes, 'the 'maritime revolution1 of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries 
was not so much a revolution in ship design as the discovery of the world wind s y s te m '. 5 5 in 
the age of sail therefore, the knowledge that there existed a sea-route to the East did not open 
the field to all-comers, and the Aviz dynasty decreed the death penalty for persons found 
smuggling charts to foreign r iv a ls . 56
^ A n  exception which proves this rule is that impressive work of Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation, Boston 1957 
[first published in 1944]. There, Polanyi associates capitalism with the predominant role played in the organisation of 
modem societies by ’the self-regulating markef. However, not only is he emphatic that 'previously to our time no economy 
has ever existed that, even in principle, was controlled by markets' [43]; he is also crystal clear that the 'self-regulation' 
which distinguishes this market from its politically- or custom-regulated forbears is itself an effect of the commodification 
of labour power (and secondarily of land). Thus although Polanyi does not discuss Marx's social theory, his own attention 
to the historical and structural specificity of the capitalist market allows him to identify the structural break between 
precapitalist and capitalist commercial activity in remarkably similar terms: TJp to the end of the eighteenth century, 
industrial production in Western Europe was a mere accessory to commerce'. [74] It might be added that the 
anthropological idiom of Polanyi's thought lends it two special strengths in this area: a powerful instinct for theorising 
societies as social totalities; and a wide range of comparative empirical knowledge of (tribal) non-capitalist societies - wide 
enough to make him wary of extrapolating conditions peculiar to the market economy1 into transhistorical and cross- 
cultural assumptions shaping the analysis of other societies. On the other hand, despite identifying the historical novelty of 
the capitalist market, Polanyi never provided a social theory of it. He simply detailed its practical effects as a mechanism 
of social organization. The next step - the apprehension of the value-relations between persons which lie 'behind' yet are 
accomplished only through exchange-relations between things - was taken by Marx alone. For Polanyi, the 
commodification of labour might be an outrage, but it was never a mystery. For a searching yet sympathetic probing of the 
limitations of Polanyi's theoretical framework, see M. Godelier, 'Karl Polanyi and the 'Shifting Place' of the Economy in 
Societies' in The Mental and the Material, London 1988.
^S ee  for example the discussion of imperialism reproduced in Gerth & Mills [ed.], From Max Weber, pp. 166-9.
^op . cit. p. 136.
^S ee  O'Sullivan, op. cit. p. 15-16.
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The Portuguese were also fortunate after 1479 in not having to face Castilian military 
competition for (and privateering raids upon) their West African trade. In that year the Treaty 
of Alcacovas which ended the Castillian War of Succession legitimised 'the Portuguese 
monopoly of fishing, trade and navigation along the whole West African coast'.^7 The treaty 
no doubt fortified the Spanish pursuit of westward exploration;^ and it afforded the 
Portuguese almost a century free from serious European naval competition in the Indian
Ocean. 59
But armed rivalry, as it turned out, was among the least of their problems. More damaging 
was the inability of the Crown to finance the spice trade which it controlled. Although the 
prospect of huge windfall profits was real enough,^® neither the monarchy nor any indigenous 
commercial interests had the resources either to underwrite the outgoing voyages or to buy 
the cargoes on their return. Hence, attempts to exclude foreign investment were abandoned 
after 1505:
The Crown undertook all subsequent voyages, but sold the entire cargoes in 
Lisbon to merchant syndicates, mostly Italian and German, who shipped the 
goods to Antwerp and distributed them there. Frequently, the Crown sold 
cargoes in advance, while they were still at sea, or borrowed on the security of 
future cargoes, so that in effect the foreigners provided most of the capital, and 
both as creditors and as middlemen absorbed most of the profit.^
Part of the problem here was that the circulation of the India trade was only half done when 
the cargoes arrived at Lisbon. Nine tenths of the consumers lived in northern Europe.^2 And it 
was under foreign ownership that the pepper and spices were carried to the central entrepot of 
Antwerp where they finally entered the capillaries of internal trade.
-^Parry op. cit. p. 173'
^A nd  in more ways than one: under the terms of the treaty Castille had been allowed to retain the Canary Islands which, 
as would soon be found, lay on the northern fringe of the North East Trade Wind zone.
^T h e  broad division of East and West between Spain and Portugal was later consolidated in the famous Treaty of 
Tordesillas (1494) which moved the longitude of demarcation proclaimed by the papal bull Inter Caetera' to a line 370 
leagues west of the Cape Verde islands. The Spanish Crown, however, persisted in the attempt to find a competing western 
route to the Spice Islands, renouncing this goal only in 1529 (Treaty of Saragossa) after Magellan had failed to discover 
westerly winds in the Pacific which could drive the homeward journey to Mexico of a Pacific trade in spices. [See 
O'Sullivan op. cit. p.44.] When the winds were finally discovered in 1565, their net effect, ironically enough, was not to 
yield Spain a cut in Portugal's spice trade but rather to produce an uncontrollable haemorrhage of American silver in the 
direction of China (via Manila).
^Braudel cites contemporary estimates of returns on the Guinea gold trade at 500%. op. cit. p. 142. As to the spice trade, a 
comparison of its weight/value ratio with that of the Baltic trade in staples makes the point: for the years around 1600, an 
average annual total of some 126,109.4 tons of grain was imported into Europe, at a value equivalent to 87.5 tons of silver, 
at the same time the annual imports of 2,712 tons of spices were worth 136.8 tons of silver. [Peasants, Landlords and 
Merchant Capitalists, Peter Kriedte, Berg Publishers, 1983, p.41] The difference in the weight/value ratio is a factor of 72.
61 Parry, op. cit. p.73.
62 Braudel p. 143.
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... the wealthy merchant houses seek to buy up large lots and form consortia 
with the aim of maximising profits on the resale and distribution of the pepper 
over Europe. The constellations of interested parties are in continuous flux, and 
the pepper never stops being manipulated...63
The Crown tried between 1508 and 1549 to extend its control of circulation northwards by 
maintaining its own agency in Antwerp. Not only was this body unable to compete with its 
commercial rivals; by the last quarter of the sixteenth century it was 'foreign pepper 
contractors [who were being] allowed to station their own representatives at Goa and Cochin, 
in order to supervise the purchase and shipment of the spices for which they had 
contracted'.64 Braudel notes that the impact of the Portuguese trade is visible in the 
considerable diversion of German silver and Hungarian copper production away from its 
erstwhile Venetian destination and towards Antwerp. For copper, in the six years from 1502- 
3, he cites a rise from 24% to 49%, leaving Venice with a mere 13%.65 One wonders how 
much of this actually made it back to Lisbon, and how much was siphoned off along the way. 
Certainly, the fact that 'the West was being drained of its silver for the benefit of the 
Portuguese trade circuit'66 did not entail either that the West was becoming proportionately 
poorer, or Portugal proportionately richer, as a r e s u l t .67
By one means or another then, commercial agents downstream in the flow of the India trade 
were able to reach back and exploit mechanisms of mercantile profit located at earlier points in 
the process of circulation. This must have been galling to the 'Lord of Conquest, Navigation 
and Commerce'. But the circuit was hardly more secure if he looked upstream to the Indian 
Ocean itself. Only two of the three key entrepots had been captured, and the Red Sea spice 
route overlooked by Aden remained open. This, coupled with the fact that the Portuguese 
were never able to monopolise the purchase of spices, but chaffered at the markets of Malabar 
alongside Indian merchants, was a severe limitation:
In the middle years of the sixteenth century, the volume of the Levant trade 
was as great as it had ever been, and at least as great as that which the 
Portuguese carried around the C a p e .6 8
^Glaman, p.486.
^Boxer, op. cit. p.61. This latter innovation was apparently unsuccessful, but its very appearance is startling.
^ o p . cit. p. 149.
66ibid. p. 149.
^ F o r  what it is worth, Pierre Chaunu calculated that the overall terms of trade between East and West in this period were 
very favourable to Europe: '120 to 150,000 tons of spices were bought, almost without merchandise in return, for 150 tons 
of gold, which the weight of domination had seized from the feeble African societies, and a quantity of specie difficult to 
calculate, but not at all comparable to the 6,000 tons of equivalent silver which remained to be made up.' [Cited in 
Wallerstein 1974, p.329]
6^op. cit. p.69. Nor did the Portuguese exercise any control over the land routes. According to Boxer, by the end of the 
century, larger quantities of pepper *were reaching Europe by the overland route to the Levant' than the Portuguese were 
carrying by sea. [op. cit. p.60] Finally, Boxer also notes that for strategic reasons (principally the desire to cultivate Persia 
as a counterweight to the Ottomans) the Gulf sea-route was never completely closed to Moslem traders, [ibid. p. 59]
110
A failed monopsony in Asia thus reinforced the failure to achieve a monopoly in Europe.
That said, the mercantile ingenuity of the Portuguese must also be recognised. For they 
succeeded, intermittently at least, in harnessing their participation in the interport trade of Asia 
as a means of driving the overall process of intercontinental accumulation. Indeed, without this 
'country trade' it would have been impossible for them to conduct East-West trade on the scale 
that they did. The reasons for this were simple: Portugal was not a productive centre, Europe 
as a whole did not provide suitable commodities on an adequate scale, and sufficient quantities 
of bullion were not available to the Crown. Thus it was by breaking into the Asian circulation 
of indigenous commodities as carriers that the Portuguese came by the use-values which could 
be bartered for spices and the surplus exchange-value which made up the deficit of payment 
from Europe.
The primaiy circuit in what developed into 'a whole network of ancillary trades'69 playing this 
role was the export of Indian cotton goods to Indonesia where they were accepted in 
exchange for spices, and to East Africa where they earned gold and ivory. In the last quarter 
of the 16th century, the voyages from Goa supplying Portuguese Macao were extended to 
take in the Sino-Japanese trade in silks and bullion forbidden to Chinese vessels by Imperial 
decree. Since Chinese silks were paid for in Japanese silver, the value of which was markedly 
higher in China, enormous windfall profits in gold were made on the return run from Nagasaki. 
In addition, most of the spices purchased by the Portuguese were resold in Asia.^O Thus after 
about 1547:
...the greater part of the gold required by the Portuguese for their purchases in
Malabar was obtained from south-east Africa, Sumatra and China..?  1
Since the Crown owned in principle almost the entire Portuguese operation, under ideal 
conditions this articulation of regional and East-West exchange relations should have been 
worked as a gigantic geo-commercial machine relaying enormous surpluses to Lisbon at 
diminishing cost. But by any comparison with this potential, the royal returns, though 
handsome enough, were small. Indeed, the passage to and from the Lisbon metropole 'formed 
the weakest link in the chain of empire'. ^ 2
^Parry, op. cit. p.240.
^India alone, says Braudel, consumed twice as much as Europe, op. cit. p.219.
^  Boxer, op. cit. p.60. Spanish exploitation of the Mexican silver mines provided the other important source of specie 
facilitating Western entry into Asian circulation. See Wallerstein 1974, p.329, especially footnotes 132 and 133. 
^Paxty, op. cit. p.241-2.
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This striking outcome - an imperial structure partly cut adrift from the originating centre which 
yet retains offical control and ownership - might be seen as an extreme instance of the special 
vulnerability to smuggling, contraband and embezzlement of any commercial network in which 
the sources of profit lie exclusively in the control of circulation - in other words, of any 
precapitalist network. But it needs also to be understood in relation to the distinctive 
institutional forms of Portuguese royal power. We noted earlier that the strong noble presence 
in Portuguese trade and industry took the form of grants of royal monopolies to individuals. 
This in itself was distinctive in an age when monarchs elsewhere guarded their monopolies 
jealously. But it did not end there:
Perhaps more than in any other country, it was a long-established practice... for 
the Crown... to farm out the smallest public offices which might be expected to 
produce any revenue...^
This device characterised Portuguese overseas expansion too. Whether it was the 
governorship of a lucrative entrepot, the captaincy of a round trip in the Carreira or the Goa- 
Nagasaki route, rights to exploit teak forests in India or one of the plethora of lesser 
administrative posts, offices were contracted out, either as remuneration or into the hands of 
the highest bidder. These bidders might be individuals or syndicates, and subcontracting was 
routine in the more complex branches of imperial activity.
However, it was the conjunction of this commercialising of office with another factor which 
transformed an administrative gamble into the world-wide carnival of corruption known to 
later historians. Unable to pay adequate wages to the roughly 2,400 men sent annually to the 
East during the 16th century, the Crown conceeded a limited right of individual employees to 
trade on their own account. For the crew of the Indiamen this meant the 'liberty-chests' - part 
of the storage capacity of the vessel given over to their private use. For officials stationed in 
the East it could mean anything from limited private deals on the side to a purchase of the 
temporary right to engross all trade under the control of their office to their own private profit. 
For the system as a whole, however, this 'spoils system' merely ensured that the empire was 
staffed from top to bottom by men with a powerful and mutual interest in defrauding the 
Crown. And the resultant internal haemorrhage sharply reduced the flow of surpluses reaching
the metropole.74
Given its unprecedented geographical extent, India Portngnesa was a remarkably flimsy 
empire in many respects.
^Boxer, op. cit. p.324.
74For examples, see Boxer pp.61-3 and Chapter 14.
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[I]t is probable that had the Portuguese abandoned their Indian empire at the 
end of the sixteenth century, they would have left even less trace than did the 
Greeks, Scythians, and Parthians...^
But precisely this territorial profile - long lines of communication linking distant points rather 
than borders enclosing areas of rule - was the signature of the precapitalist trading-post empire 
pur el dur. (Thus did Venice and Genoa throw out their strings of military bases along the 
Mediterranean litoral, in order to compete by force over the sea-lanes of the Levant trade.) As 
with any territorial strategy, its shape and orientation followed the particular social relations it 
sought to affect: the stuff of Portuguese imperial power was the control over the mercantile 
mechanisms of surplus appropriation available in the circulation of commodities, not an 
extension of command over the actual generation of those surpluses in the exploitation of 
productive labour. Its superficiality of impact and its huge geographical scale can therefore 
both be illuminated by an understanding of its structural identity.
4.3 New Spain
On the face of it, the Spanish empire in the Indies could hardly form a starker contrast with its 
Portuguese contemporary in the East. The latter was a naval empire par excellence, the former 
a territorial dominium. The Portuguese found and penetrated an existing mercantile system, 
without ever (in our period) exercising extensive political rule over subject populations; the 
Spaniards found no maritime commerce but subdued and ransacked two enormous empires, 
subsequently installing themselves as a ruling elite living off the labour of the surviving 
population. India Portuguesa was carved out and operated under the jealous leadership of a 
grasping aristocracy; America was captured by ’dispossessed Spaniards of all conditions... 
mostly of low extraction’. ^  Clearly, these two fronts of 16th century European expansion, 
though both commanded from the Iberian peninsula, were advancing according to very 
different dynamics, over very different terrains of operation, and were consolidating 
themselves by very different mechanisms of control.
Moreover, one of the key differences, Spanish exploitation of indigenous labour, enables us to 
explore further the theme of capitalist and precapitalist ’international economies’. For by the
^Sansom, cited in Wallerstein 1974, p.331n. In fact it was not only the penetration of Asian social orders which was 
superficial. The Portuguese success in cornering the country trade was itself modest relative to the whole. Curtin suggests 
that the value of Gujarat customs revenues was still three times the total revenue of the Portuguese empire in Asia [in the 
1570s], though many Gujarat merchants worked within the Portuguese cartaz system', op. cit. p. 145.
^ H . Kamen, Spain 1469-1714: A Society in Conflict, Harlow 1983, p.91.
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end of the century, the Spaniards had not just substituted themselves for the Aztec and Inca 
elites, taking over the existing structures of surplus extraction and appropriation; under the 
combined pressures of demographic collapse, rising demand for labour in the mines, and an 
absolutizing monarchy, they had reconstituted the remaining population into a new society, 
New Spain, a tributary social formation organized around the production of bullion and its 
relay, via a controlled series of exchange relations, to the Castilian metropole. Moreover, as 
Parry notes, ’precisely because it was a colonial society, Spanish America, much more than the 
highly developed societies of the East, was the economic complement of Europe'.77
(i) Social Forms and Structural Dynamics o f Castilian Expansion
It is a truism that the Spanish assault on the Americas proceeded under the momentum and 
using the techniques of the recently completed Reconquista. Thus, Claudio Sanchez-Albomoz 
describes it a s t h e  most immense result of the peninsular activism created by Spain's 
centuries-long struggle with I s la m '.  78 And James Lang, clearly no devotee of the English 
School, suggests that
The extension of royal power to the vast area of two continents was a
monumental task. But it was not a new task nor even a bold new p o l i c y .  79
Both the structural continuities and the dynamic links between the old world and New Spain 
are indeed vital to any historical understanding of the Spanish moment of European expansion. 
To render them visible, however, we must revive some of the anterior theoretical and 
historical questions which truisms, by their nature, typically abbreviate: what does it mean to 
speak of a 'momentum' of territorial expansion? How did such a momentum, associated above 
all with seven hundred years of land warfare, suddenly come to 'spill over' across two 
thousand miles of uncharted ocean? And how were the institutional forms of Castilian power 
expressed at the new level of an intercontinental system of control as opposed to their earlier 
innovation within the expanding territorial unity of the Iberian kingdom?
As Anderson points out, the early Moslem conquest of Iberia interrupted the slow fusion of 
Germanic and Roman social forms which elsewhere characterised the emergence of European 
feudalism. Instead, the seven centuries' struggle with the Moors 'was the fundamental
77The Age o f  Reconnaissance, London 1973, p.225.
7^The Continuing Tradition of Rcconquest' in From Reconquest to Empire: The Iberian Background to Latin American 
History, H.B. Johnson [ed.J, New York 1970, p.43.
James Lang, Conquest and Commerce: Spain and England in the Americas, New York & London 1975, p. 10.
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determinant of the forms of Spanish feudalism'.*^ The Reconquisla was a temporally uneven 
and regionally differentiated historical process: different areas were recovered at different 
speeds, were absorbed in different ways and with differing consequences for the development 
of the expanding whole. Moreover, its pace was affected also by developments within the 
world of Moslem Spain - notably the break-up of the caliphate of Cordoba (from 1031) into 
twenty to thirty competing taifas (successor states), and the Almoravid and Almohad Berber 
jihads (c l036 and cl 135) which temporarily threw the Christians back onto the defensive.** 1
During the ’slow reconquest' of the tenth and eleventh centuries, the peasants' haven of a no- 
man's-land on the moving frontier had undercut the consolidation of seigneurial relations 
further north, thus simultaneously elevating the organising military role of the monarchy and 
inhibiting the political consolidation of a landed feudal nobility. **2 Instead an urban class of 
commoner knights (the caballeros villanos), drawn from the free small-holders who settled 
the land, were used to staff the frontier towns and fuel the waves of military advance. The 
recruitment of this class was organised through the granting of fiscal privilege and the 
reservation of municipal office. Furthermore, 'apart from stock-raising, these towns in the 
twelfth and thirteenth centuries lived chiefly from booty in the form of cattle, slaves, 
moveables and even foodstuffs'. **3 Thus the structural relation of town and country was very 
different to that which characterised the material reproduction of feudalism, either in central 
and western Europe or in northern Italy. The Christian towns of central Spain did not arise as 
centres of trade and craft production dominated by a commercial class distinct from 
surrounding hierarchies of feudal rural power. They were 'military and religious centres'**  ^. 
comprising indeed the bulk of the population*^ - which co-ordinated both the intra-Castilian 
relations of authority, and the marshalling of resources for further campaigns against the 
Moors.**6
Thus the material and political reproduction of the Castilian social order was organized around 
permanent military mobilization, continuous plunder (whether direct, in the form of marauding 
raids, or indirect, as in the case of the 'heavy annual tribute' extracted from the Caliphate from 
the 11th century o n w a r d s * *  7) and the task of incorporating and settling new lands inhabited by
80Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism, London 1974, p. 168.
See J. H. Parry, The Spanish Seaborne Empire, London 1966, pp.30-1.
82Anderson 1974a, pp. 168-9.
8-^Elena Lourie, ’A Society Organized for War: Medieval Spain', Past and Present. December 1966, p.69.
^Lang, p.27-8. 
pp.556-7.
°°In Castile itself, the parallel result of this orientation of the town towards booty and privileged military consumption was 
the retarded growth of an urban bourgeoisie. And one of the strongest indicators of this skewed development is that 
whereas elsewhere in Europe the later consolidation of royal absolutism was typically pursued in the face of noble 
resistance and with urban support, in Spain the pattern was reversed: '...the Spanish monarchy's most fundamental victory 
over corporate resistance to royal absolutism - indeed its only actual armed contest with any opposition in that realm - was 
the military defeat of the towns, rather than the nobles.' [Anderson 1974b, p.68.]
8^ Lourie, p.60.
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non-Christian populations. Indeed the very name 'Castile' witnesses to the distinctive, 
militaristic origins of this polity: a buffer state erected by the Kingdom of Leon in the 9th 
century, fronted by a line of castles built as a forward defence against Moorish raids on the 
newly recaptured plains of A s t u r i a .8 8  On the one hand, this entailed that the final closing of 
the frontier - or even a long pause in the Reconquisla - would threaten social disorder, and 
require fundamental changes in the structure of Castilian s o c i e ty .  89 On the other, it meant that 
the conquistadors who landed in the Americas were equipped with a formidable repertoire of 
institutional devices and forms by which to imagine, organize and legitimate their conquest and 
plunder. Thus the capitulaciones which apportioned in advance the respective rights of king 
and conquistador over any human and material resources captured in the Americas echoed 
the 'practice of the Crown to make contracts with leaders of military expeditions against the 
M o o r s ' .99 The encomienda system by which, following the opening round of slaughter and 
looting, the Spaniards institutionalised their command over native labour was adapted from 
institutions developed earlier by the crown to allocate newly reconquered Moorish 
territories.^^ And the distinctive role of the Castilian town - both as the garrison planted in an 
alien countryside and as a co-ordinating grid of intra-Spanish relations of authority and 
appropriation - was also carried o v e r .92 As in medieval Spain,
Towns in Spanish America did not 'emerge'. They were planned in accordance 
with a definite ritual... An instrument of domination, the Spanish town was 
planned to control the countryside.93
When Cortez landed on the mainland in 1519 with 600 men in search of the Aztec capital, 
almost his first action was to found a new town, Vera Cruz, and formally to appoint himself 
and his men to municipal offices. This, clearly, was not a piece of innocent town planning. It 
was a deliberate political act which served formally to redefine the legal status of his 
expedition, repudiating the authority of the colony of Hispaniola and invoking direct allegiance 
to the Castilian m o n a r c h .94 This was to become a routine d e v i c e ,95 its real purpose
^S ee  James Westfall Thompson, Economic and Social History o f  the Middle Ages, Vol. II, New York 1959, pp.554-5. 
^S ee  Johnson, p.9-10.
90Elliott, p.59.
For an exhaustive if also exhausting contrast of the encomienda of the Indies with its multiple Castilian forbears, see R. 
S. Chamberlain, The Roots of Lordship: the Encomienda in Medieval Castile' in H. B. Johnson [ed.] op. cit.
^E lliott affirms that the municipal organization of medieval Castile was faithfully transplanted to the overseas colonies', 
op. cit. p.60.
9-^Lang, op. cit. p.27-8.
9^See Parry, p.211 and O'Sullivan, p.46.
9^'Every leader of a conquering army made it his first care to establish towns, to get them legally incorporated and to 
install his own immediate followers as the officers of municipal government.' J. H. Parry, The New World 1521-1580' in 
The New Cambridge Modem History, Vol. II, The Reformation 1520-1559, p.563.
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underlined by the fact that permanent settlement did not result. On the contrary, the new 
towns were routinely depopulated as soon as further prospects of plunder b e c k o n e d .9 6
As already suggested, the Reconquista was an uneven process. By contrast to the slow build­
up described above, the 'quick reconquest' in the first half of the thirteenth century saw the 
Moors expelled from the Algarve by the Portuguese, while the Aragonese captured Valencia 
and the Castilians overran Extremadura, Andalusia and Murcia, leaving Granada the last 
moslem kingdom on the peninsula. In Portugal this swift conclusion allowed the leading 
military institutions, the monarchy and the Church, to block off the emergence of a strong 
nobility for over a century. 9? In Castile, however, the very scale of the new territories to be 
digested obliged Ferdinand III to parcel out huge estates to aristocratic supporters.98 Had 
Castile bitten off more than it could chew? Certainly, after 1270 the Reconquista slowed to a 
halt which lasted two hundred years; and Castile entered the general crisis of the fourteenth 
century already riven by the revolts and dynastic struggles of an overmighty magnate c la s s .99
A further specificity of this penultimate wave of expansion was the rapid growth of wool 
production enabled by the incorporation of Andalusia, an industry which came to absorb much 
of the demobilized class of caballeros villanos:
For the first time sheep owners could move their flocks with real safety along 
the great canadas (sheep walks), which extended the length of Spain from the 
summer pastures in the northern mountains to the winter grazing grounds in the 
Guadalquivir valley.
This development, combined with the introduction^* of the merino sheep, was full of 
consequences for the future. Apart from ensuring in Castile 'the triumph of a pastoral 
e c o n o m y ' , * ^  it linked Spain with Italy, both as a raw materials producer and as a luxury 
market. In addition, the making over of arable soil to pasturage began to displace agrarian 
labour on a scale later reflected in the disproportionate demographic contribution made by
9**Every township established by the Spaniards in Mexico, with the exception of Mexico City and perhaps Vera Cruz, lost 
most of its Spanish population within a few years of its foundation.' [Davis op. cit. p.42]
9^'...down to the Avis revolution of 1383, the annual income of the monarchy was approximately equal to that of the 
church, and the two combined were between four and eight times larger than the total revenues of the nobility1. [Passages 
from Antiquity to Feudalism, p. 172]
98See J.H. Elliott, Imperial Spain 1469-1716, p.26.
99For the content of some of these struggles, see George Holmes, Europe: Hierarchy and Revolt 1320-1450, Glasgow 
1975, pp.61-3.
^Johnson , op. cit. p. 10.
Perhaps by the Moors (as Kamen suggests, p.50), perhaps by the Castilians at the instigation of Italian merchants 
(Johnson p. 10).
l^EHiott, op. c it, p.33. It had always been true of Castile that 'Ranching was almost the sole occupation of the 
inhabitants...' [Thompson 1959, p.555]
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Andalusia to New World settlement. 103 it was a pattern of agrarian change which would 
recur in Mexico.
(ii) A Systemic Pressure?
Cortes and his followers also brought with them that ’wolfish greed for g o ld 'l l  for which the 
conquistadors have been famed: 'I came here to get gold, not to till the soil like a peasant'. 
How are we to explain this obsession which almost brought Columbus' first voyage to 
grief, 107 and which soon manifested itself as the overriding pressure leading to the 
extermination of the unhappy Caribs of Hispaniola? 108 in part its roots lay in the historical 
formation of the broad hidalgo class with its distinctive ideological self-definition:
...the very character of the Reconquista as a southwards migration in the wake 
of conquering armies encouraged a popular contempt for sedentary life and 
fixed wealth, and thus imbued the populace with ideals similar to those of the
aristocracy. 109
But more particularly, gold itself had been a regular and sought after prize in the looting of the 
Moorish kingdoms. For the latter controlled the land routes via Morocco to its African source, 
and thus, alone among the societies of early medieval Europe, were able to use a gold 
coinage. 110 Even during the two hundred year pause after 1250, the Castilian monarchy was 
able to secure a steady supply in the form of tribute from the kingdom of Granada. 111 This 
flow was interrupted after 1415, first by the Portuguese capture of Ceuta, then by their direct 
contacts with Guinea.
None of this however, would have carried the Castilians across the Atlantic had it not affected 
wider interests. The 14th and 15th centuries witnessed a partial but significant redeployment of 
Italian mercantile activity to the western Mediterranean. This was partly conditioned by the 
deteriorating geopolitical and commercial situation in the Levant, (the final collapse of the 
Byzantine Empire under Ottoman pressure came in 1453), and partly by the expanding luxury 
market of Castile. In addition, the production of sugar-cane on slave plantations managed by
103Johnson p. 11.
^ S e e  Wolf p. 135 and Davis p.46. 
^^CSullivan p.55.
^C o rte s , cited in Kamen op. cit. p.92. 
lO^See O'Sullivan op. cit. p.32. 
l^ ib id . p.34.
^E llio tt, op. cit. p.32.
Johnson p. 17.
11 1 See Johnson, op. cit. p. 17.
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Italian merchants had itself migrated westward - from the Levant to Cyprus, to Sicily, to the 
Algarve and beyond - as military pressure from the East and the shifting supplies of slave 
labour dictated. (By 1450, Portugal was importing 2,500 African slaves annually.) But equally 
important was the Italian (and in particular, Genoan) commercial involvement with both 
Castile and the coastal ports of Morocco as a means of drawing off gold specie to drive the 
eastern trade in spices. The importance of this direct penetration was already considerable in 
the 14th century due to a marked fall in European silver production on the one hand, *12 an(j 
rising prices in the spice trade following the collapse of the Mongol Khanates on the other. 
From 1471, Portuguese direct contacts with Guinea diverted the Moroccan supply of bullion. 
And by the time central European silver production revived in the latter half of the 15th 
century, this 'bullion hunger' was further compounded by the sharply rising demand for specie 
which accompanied the early economic recovery after the Black Death. Between 1460 and 
1620, European population nearly doubled and the volume of money transactions may have 
increased ten- or twenty-fold. 1 ^  It now seems to be agreed that this burst of growth was 
already generating the inflationary pressures of the sixteenth century before the discovery of 
American silver - which in any case did not come 'on stream' until halfway through the 
century. 1 *4 And while it remains true that Mexican and Peruvian imports later superimposed a 
monetary inflation onto this 'real cost inflation', it follows that their first effect was to relax 
those restraints on growth which were due to the objective scarcity of the means of exchange. 
As Davis observes, on the eve of the Discoveries '[t]he European economy urgently needed a 
large increase in the supply of silver, and to a lesser extent of gold.'l ^
It might be asked: How can we reckon this urgency as a factor in our historical explanation of 
European expansion - without posing the issue in unacceptably functionalist or teleological 
terms? As we noted axiomatically in Chapter 2 above, systems do not have 'needs', and we 
cannot therefore assume an automatic causal link between a dispersed systemic 'pressure' and 
subsequent outcomes. The challenge is not dissimilar to our earlier task of making sense of the 
idea of a 'momentum of reconquest', and it must be answered in the same way: that is by 
spelling out how the social structures under view (in this case those which organised late 
medieval trade and finance) comprised sets of social relationships reproduced by 
knowledgeable, concretely located human agents, what the broader conditions (and dynamic 
tendencies) of this reproduction were, and how they were met - or not. In this case we find 
that some groups, notably mercantile interests, would have experienced this scarcity not
1 ^Anderson 1974a, p. 199-200. 
l^Davisop.cit. p.98.
1 ^  Davis p.69, C. Kindleberger, Spenders and Hoarders: the World Distribution of Spanish American Silver, 1550-1750, 
Ch. 3 of Historical Economics: Art or Science?, Hemel Hempstead 1990 p.37, Glaman p.430. Davis later adds: 'During 
much of the sixteenth century, pressure on real resources had been largely responsible for pushing Spanish prices upward, 
and the influence of rapidly growing money supply had added little to it.' op. cit. p. 145.
1 ^Davis op. cit. p.98.
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simply as a diminished stock of wealth available for individual engrossment, (as did the 
Spanish hidalgo class) but additionally, and more particularly, as a brake on circulation itself 
And since for these groups access to the means of exchange is vital to their basic social 
reproduction, it hardly surprising that the scarcity of the money-form was expressed as a 
fixation with and determination to accumulate the finite supply, and discover new sources:
'With metallic coinage shrinking, trade rising, and a lag in the spread of Italian methods 
of credit... bullionism was not a simple fallacy, like that of misplaced concreteness.'1 ^
Thus it may well be that, as the aged Bernal Diaz reflected, 'all men alike covet gold, and the 
more we have the more we want'; ^  ^  but it is also clear that the lethal obsession of the 
conquistadors was historically overdetermined: behind the personal greed shaped by the 
collective memory of Moorish booty were gathering the dispersed pressures of a social system 
beginning to strain against the objective limits of the conjuncture. It would of course be a 
simplification to conclude that the southwards momentum of the crusading Reconquista1 ^  
met a westwards thrust of Italian mercantile speculation racing the Portuguese to the eastern 
sites of spice production - a thrust which, while it failed in its own purpose, unwittingly 
catapulted the Castilian engine of plunder to within reach of the hapless Amerindian 
civilisations. But there have been worse simplifications. For Columbus, it will be remembered, 
was not a Castilian, but an Italian, who had been in the employ of a Genoese bank. (The New 
World itself came to be named after the Florentine businessman, Amerigo Vespucci.) 
Moreover, Ferdinand and Isabella agreed to support his venture only after a guaranteed loan 
was secured from private sources by the Royal Treasurer - quite possibly from the group of 
Genoese financiers with whom the latter was linked. And certainly, there is no doubt that 
the aim of the voyage was to discover a westward route to the Spice Islands. Included within 
this brief was the search for new sources of gold, 'a metal that he mentioned at least sixty-five 
times in his diary during the p a s s a g e . . . '120 Columbus apparently never gave up the belief that 
the Caribbean islands he discovered lay off the eastern coast of China. And even after this was 
proved false, the search for a passage through to the riches of the Pacific remained the most 
powerful inspiration of seaborne exploration of the Americas. 121 Magellan's heroic voyage of 
1519-22 was supported by Charles V on the (spurious) grounds that 'if the line of Tordesillas
H6C. Kindleberger, p.40.
* ^  The Conquest o f  New Spain, Hamiondsworth 1963, p.274.
* ^Isabella’s 'dying request [in 1504 was] that her husband should devote himself "unremittingly to the conquest of Africa 
and to the war for the Faith against the Moors"'. [Elliott, p. 53]
* ^O'Sullivan p.27.
^^Kindleberger op. cit. p.40.
This was true of the discoveries of the Reconnaissance as a whole. Parry, discussing the simultaneous rise of 
Portuguese and Spanish long-distance trade in the 16th century, remarks that 'Much of the exploring activity of other 
nations during the century was inspired by the hope of breaking or circumventing one or other of these monopolies.' [op. 
cit. p.224] Similarly, most land exploration in the Americas in the 16th century was undertaken by individuals hoping to 
emulate Cortes and Pizarro by discovering further empires to conquer. For examples, see ibid. p.221 -2.
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were extended to the other side of the globe, it would leave the Spice Islands on the eastern, 
or Spanish, s i d e ' .  122 And over a century later, the Anglo-French competition in the American 
fur trade which was to become of such geopolitical moment, began largely as a by-product of 
the search for a North-West P a s s a g e .  123
Such were the motives of the Italian vanguard, motives which underlay the so-called 
'Mediterranean approach1 associated with Columbus. 124 Although on his return from the first 
voyage, Columbus promised the monarchs gold and 'slaves, as many as they shall o r d e r 1, 125 
the second trip to the West Indies (1493) was not planned as a campaign of conquest. The 
1,500 passengers included soldiers, but composed 'a microcosm of male Spanish society'. 126 
The purpose was rather 'to establish trading factories on the pattern of Genoese establishments 
in the Levant'. 127 This, however, required that contacts be made with the Far East as rapidly 
as possible. Failure to achieve this exacerbated strains between the Italian leadership 
(Columbus was attended by his brother Bartholemew) and the Castilian settlers who were 
more interested in extorting gold from the Caribs of Hispaniola. In an attempt to contain this 
rift, Columbus was compelled to distribute land and natives among the settlers in the form of 
encomiendas. And when, in 1499, he was replaced by the Catholic Kings and sent back to 
Spain in irons, the social organisation of European expansion in the Americas reverted 
decisively to 'the Iberian tradition of conquest and settlement.' 128 Banned from returning to 
Hispaniola, Columbus was allowed one final chance by his patrons to discover the sea-route to 
Cathay. As the westward Italian reconnaissance petered out along the shoreline of the Gulf of 
Mexico, the fate of the Carib populations, collapsing under the combined pressure of intensive 
slave-raiding, overwork in the forced search for gold, and, in conditions of traumatic social 
dislocation, disastrous vulnerability to alien pathogens, prefigured the impact of the reviving 
conquista about to burst onto the American mainland.
^^ibid. p.40.
l^ S e e  Parry 1973, pp.253-6. Parry describes this search as 'another story of heroism, of failure in its main purpose, and, 
later, of successful results in unexpected directions', [p.255]
^^See Johnson p.23.
^ O ’Sullivan p.33 .
^^ibid  p.24.
^Tlohnson p.34. Elliott also briefly discusses Columbus' personal failure in the context of the tension between 
Mediterranean (trading post) and Iberian (territorial) approaches [p.61-2]. Parry, however, implies that the contrast was 
not, at this stage, explicit: The immediate object of the voyage was not to open a new trade or to conquer Oriental 
kingdoms, but to settle the island of Hispaniola, to found a mining and fanning colony which could produce its own food, 
pay the cost of the voyage by remitting gold to Spain, and serve at the same time as a base for further exploration in the 
direction of Cipangu [Japan], Cathay and India.' (p. 194]
* -^Johnson p.23.
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(lii) Conquest and Settlement
As J. H. Parry puts it, the age of the professional explorer gave way swiftly to the age of the 
conquistador:; and the latter was itself to prove 'quarrelsome and brief. ^ 9  The conquest of 
Cuba (1511) was followed by two exploratory voyages to the Yucatan peninsula (1517-18) 
which returned with intelligence of a large empire inland. A third voyage (1519) carried 600 
men under the leadership of a former treasurer's clerk, Hernando Cortes. The events which 
followed, culiminating in the rapid and complete destruction of the Aztec empire, compose a 
narrative of reckless and breathtaking courage, astonishing historical coincidence, a fatal, 
dreamlike cognitive dissonance enabling spectacular plunder - all of these in a conjunction that 
must have seemed unrepeatable, until it recurred a dozen years later in the high Andean 
heartland of Inca power.
Cortes seems to have been mistaken for the reincarnation of an Aztec god, Quetzlcoatl, 'whose 
return to earth was expected by Mexican augurers about the time that the Spaniards 
landed'. 130 This would perhaps explain the contradictory behaviour of the Aztec ruler, 
Montezuma, and the fact that the Spaniards were eventually welcomed into Tenochtitlan, (the 
capital city comprising 60,000 dwellings built on an island in lake Texcoco), and lodged in a 
palace adjacent to that of the emperor. Within weeks, Montezuma, by a mixture of 
psychological manipulation and physical force, had been reduced to a puppet of Cortes; and 
the formal political structures of the empire were being mobilised to raise tribute in gold from 
subject populations. Montezuma handed over the contents of the royal treasury, and Aztec 
warrior-guides escorted Spaniards to the mines and rivers where the gold was extracted. ^  1 
Inevitably, Montezuma's increasing subservience generated rising tensions within the Aztec 
political elite, tensions which exploded into open rebellion following Spanish interference with 
the routine ceremonies of mass human sacrifice. Expelled from Tenochtitlan, the 
conquistadors fell back on native allies. In the final assault, several hundred Spaniards led a 
native army of over 100,000 in ninety-three days of continuous fighting, 'systematically looting 
and destroying [the capital] building by building'. *32
Pizarro's conquest of the Incas was no less spectacular. The first European to find the Indian 
coastal city of Tumbes in northern Peru in 1527, he returned first to Spain, securing from 
Charles V a capitulacion ceding the govemership of any territories captured. By another fatal
l29op. cit. pp. 207 & 222.
^ P a rry , p.211.
^ S e e  Bernal Diaz, The Conquest o f  New Spain, Harmondsworth 1963, pp. 245-277. Of the contents of the royal treasury, 
immediately melted down for distribution among the conquistadors, Diaz says: There was so much of it that after it was 
broken up it made three heaps of gold weighing over six hundred thousand pesos in all, not counting the silver and many 
other valuables, or the ingots and slabs of gold, or the gold from the mines.' pp.271-2.
132Panyp.213.
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historical coincidence, the Inca empire, whose engineers had constructed a military 
communications infrastructure surpassing even that of the Romans, 133 was at the time of 
Pizarro’s arrival approaching the climax of a five-year war of succession. As the 180 or so 
Spaniards set out from Tumbes, the 80,000 strong victorious army of Atahualpa, 640 km 
away on the high Andean plateau, was preparing for its triumphant descent to the capital 
Cuzco, having finally defeated the reigning Inca, Huascar. Why Atahualpa allowed the 
Spaniards to approach unhindered - indeed, even evacuating the small town of Cajamarca for 
their use - remains unclear. 134 Even stranger was his acceptance of Pizarro’s invitation to a 
parley in the town's main square - a natural setting for the ambush which followed. Completely 
unprepared for the Spanish onslaught, the 5000 unarmed royal escorts died (or escaped) 
without offering any resistance. 135 And the remainder of the army melted away. Once again, 
the captive ruler retained his divine status and was used to command the labour of the empire 
in its new task of delivering gold to the conquerors: 'Atahualpa's Ransom', (which failed to 
save him from execution by his captors) was assembled by a two-month, officially 
promulgated mass stripping of the artefacts of Inca civilisation, 13 <3 an(j amounted to no less 
than 1,326,539 pesos of gold and 51,610 marks of silver. 137 And here too, early attempts to 
rule through Inca puppets led to open rebellion (1537) requiring a more substantial military 
conquest. In two major respects, however, the Peruvian theatre of expansion differed from the 
Mexican. First, for reasons of logistical supply, Pizarro did not retain the Inca mountain city of 
Cuzco as the capital of Spanish rule, preferring instead to operate from the new coastal city of 
Lima. As a result, the topographical disjuncture between coast and mountain (together with its 
associated contrast of forms of social organisation) came to underlie - as it has done ever since 
- the weakest seams in any project of unified political rule. But secondly, this geography 
informed not only Spanish-Indian relations, but also the intra-Spanish civil wars in which rival
l^ T h e re  were 15,000 kilometers of paved roads!'exclaims Mann. [The Sources o f  Social Power, Vol. I,p .l22 . The 
Andean 'Royal Road' traversing the Inca territories from north to south was, at 3,250 miles, 'until the nineteenth century, 
the longest arterial road of history1. [V. W. von Hagen, The Ancient Sun Kingdoms o f  the Americas, London 1962, p.308.]
It was supplemented by a parallel 2,520 mile coastal road, the two being linked at numerous points by cross-cutting lesser 
roads. These roads were, wherever possible, built to a standard 24-foot guage and lined on either side by a low wall.
Prepositioning of food and other resources at regular intervals enabled not only rapid massing and movement of forces, but 
also a runner-based messenger relay-system which composed the fastest communication system the world had seen, not 
excepting the Roman’, [ibid., p.317] (Mann is, perhaps wisely, sceptical of some of the early records on which such
judgements as the last must have been based. See op. cit. p. 122.)
134yon Hagen [op. cit. p.328] suggests that once again the Spaniards were mistaken for returning gods. On the other hand, 
any commander of an 80,000 strong army confronted with 180 travel-weary intruders, might normally be forgiven a certain 
amount of complacency.
135pizaiTo’s secretary reported that During the whole time no Indian raised his arms against a Spaniard'. [See O'Sullivan 
p.53.] This paralysis is reminiscent of Montezuma's stupefaction at being kidnapped by Cortes: so incredulous was he of 
this development that, it seems, he could more easily believe that he was being imprisoned of his own free will - a 
delusion which Cortes fostered assiduously, to great manipulative effect. [See Diaz, op. cit. pp.246-7.]
136see O'Sullivan, p.53.
1-^von Hagen, op. cit., p. 300. By comparison, in 1550, the total value of the ordinary taxes of Castile (e.g. principally the 
domestic sales tax) was equivalent to just over 1m pesos. See Kamcn p.87 for the figure in ducats, and ibid. pp.x-xi for the 
conversion ratios.
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conquistadors fought out first their claims for territorial dominium and then their resistance to 
the consolidation of the bureaucratic authority of Charles V .
As mentioned above, the conquistadors organised their settling of the new territories using 
institutions carried over and modified from the r e c o n q u i s t a . H 9  in particular, the distinctive 
articulation of urban and rural social relations was reproduced. Cortes' immediate followers 
lived in the new Mexico City, relations among them being organised through the rotation of 
municipal offices. Their material reproduction, however, was secured outside the city by the 
conferment of encomiendas - grants of territory with an assigned number of Indian households 
from whom tribute in kind and in labour could be levied, and towards whom the 
encomenderos assumed a general responsibility of religious conversion and military security. 
(Cortes himself aquired an enormous encomienda, numbering no less than 23,000 
households.) Strictly, the encomienda involved no cession by the Crown either of land 
ownership or of jurisdiction over persons. However, the evident desire of the conquistadors to 
make their positions heritable, coupled with the despotic power enabled by the right of forced 
labour, confirmed the Crown in its determination to abolish the institution.
The displacement of the conquistadors was undertaken in two stages. First, the Crown 
established structures of legal and administrative authority staffed by peninsular Spaniards and 
answerable directly to the Council of the Indies in Castile (set up in 1524). The audiencia 
(court) of Mexico was not resisted on its inauguration in 1528; and the first governor of New 
Spain, appointed over the head of Cortes, arrived in 1535. At the same time, the Crown 
gradually aquired the power of appointment to the main city councils (cabildos) and curtailed 
their political independence. Local fiscal and legislative control passed into the hands of 
another royal appointee, the corregidor, whose responsiblity for supervising the collection of 
taxes (including among the Indians) and acting as a local court of appeal, further blocked the 
development of the encomendero class into a feudal aristocracy. 140 Thus at every level the 
settlers were to be hedged about by the royal bureaucracy unfurled from Seville. And this in 
turn was not simply government for the sake of government. The same organised structure of 
social relations which carried royal authority from the Council of the Indies down to the local 
adminstration of Mexico also comprised a structure of public finance which relayed resources 
upward, level by level, until all the costs of government had been met, whereupon the balances 
could be remitted to Spain. 141 (The other major source of New World income lay in the royal 
supervision of colonial trade.)
138See Parry 218-20.
l^ F o r the following, see Parry 1958, pp.562-72.
^®See Lang, op. cit. p.33-4.
l^Lang, op. cit. p.35.
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Second, this progressive displacement of the encomenderos within the government of the New 
World was followed in 1542 by a direct assault on the encomienda itself. The New Laws of 
that year, fruit of a temporary but powerful confluence of interest between a centralising 
monarchy and a proselytising Church, provided for the abolition of Indian slavery, the close 
restriction of personal labour services, and the permanent reversion to the Crown of every 
encomienda as it fell vacant on the death of its tenant.
The New Laws provoked such a storm of opposition - including, in Peru, outright rebellion 
and the killing of the viceroy - that they were never implemented, and were formally revoked 
in 1547. The encomienda, however, did not survive. Slotted in at the apex of pre-existing 
Aztec and Inca tributary structures, it was undone by the physical and institutional collapse of 
the Indian societies on which it bore so heavily. Between 1520 and 1650, the native population 
of Mexico may have fallen from 25 million to 1.5 million, while that of Peru dwindled from 5 
million to less than 300,000.142 As the free fall continued, control of Indian labour passed 
increasingly to the Crown’s corregidores de indios, who allocated coerced labour recruited 
through a rotating native levy system to a new class of Spanish farmers. This repartimiento 
gave way in turn to the haciendas, large estates occupying the lands of extinct Indian 
communities, now held in full ownership by private individuals and repopulated under the rule 
of wage-labour and debt peonage. The falling numbers of Indians meant a proportionate rise in 
the burden of the repartimiento on the survivors. Since the latter was levied on Indian 
communities rather than on individuals, and since Indians could escape communal obligations 
by dispersing to haciendas (or to the mines), the repartimiento acted historically as a bridge 
between the natural modes of production taken over by the conquistadors and the 
reconstituted tributary colony of New Spain. 143
(iv) The Spanish Theory o f Empire
The Spanish conquest of the Americas is a minor locus classicus for those students of the 
modem international system who chart its historical emergence in terms of a normative 
evolution from a culturally monolithic Christendom to a self-conscious 'international society' 
accommodating an extensive cultural diversity. 144 Now, it is indeed the case that first the 
conquest and then the governance of the Indies provoked vigorous legal and theological
l^W olf, op. cit. p. 134. The Peruvian silver mine at Potosi, Icing of mountains, envy of kings' as the town’s coat of arms 
proclaimed, consumed the surrounding population with a ghastly voracity. By 1660 the provinces of the altiplano had been 
depopulated by some 80%. By the time it was closed in 1823, this operation may have cost 8 million lives. [See Lydia 
Potts, The World Labour Market: a History o f Migration, London 1990, p.22-3]
*4^See Lang, op. cit. pp. 18-24, for an excellent discussion of these processes.
144For a cautious discussion along these lines, see M. Donelan's 'Spain and the Indies' in The Expansion o f  International
Society, [Bull & Watson eds.], Oxford 1984. The caution is well-advised.
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controversies in 16th Century Spain. It is also true that these debates turned on more than 
humanitarian appeals, or the cosmopolitan rights of individuals developed in the Roman 
tradition of jus gentium: if they were not yet a discussion of the rights of states in the modem 
sense, (though it can be claimed that Vitoria 'assumed, though without stating, the now 
familiar doctrine of the equality of States' 145), their core was nonetheless the jurisprudence of 
an extension of specifically political rule. This much is evident from the 'conspiracy of 
silence' 146 which they maintained on the contemporaneous expansion of African slavery 
which raised no equivalent legal dilemmas: the Amerindians, for all their subordination, 
remained political subjects in a way that slaves, entering the New World as privately traded 
commodities, did not. Finally, it is also true that these legal questions agitated the Spanish 
monarchy itself, which not only permitted the controversies but actively solicited contributions 
and provided an official forum - as in the set-piece debate between Las Casas and Sepulveda 
at Valladolid in 1550 or the earlier 'Junta of theologians and jurists convened by order of the 
Emperor at Barcelona' in 1529.147
What is much less certain, however, is any attempt to picture the cause and significance of 
these debates as the emergence of a new conception of International Society called forth by 
the expansion of European political rule beyond Christendom. While this may indeed have 
been their formal content, it is arguable that their centre of gravity and their political 
momentum are to be found elsewhere, in a partial and temporary congruence of interests 
between the proselytising orders and an absolutising monarchy.
The Fransciscan and Dominican Orders charged with the conversion of the indigenous 
population had set about creating new urban centres where Indian communities would be both 
segregated from their Spanish conquerors and concentrated for the purposes of conversion 
and Church regulation. This 'necessarily interfered with the control of Indian labour upon 
which Spanish economic activity depended'; 148 jn particular it competed directly with the 
semi-feudal system of encomiendas by which the conquistadores had institutionalised their 
booty. Dominican campaigns (from 1510) for the reform of colonial property and government 
found a willing audience in the Habsburg court which had its own reasons for hostility towards 
the encomienda: 'A growing royal absolutism could not tolerate the emergence of a new 
feudal aristocracy o v e r s e a s ' .  149 It is perhaps significant therefore that the formal arguments of 
the leading campaigner for Indian rights, Las Casas, are organised around a theory o f 
kingship, which insists on the inalienability of royal jurisdiction. 150 Las Casas' proposals fed,
H. Parry, The Spanish Theory o f  Empire in the 16th Century, New York 1974, p.21.
S p a rry , The Age o f  Reconnaissance, London 1973, p.347. 
l^ S ee  Parry 1973 p.386 and 1974 p.27 respectively.
I48Pany 1973,p.291.
I49ibid. p.222.
l^ S ee  Parry 1974 pp.49-56.
126
in some cases directly, into the unsuccessful attempt to abolish the encomienda in the New 
Laws of 1542. By contrast, Sepulveda’s arguments draw on the notion of a natural aristocracy.
Thus the wideranging debate on the political rights of the Europeans over the Indians reveals a 
subtext about the rights of absolutist monarchy over the emergent colonial aristocracy. And 
the importance of this subtext may be seen from the fact that when, in the reign of Philip II, 
demand for Indian labour in the silver mines switched royal interests out of the legal and 
organisational tracks laid by the missionary project, the subject of Indian rights simply dropped 
out of view:
...after the middle of the sixteenth century the political theory of imperialism
has to be deduced from imperial practice and from the opinions of imperial
administrators... [for it] disappeared from serious academic debate in Spain. *51
Now, we may remember this episode for its novel philosophical significance. We might, 
however, remember it also for a slightly different reason. For what Parry calls 'the Spanish 
theory of empire' was indeed the IR theory of its day, the language with which privileged 
groups within an imperial formation figured to themselves the superior right of their 
ascendancy, and fought out the fate of subject peoples. Because we know that great human 
interests were at stake in this debate, we do not underestimate its importance. Yet equally, 
(perhaps partly because, as twentieth century observers, we no longer believe in either 
kingship or aristocracy) we do not read it literally or take its categories for granted. We look 
for clues about how these categories resonated with the structures of social power specific to 
that society. If it comes much less naturally to us to adopt the same approach to our own 
contemporary intellectual frameworks in IR, this is surely not because the clues are any less 
compelling. This discipline is almost entirely Anglo-Saxon, the preserve of those national 
centres which have played a directive role in the modem states-system. It would therefore be 
surprising if its core discourses were not managerial ones, articulating and legitimating the 
exercise of particular forms of international power.
4.4 Conclusions
This review of Iberian expansion has two implications for our wider argument. First it 
illustrates the contention that the dynamics and forms of geopolitical expansion are structurally 
specific - specific on the one hand to the historical identity of the social order which is 
expanding its reach, and on the other to the particular social relations which it seeks to
151 Parry 1940 p.57.
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encompass and direct. It would therefore be pointless to construct an exclusively geopolitical 
account of these episodes or to attempt to explain them by reference to some property of 
geopolitics sui generis, as in the following:
It is the nature of powers to expand... the expansion of powers is the product
of two causes: internal pressure and the weakness of surrounding powers.
When an equilibrium is reached between the outward pressure and the external
resistance, expansion stops.152
The second implication points forward to what must be our task in the remainder of this thesis. 
It is not difficult to see that the early modem empires were reproduced as composite social 
orders: structured sets of social relations which resist attempts to distinguish between 'power 
and plenty'. Although the Portuguese moved for the most part in the interstices of the Asian 
world, their commercial operation comprised relations of exchange commanded by the 
political authority of the Crown. The Spanish empire, for its part, was literally an extension of 
Castilian society. Because in both cases political relations travelled with the commodities, the 
line of social power effecting the relaying of surpluses are clearly visible: they take the form of 
an extension of the political jurisdiction of the metropole. Thus the Iberian empires, like nearly 
all precapitalist structures of geopolitical power, can be visualized as geographical entities.
This unseparateness of politics and economics (the perception of'economies' as social orders) 
is harder to visualize today. Indeed, the contemporary international system could hardly look 
more different. Lines of political jurisdiction halt at fixed national borders, while those of 
economic activity speed on through a myriad of international exchanges without undermining 
the ramparts of formal sovereignty above. This appearance might seem to suggest that our 
structural method of analysis will not find the same purchase in the modem international 
system as it did when applied to the past. For, it could be argued, as long as traditional 
societies and states prevented the emergence of a self-regulating market, politics and 
economics were indeed intertwined and a sociological analysis was therefore needed to specify 
the particular structures of interference and corruption which resulted in each case. But once 
the wealth-creating properties of a free market were understood, the state conceived an 
interest in allowing the latter to regulate itself, and increasingly restricted its own activity to 
the more properly political functions of government.
As a result, the business of wealth-creation now takes place in the market, whose workings are 
analysed by the science of economics. Meanwhile, the struggle for power takes place within 
the state, a domain scrutinized by political science. The empirical interaction between the two
152 Wight 1979, pp. 144 & 149.
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spheres is studied by political economy. And sociology forms a residuary discipline, combining 
under the general rubric of'society' the remaining accoutrements of social reproduction: the 
family, social class, deviance, education and so on.153 An equivalent separating out at the 
international level gives us a world market studied by international economics and a states- 
system studied by IR.
If this view of history is correct - if what distinguishes the modem international system is 
simply freer markets and better behaved states - then no amount of demonstrating the 
interconnection between social structure and geopolitical system in past historical epochs need 
have any critical implication for the division of labour among the contemporary social 
sciences. After all, we are now living in a different world, one whose institutional 
differentiation does in fact correspond to this division of labour. If this were so, then our 
conclusions up to this point, and the historical materialist method we have deployed, would 
indeed be of historiographical interest only. Thus', wrote Marx, drawing out the extraordinary 
assumptions which such a view would entail, 'there has been history, but there no longer is 
any.'154 On the other hand, if it is not true, if the division of labour is on the contrary a 
naturalizing of the social forms of modernity which also mystifies them, then Marx's method 
may be the key to a world of insight which the orthodox social sciences could never unlock. 
This is the issue to which we turn in the next chapter.
153For a treatment of the modem international system in terms of separately constituted markets, states and societies, see 
R. Gilpin, The Political Economy o f  International Relations, Princeton 1987, Chapter 1. This fetishism, however, also 
marked the boundary of Polanyi's social thought.
154The economists have a singular way of proceeding. For them, there are only two kinds of institutions, artificial and 
natural. The institutions of feudalism are artificial institutions, those of the bourgeoisie arc natural institutions... Thus 
there has been history, but there no longer is any.' [Marx, quoting The Poverty o f  Philosophy in Capital Vol. 1, p. 175n.
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V The Empire of Civil Society
5.1 Introduction
As we have seen in the chapters above, Marx's method (tracing the correspondence between 
the strategic relationship and the wider forms of social power) can be used as a general 
method in historical sociology. But the principal deployment of it by Marx himself was of 
course in the analysis of capitalism. For it was by elaborating the structural uniqueness of 
capitalism as a mode of production that Marx sought to explain the distinctive institutional 
forms of modernity. Our purpose in this chapter is to extend this explanation to the dominant 
forms of modem geopolitical power.
The argument will be set out in six parts. First we must identify the strategic relationship in 
modem Western societies and examine its connection with the political form of the state. This 
leads, secondly, into the suggestion that sovereignty needs to be understood historically as a 
form of political rule peculiar to capitalism. Thirdly, it is suggested that these structural 
connections (between capitalist relations of production and the sovereign form of the state) 
underpin the distinctive form of modem international power - and indeed explain how it is that 
we can have a global states-system at all. This observation is then developed on the one hand 
into a challenge to the widespread notion that the modem states-system dates from the era of 
Absolutism, and on the other into a reinterpretation of another category of Realist theory, 
namely the balance of power. In turn, reinterpreting the balance of power makes it apparent 
that Marx himself provides a theory of anarchy - not as the timeless condition of geopolitics, 
but as the characteristic social form of capitalist modernity. The argument therefore includes 
the theoretical redefinition promised earlier of the two core categories of Realist International 
Relations. In a nutshell, the structural specificity of state sovereignty lies in its 'abstraction' 
from civil society - an abstraction which is constitutive of the private sphere of the market, and 
hence inseparable from capitalist relations of production. Meanwhile, anarchy - which, for 
Realism comprises a presocial state of nature - is rediscovered as an historically specific 
condition defined by Marx as 'personal independence based on dependence mediated by 
things'.
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5.2 The Structural Basis of Civil Society
Let us begin, as Marx recommended, with the relationship between the direct producer and the 
owner of the conditions of production - what Eric Wolf termed the strategic relationship.
In capitalist societies the direct producers are no longer in possession of their own means of 
subsistence, and what binds them to the processes of surplus extraction is no longer political 
command, but rather the requirement to sell their labour in order to gain this subsistence. This 
necessity supports the distinctive capitalist relations of surplus extraction themselves: a legally 
sanctioned contract of exchange between formal equals in which the labourer accepts 
authoritative subordination in the private realm of production and foregoes any rights over the 
product in exchange for an agreed wage payment.
There is a very striking contrast here. In precapitalist societies the apparatus of public rule was 
implicated directly in the process of surplus extraction and the producers were therefore, as 
we would regard it, politically unffee. This does not mean that all precapitalist societies were 
prison camps. The non-economic means used to extract the surplus varied, as Marx observed 
'from serfdom with enforced labour to a mere tributary relationship', * and an apparatus of 
domination might bear down more or less heavily on the peasant majority. It does mean, 
however, that formal political inequality was basic to social reproduction. Not so with 
capitalism. Under capitalism the formal subordination in production which accomplishes the 
extraction of the surplus is not exercised through the state. Formal political inequality is 
therefore not inscribed in the relations of production. This does not mean that all capitalist 
societies are havens of human rights. Once again, the historical variation is considerable, and 
only a tiny number of capitalist societies have been able to sustain durable political 
democracies.^ But if any have been able to do so, and to institutionalize a formal political 
equality among the citizenry, this reflects the fact that under capitalist relations of production 
the direct extraction of a surplus is accomplished through 'non-political' relations associated 
with new forms of social power.
What, then, are these new forms of social power? This is the riddle that Marx sets himself to 
answer in Volume one of Capital. We call them 'market forces' and the rule of law. But what, 
after all, is the market? In the first place it is, as Sayer puts it, not just a thing we inhabit as
l \959, p.790.
^Often, upholding a rule of law in connection with the capitalist labour contract is a bloody affair - drawing out the 
coercive arm of the state in routine acts of violent repression. South Korea still provides not infrequent examples of this. 
However - and here is the point - the pitched battles between police and workers in South Korea take place not in the 
courtyards of state-owned factories, but on the premises of Hyundai and Samsung corporations, non-govemmental 
organizations. And if it sometimes takes bayonets and tear gas to drive workers into factories, the rule to which they 
submit once inside is not that of the state, but rather that of so-called 'management'.
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individuals, but simultaneously a way we collectively are as a society. ^  It is an historically 
specific set of social relations between persons which effects the reproduction of the social 
order in a determinate form. And what makes the capitalist market different from all other 
markets in history is the generalized commodification of labour power. Where this occurs, the 
market ceases to be simply a set of voluntary exchange relations which circulate specialist or 
surplus products. It becomes a compulsory association, which subordinates all its members to 
the impersonal rule of value. There is a great deal to be said about what this rule is and how it 
works. But the crucial point here is this: because incorporation into this association through 
the labour contract takes the form of a relation of exchange between legal equals, the process 
of surplus extraction is reconstituted as a private activity of civil society.
This is called economics. But what is economics? We are so used to assuming the presence of 
this distinct branch of social life that it is always surprising to recall how little the word itself 
gives away about the novelty and character of what it describes. A combination of the Greek 
terms for house and law, 'economics' originally referred to the management of the household. 
And as late as the 1740s, Adam Smith's teacher, Francis Hutcheson still included marital, 
parental and master-servant relations under the heading of'Principles of Economics'. In short, 
there is nothing in the earlier use of the word (unless it be the hint of a private sphere) which 
accounts for why it should have come to refer exclusively to market relations. And nothing is 
explained therefore by using the term 'economic' in its modem sense unless one already 
assumes (consciously or otherwise) the capitalist relations of production which create its 
object.^ Similarly, if one looks up any of the words we habitually use to describe the process 
of surplus extraction under capitalism - market, business, industry, commerce - one finds that 
each of them is an etymological dead-end in the same way that 'economics' is.5 The tracks of 
modernity are well covered.
Meanwhile, if the state no longer carries out the process of surplus extraction itself its role 
now is to uphold the terms of the contract through the rule of law. Thus we see a redefinition 
of political power in public, communal terms: it guarantees contracts between private 
individuals, it keeps the peace both internally and externally, it imparts a degree of collective 
management to the overall social development of the society. But there are also things that it 
no longer does, social roles which are by the same token removed from the domain of political
^ The social world of capitalism appears as something we inhabit... rather than some ways we are...' Sayer 1991, p.88. 
^Eduard Heimann [1964, p.23], referring to the Greek distinction between oikonomia and chrematistike, notes that the 
modem name 'economics' which has been taken over from the ancients now denotes the exact opposite of what they meant 
by it'. This distinction is also discussed briefly by Marx in Capital, Vol 1 ,1976 p.253-4n. See also Therbom 1976, Chapter 
2, for an admirably clear discussion of these points. As he puts it: 'Economic discourse emerged as a concomitant of the 
rise of what this discourse was about: the capitalist economy. Thisshoujd be understood in a strong sense.' [p.77]
 ^In the Grundrisse, Marx alludes to this by joking with the f ymology of the word 'capital': 'If the concern is the word, 
capital, which does not occur in antiquity then the still migrating hordes with their herds on the Asiatic plateau are the 
biggest capitalists, since capital originally means cattle....' p.513.
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power and redefined as private. Among these, the most striking is the process of surplus 
extraction.
The emergence of distinct institutional spheres called the state and the economy is the 
signature of capitalist society. But no adequate social theory can take it at face value. For, as 
Ellen Wood put it, in a passage we have already cited in Chapter 2 above:
...the differentiation of the economic and the political in capitalism is, more 
precisely, a differentiation of political functions themselves and their separate 
allocation to the private economic sphere and the public sphere of the state.
This allocation reflects the separation of political functions immediately 
concerned with the extraction and appropriation of surplus labour from those 
with a more general communal purpose. ...the differentiation of the economic is 
in fact a differentiation within the political sphere.^
If this is true, then the very least that can be said is that under such an arrangement the 
activities denoted by the term 'politics' - or, indeed, 'the state' - are going to be radically 
different from what these terms would refer to in other kinds of society. There is a kind of 
emptying out of certain powers and functions from the formal political realm of the state. The 
inverse applies, as already suggested, to the term 'market'. Here we see a kind of filling up with 
new social powers and functions, centred on the processes of surplus extraction, which 
exchange relations never previously encompassed. Historically speaking, it is a very strange 
form of social organization. ^
5.3 Sovereignty as a Capitalist Political Form
These observations may turn out to be of considerable relevance to IR. For what is the 
political form under discussion here if not the conceptual building block of the discipline, 
namely the sovereign state? This is a category in need of some clarification. Most 
commentators accept that the primacy denoted by the term 'sovereignty' cannot be defined 
straightforwardly as the ability of the state to control activities within its borders or resist 
external constraint on its freedom of action. Apart from anything else, there are just too many 
small, weak states in the world for this to be empirically plausible. For this reason, we all learn 
that its absolute properties refer to its juridical status. A sovereign state does not share 
jurisdiction with Church and nobility as under feudalism, or suffer systematic subordination to
6ElIen Wood, 1981, p.82.
7As noted earlier, Polanyi was insistent on the novelty of this: 'Nineteenth century society, in which economic activity was 
isolated and imputed to a distinctive economic motive, was, indeed, a singular departure.' 1957, p.71.
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a party organization as under Soviet communism. Yet sovereignty is not just the legal 
paramountcy of the state - and even if it were, this could surely not be sustained without 
exercising a preponderance of power. Much IR theorizing on the subject seems to waver 
uncertainly between these two definitions, substantive and formal, switching back and forth 
depending on the particular issues being discussed. Excited claims that the latest wave of 
military or communications technology, or the latest round of'globalization' in the world 
economy, are rendering the concept of sovereignty obsolete alternate with firm denials of any 
diminution in the political, legal and military monopolies commanded by the state. As a result, 
students often find the whole issue of sovereignty deeply enigmatical: an absolute form of rule 
which seems never to be absolute in practice even though, for some reason, the formal 
constitution of the international system rests on the assumption that it is so. 8
Perhaps what we need is to think about it not as a self-evident starting point - which is what 
we do if we accept its own legal or political self-definition - but rather as a form of political 
rule historically specific to the distinctive configuration of social relations which define 
capitalism as a kind of society. For sovereignty also, crucially, involves the idea of the state 
being outside, over against civil society, autonomous, 'purely political'. What do these phrases 
mean?
In part, they mean that 'the primacy of geopolitics' gives the state executive a warrant to 
override internal interest groups in the conduct of foreign policy. But something like this must 
apply in all hierarchical societies incorporated into geopolitical systems, and is therefore not 
specific to sovereignty, the form of rule held to distinguish the modem state. Nor do they 
mean that the state is not involved in regulating civil society. It is, after all, the state which 
frames laws, upholds contracts, raises taxes and implements policies designed to promote the 
development of the sphere of production.
None of these, however, need involve the state moving into that other realm of political 
command, namely the privatised sphere of production, by taking over the process of surplus 
extraction itself. Where it does do this, for example by extending its direct ownership through
^See for example The Anatomy of the Nation-State and the Nature of Power\ J. Stoessinger, reprinted in M. Smith et al. 
eds. 1981, Tribal Sovereignty vs Interdependence' in ibid., and The Erosion of External Sovereignty?, G. Goodwin, 
Government and Opposition. Vol 9, No. 1, Winter 1974. For a brief, though highly selective survey of definitions of 
sovereignty in ER, see Alan James, Sovereign Statehood: the Basis o f  International Society, London 1986 Chapter 2. James 
himself opts for a definition of external sovereignty as 'constitutional separateness1 [ibid. p.24], a somewhat unhistorical 
formulation which leads him at one point to the curious observation that 'an empire [is] a form of sovereign state' [p.31J. 
However, James' purpose is to explicate sovereignty not as a particular form of rule but rather as a term '...used by states 
when referring to what it is about themselves that fits them for international life', [p.51 ] This is in step with the work of the 
English School as a whole. Wight (who rarely uses the term at all) Bull and Watson have all remained content with a very 
general defmition in terms of internal primacy and external independence. (See Wight 1977, p. 129-30, Bull 1977, p.8 and 
Watson 1992, p.316.)
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nationalisation,9 it can find that the sovereign character of its rule diminishes. It no longer 
stands over against civil society. Industrial disputes are immediately political disputes. The 
appropriation of surplus becomes an object of public 'political* struggle within the state rather 
than private political struggle within the productive corporations of civil society - the so-called 
economy. The private despotism of the workplace becomes the public despotism of the 
state. 10 Something like this seemed to be part of what was happening in the British 'Winter of 
Discontent' of 1978-9: the sovereignty of the state was eroded because the day to day 
separation between politics and economics was blurred, and the government therefore found 
itself dragged into one industrial dispute after another.
Conversely, however, the restoration of the sovereignty of the state in such circumstances is 
also the restoration of the private political sphere and of the class power of capital in this 
sphere of production. In fact, is this not what happened next in the British case? The Labour 
government fell, and was replaced by Margaret Thatcher who came into office with a 
commitment to 'roll back the frontiers of the state'. On the face of it, this commitment seemed 
to be contradicted by the evidence, namely the failure to reduce public spending levels, the 
reinforcement of the coercive arm of the state, and the transparent use of state legislative 
authority to intervene in industry by reducing the legal power of organized labour. But if we 
understand the capitalist separation of politics and economics in the manner suggested by Ellen 
Wood, then a real underlying consistency emerges which concerns the sovereignty of the state.
For the sovereignty of the state does depend on both a kind of abstraction from production 
and the reconstitution of the state-political sphere as external to civil society. But this is not an 
abstraction which means that the sovereignty of the state is neutral. On the contrary, its very 
form is a dimension of class power because it entails the parallel consolidation of private 
political power in production. An illustration of what this can mean in practice was the British 
miners' strike of 1984/5. Since it is known that the government gave the Coal Board every 
possible assistance behind the scenes,11 its insistence that the strike was an industrial dispute 
and not the business of the state can be made sense of only in terms of a determination to 
redefine 'the political' as outside and separate from surplus extraction, a redefinition whose 
other half was necessarily the restoration of private political power in production. Perhaps the 
two most oft-repeated goals of the government during the dispute were that an impersonal 
rule of law should be upheld, and that 'management should be allowed to manage'. In other
^Or even where it redresses imbalances of power within production through constraining the freedom to hire and fire' or 
assuaging the rigours of unemployment.
^And, one could say, legitimation crisis' enforces a limit to change which social democracy cannot overleap. For a lucid 
and not uncritical discussion of Habermas' theory of legitimation crisis, a theory whose appearance towards the end of the 
1970s reflected unmistakably the strains building up within West European social democracy after the end of the long 
boom, see D. Held, ^ Crigkrtondenciesy.legitimation-and the state' Habermas; Critieal Debates, -i. Thompson and D. Held 
teds}, London 1982.
11See for example the account given in Goodman 1985, Chapter 2: The State Prepares'.
135
words, the state was neither withdrawing from civil society nor necessarily encroaching further 
upon it. It was reimposing the separation of political functions between public and private 
spheres which is the form  of both class power and state power under capitalism.
All this suggests that we should define sovereignty primarily not in terms of the practical 
ability of the state to command the behaviour of its citizens, nor yet as a kind of residual legal 
paramountcy. To be sure, without these there would be no sovereign states. But these 
descriptive attributes, enormous though their practical significance is, do not comprise an 
explanation of why the modem state assumes its distinctive ’purely political’ form. By contrast, 
if we define sovereignty as the social form of the state in a society where political power is 
divided between public and private spheres, it becomes apparent that at least some of the 
confusion over whether modem state power is strong or weak, autonomous or determined, 
sovereign or constrained has been unnecessary. For under capitalism, these are not necessarily 
dichotomies.
5.4 The Sovereign States-System
(i) The structural implications o f sovereignty
The historical rise of the sovereign state is thus one aspect of a comprehensive reorganization 
of the forms of social power. The change that it works in the form and content of the 
international system is no less startling. For under this new arrangement, while relations of 
citizenship and jurisdiction define state borders, any aspects of social life which are mediated 
by relations of exchange in principle no longer receive a political definition (though they are 
still overseen by the state in various ways) and hence may extend across these borders. And if 
political functions which used to be in state hands are now assigned to a private political 
sphere fronted by a set of exchange relations, then these political functions will travel.12
This is indeed what has occurred. It is now possible, in a way that would have been 
unthinkable under feudalism, to command and exploit productive labour (and natural 
resources) located under the jurisdiction of another state. This is because capitalist relations of 
surplus extraction are organized through a contract of exchange which is defined as 'non- 
political'. It must be said that it will not do to call this 'economics' and think we have explained 
anything unless we either say that this is the first time there has been such a phenomenon as 
'economics' or we define it more closely as capitalist economics. And either way, we have to 
include in our definition the peculiar state-form which is its other half, because these functions
^Unless they are interrupted by direct state intervention.
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can be regarded as non-political only on the assumption that politics has been redefined to 
restrict it to general communal functions.
Historically, this transformation seems to have been accomplished in Europe in two broad, 
overlapping phases. The first phase comprised the processes of state-building, that is, the 
centralizing of political authority by Absolutist monarchs, the suppression of rival centres of 
power and the construction of a bureaucratic machinery of government. This made it possible 
for monarchs to exercise a much more absolute and exclusive jurisdiction, so that states 
become much more sharply defined territorially. The modem political map of the world is a 
perfectly fitting jig-saw in which all the separate, interlocking pieces are clearly marked in 
different c o l o u r s .  13 For much of orthodox IR, the modem world begins here, where the 
impossible patchwork of medieval Christendom is replaced by territorially unified 
jurisdictions.. However, lagging some way behind this process of statebuilding there followed 
the liberal transformation of the state discussed above - which eventually overthrew 
Absolutism. And as a result of this process, it actually becomes less and less realistic to try to 
theorize the international system in terms of relations between states alone. And if we take the 
two processes together over the whole period, we must say that what looks to the naked eye 
like an unprecedented concentrating of power in the hands of the state apparatus (as certain 
functions are centralized as never before) is simultaneously a dramatic disaggregation of social 
functions and social power, between public and private spheres. ^
Clearly, the trick here, as this overall shift takes place, is to keep our eye on both political 
spheres which emerge (that is, public and private), otherwise we will assume that what we are 
seeing is simply a shift from empire to states-system, which could safely be treated purely in its 
external aspect. In the public political sphere this is indeed the form of the shift. And if we 
watch only that external, public sphere, it would then seem that we could theorize the 
international system by listing the differentia specifica of a states-system as compared with an 
empire, and understand its properties sui generis as those of anarchy. This is the path of
^ I t  would not be possible to make a such jig-saw out of feudal Europe, in which each piece corresponded to a single, 
exclusive jurisdiction. Jeremy Black notes that It was usually beyond the ingenuity of even the most skilful cartographer to 
indicate on one map alone areas of mixed jurisdictions, owing allegiance to different rulers for different aspects of their 
existence.' (The Rise o f  the European Powers 1679-1793, London 1990) Black gives an example of one treaty (Turin,
1760) which required no less than eight different maps of the same area in order to render fully its complex political 
identity, (ibid. p. 194) Ironically in the light of our discussion in Chapter II, the dispute resolved here concerned the 
delineation of boundaries by the Treaty of Utrecht.
*4One of the effects of this realization is to show up the inadequacy of ahistorical discussions of'international ethics' 
which unwittingly universalize social forms peculiar to capitalist modernity into 'natural' starting assumptions. A clear 
example arising from the present discussion concerns the question of borders. The fact of borders between 'national' 
political communities is held by communitarian thinkers to mark a fundamental obstacle to the extension of ethical 
reasoning to IR - a claim contested by writers of a cosmopolitan stamp. Which is right? If the argument put forward above 
is correct, then the debate itself is simply not worth having until we have understood the historical and structural 
specificity of territoriality in a capitalist states-system.
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Realism. But it ignores the changing structural definition and content o f’the political’. And its 
effect is precisely to occlude the distinctive character of modem international power.
For it is this formal disjuncture (between public and private political realms) which explains 
part of the paradox of sovereignty : why it is both more absolute in its ’purely political' 
prerogatives than other historical forms of rule, and yet highly ambiguous as a measure of 
actual power. It explains how we can see simultaneously an enhanced territorial differentiation 
between states together with an unprecedented porousness and interdependence.^
Viewed in this way, it becomes increasingly apparent that in Realism, reality is standing on its 
head. Realists, including the English School, tell us that the modem international political 
system is different because it is a states-system organized by anarchy rather than an empire 
organized by command. However, if the above discussion is sound, then to be true, this 
statement needs to be turned right way up. It is not so much that modem international politics 
is different because it is a states-system; rather we can have a global states-system only 
because modem ’politics' is different. And the surest way to misunderstanding here is precisely 
the attempt to theorize this difference in abstraction from the historically specific kind of 
society which produces this form of politics. For the form itself is not inert or neutral, but 
rather suffused with determinations deriving from its capitalist character.
Once this point is seen, we can and must go on to explore the distinctive properties of this 
social form of geopolitics - including the character of anarchy. But if empire is taken to mean 
the expansion of political command beyond the territory of the originating community in order 
to accumulate resources from outside, then the last thing this portends is the end of empire. 
Rather it means that the exercise of imperial power, like domestic social power, will have two 
linked aspects: a public political aspect which concerns the management of the states-system, 
and a private political aspect which effects the extraction and relaying of surpluses.16 It means 
the rise of the empire of civil society.17
^Universal interdependence of nations' as a result of these specific social relations (rather than as a novelty of the 1970s) 
was described by Marx and Engels in the Communist Manifesto - reprinted in The Revolutions o f 1848, D. Fembach [ed.], 
Harmondsworth 1973c, p.71.
16In fact, we shall see in the last section of this chapter that what we have here is not only a differentiation of the spheres 
of social power, but also a radical, epochal transformation in the character of that power in both spheres. In Marx's 
formulation, 'relations of personal dependence' are replaced by 'personal independence based on dependence mediated by 
things'. But this belongs to the redefinition of anarchy.
17'Civil society* here is used to denote the social totality, including the state, a connotation which its French (bourgeois) 
and German (bQrgerliche Gesellschaft) equivalents have not lost. In Anglo-Saxon usage, however, the term has come to be 
defined not in contrast to other kinds of society, but rather over against the state within capitalist society - a device which 
assigns the exercise of political power exclusively to the public sphere of the state and allows the private political sphere 
of capital to represent itself as the realm of individual freedom. For a powerful and systematic critique of this usage, see 
Ellen Wood, The Uses and Abuses of'Civil Society', Socialist Register 1990.
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0(ii) Political implications o f sovereignty
Each of these aspects, public political and private political, has its own specificities: military, 
legal and territorial for the one; and civil, profit-seeking and transnational for the other. 
Moreover, they are largely carried out by identifiably distinct actors: states and private 
corporations. But does this not mean, that International Political Economy was right all along 
to pose the discipline in terms of the interaction of states and markets?
The answer must be negative. For assuming the separation of politics and economics as a 
starting point in this way is not a theoretically innocent assumption. It is to assume the 
automatic reproduction of the particular human social relations which bring about and sustain 
this institutional separation. And we cannot assume this, partly because these relations have 
not obtained for most of history, perhaps more importantly because there are still large areas 
of humanity where they do not obtain; but mainly because even where they do obtain, they are 
continually being contested. Much of the content of international relations, past and present, is 
the outcome of continuous struggle over the reproduction of these capitalist social relations. If 
we assume their reproduction, then we exclude from our account the very human agency and 
historical process we are trying to recover as the basis of the social world. We see that world 
not as the daily outcome of definite social relations between real living individuals, but as the 
timeless clash of disembodied social forms; the remorseless grinding of the balance of power, 
the ghostly motions of the hidden hand.
But this is to imply that in some way parallel to the earlier example of the miners' strike, the 
sovereign form  of the states -system is itself the object and outcome of struggle and 
contestation. What could this mean?
Consider the fate of the New International Economic Order (NIEO).18 From the mid-1970s, 
emboldened by the example of OPEC, a large group of Third World governments (organized 
as the Group of 77) used their numerical majority in the General Assembly of the United 
Nations (UN) to press through demands for a reform of the international economy. In 1974 
the General Assembly adopted a 'Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States' which 
included provisions for linking commodity prices to prices of manufactures, the expropriation 
of foreign investments, increased controls on the activities of multinationals and so on. Here, 
then, was an attempt to challenge the separation of politics and economics, the separation 
which enabled the private dimension of the relationship between Western and Third World 
societies to count as non-political. Of course, majority votes in the General Assembly have no
l^For a brief account of the NIEO campaign, see J. Spero, The Politics o f  International Economic Relations, London 1985, 
pp.207ff.
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binding force, and the campaign for the NIEO failed for a number of reasons, including 
disunity among the southern states pressing for it. The point, however, is the form that this 
failure took.
By the mid 1980s, the UN was in financial difficulties due to the reduction or delay of funding 
by disenchanted Western governments. Moreover, a number of the Group of 77 were now 
submitting themselves to International Monetary Fund (IMF) restructuring packages in 
exchange for debt rescheduling agreements. Now, the negotiation of economic terms by 
indebted countries with the IMF does not count as a political process; nonetheless, it did 
embody a dramatic reversal of the very programme which these countries had been attempting 
to advance by political means. For a prominent feature of these^packages was a withdrawal of 
the state from direct control of prices through subsidy and tarrif  - a withdrawal which effected, 
in principle at least, a new separation of politics and economics, and thereby opened these 
societies further to the world market. The geographical progress of this outcome among the 
countries involved could be followed throughout the 1980s in the spread of what became 
known as 'IMF riots’ - mass demonstrations against price increases implemented by 
governments as part of IMF restructuring packages. By January 1989, these had occurred in 
23 countries and had cost some 3000 lives. ^
It would be hazardous to draw any substantive conclusions from these events. But the overall 
pattern of this episode is surely too suggestive to pass without comment. The Group of 77 
pressed for further public political regulation through the UN; their defeat was registered in a 
fuller than ever subordination to private economic mechanisms through the IMF. By 
reimposing the separation of the world economy from the formal political institutions of the 
states-system, the West was able to restore simultaneously the private freedom of capital and 
the purely political sovereignty of the states-system, both of which were challenged by the 
NIEO.
Interestingly, this denouement of the 1980s coincided historically with a vigorous revival of 
both neo-liberal economic theory (and deregulation) and neorealist state theory (and flexing of 
the coercive military arm of the state). These supplanted the 1970s vogue for 'complex 
interdependence' and fears of international ungovernability, replacing them with a revived 
definition of the sovereign individuality of the s ta te d
l^Susan George, LSE seminar, 16.1.89.
20This is the deep sense in which Realism is ideological. It is not just that it provides politicians with a convenient 
language with which to justify their policies; rather, by reifying and naturalizing the alienated social forms of modernity, it 
reproduces at the cognitive level the separation of economics and politics which is constitutive of the specifically capitalist 
form of international power.
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The NIEO, however, was a comparatively minor episode. What was the entire Soviet 
experience and the Cold War which dominated world politics for the last four decades, if not 
an enormous geopolitical challenge to the social form of the modern states-system? The Soviet 
Union was precisely not a sovereign state, in the sense that we have been discussing 
sovereignty. It did not stand outside a distinct private sphere of surplus extraction. It moved in 
and took it over. And it supported other governments who did the same - who, by 
overthrowing the separation of politics and economics, withdrew their societies from the 
world market, and hence from the reach of private Western power. This was ultimately the 
political content of the Cold War. With the best will in the world, it would be impossible to 
understand the Soviet presence in the international system in terms of states and markets. It 
was precisely an attempt to abolish both of them.
Marx would have us go even further. For him, the increasingly global, continuously fought 
over, separation of politics and economics - the construction of the world market and the 
linked emergence of a sovereign states-system - was the central unfinished theme of modem 
world history. In fact, for Marx it is what has 'produced world history for the first time'. 21
Let us pause for a moment to take stock of where our argument has led us. We began, in 
accordance with the overall method of this thesis, by specifying the 'strategic relationship' of 
modem Western society. The contrast with earlier kinds of society seemed to confirm that it 
was the distinctive character of this relationship which underlay/constituted the institutional 
differentiation of spheres we call economics and politics, civil society and the state. We also 
saw that this differentiation was not a substantive separation or 'autonomy', and we illustrated 
the structural interdependence involved, using the examples of the 'winter of discontent' and 
the miners' strike of 1984-5. By this stage we had already noted the descriptive affinities 
between the political moment of the society in question and the theoretical ambiguities of the 
treatment of sovereignty in IR. These affinities led us to merge the two in a redefinition of 
sovereignty as the abstracted social form of the state specific to (and partly constitutive of) 
capitalist social relations. Once this connection was made, we sought to develop its 
implications for theorizing the sovereign states-system. These implications were of two kinds. 
First, the differentiation of spheres provided the structural precondition for a simultaneous 
enhancement of territorial definition of polities and yet deepening of material integration of 
social reproduction across borders. This was seen to give rise to a wholly new idiom of 
geopolitical power which we named 'the empire of civil society'. But second, our attention to 
the underlying structural interdependence of the public and private spheres led us to identify 
sovereignty itself as a contested social form because of its profound imbrication in the
Marx 1947, p.57. In the overall schema of Capital as set out in the ’General Introduction’ of 1857, this theme was 
marked out for development: World history has not always existed; history as world history as a result.' (1973, p. 109]
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reproduction of these new forms of (private) power. Searching for manifestations of this 
within contemporary international history, we found first the NIEO, then the Cold War and 
finally, pursuing a hint from Marx, the emergence of the modem international system itself.
If sovereignty is redefined as a social form, and hence is specific to a very distinctive kind of 
society, then the consolidation of sovereignty and its generalization into a global states-system 
must imply a concrete historical process of social upheaval and transformation. And since this 
process is what produces the states-system in its modem form, then arguably it is here - rather 
than strictly in the diplomatic interchange between preconstituted states - that we shall find the 
real and continuing history of the international system. With this move, we have finally broken 
out of the Realist framework for thinking about the origins of the sovereign states-system, and 
have instead linked up our account with the broader historical processes of social 
transformation involved in the making of the modem world. The agenda for historical research 
to which this points will be spelled out in a little more detail in the last chapter.
5.5 The Question of Absolutist Sovereignty
We now have an historical puzzle to solve. The emergence of the modem idea of sovereignty 
is conventionally traced to the Absolutist monarchies of early modem Europe. This seems at 
first sight to constitute a straightforward empirical refutation of our argument. For it was 
central to the definition of Absolutism as a political form that the monarchy was a direct and 
major appropriator of the surplus. It could not constitute itself as sovereign in the sense in 
which we have redefined that term because it was based not on taxing surpluses already 
extracted in a separate private sphere - the European aristocracies did not pay tax - but rather 
on consolidating the grip of the state as a gigantic landord, a centralized apparatus of surplus 
extraction (on behalf of an emasculated noble class). This was a very distinctive political form, 
very different from the classic model of European feudalism. Bringing it about involved many 
of the rigours we associate with state building: breaking the independent power of the nobility 
and the Church, maintaining standing armies, creating a bureaucratic apparatus, enforcing the 
king's law evenly across the territory, elaborating new diplomatic forms and so on. In many 
ways it looks quite modem. No doubt for this reason, there remains within IR a broad 
consensus that the modem states-system dates from the Absolutist epoch - in particular, from 
the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648. What are we to make of this?
It has been argued in the pages above that in order for the modem capitalist form - what Marx 
called 'a real state' - to emerge, something else has to happen. For it is only when those areas 
of social life which we now call civil society have been depoliticized that the state can 
represent itself as a separate, neutral sphere of common interest, rather than a despotism using
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political coercion to extract resources for the benefit of a privileged minority. And historically, 
this occurred in continental Europe only with the overthrow of Absolutism - precisely by 
liberalism. As Marx put it in his essay On the Jewish Question.
The political revolution which overthrew this sovereign power and raised state 
affairs to become affairs of the people, which constituted the political state as a 
matter of general concern, that is, a real state.... abolished the political 
character o f civil society .22
Marx’s use of the word 'sovereign' here carries us to the heart of the question It was indeed the 
Absolutist monarchies who elaborated the concept of sovereignty to legitimate their 
suppression of rival centres of power within the state. So did the sovereign states-system 
emerge with Absolutism or not?
If one defines sovereignty very broadly, then the significance of Westphalia is indeed 
considerable. Let us take Hedley Bull's definition:
On the one hand, states assert, in relation to this territory and population, what 
may be called internal sovereignty, which means supremacy over all other 
authorities within that territory and population. On the other hand, they assert 
what may be called external sovereignty, by which is meant not supremacy but 
independence of outside authorities.^
Now, the terms of Westphalia were not wholly unprecedented; Augsberg had already 
established a principle of cuius regio, eius religio. Nor is it claimed that the treaties themselves 
accomplished the overall development which they recognized - that is, the emergence of a 
secular states-system. But they did mark an end to the religious wars of Europe; they did 
(much to the fury of Pope Innocent X)24 abolish the competing political rights of the papacy 
in the territories of the states concerned; and they did undermine the hierarchical geopolitical 
structure centred on the Holy Roman Empire by proclaiming the freedom of the German
22Sayer [ed], p. 124.
23Bull 1977, p.8.
2^The Pope's response to Westphalia, Zelo Domus Dei, ends with the following pronouncement: '...we assert and declare 
by these presents that all the said articles in one or both of the said treaties which in any way impair or prejudice in the 
slightest degree, or that can be said, alleged, understood, or imagined to be able in any way to injure or to have injured the 
Catholic religion, divine worship, the salvation of souls, the said Roman apostolic see, the inferior churches, the 
ecclesiastical order or estate, their persons, affairs, possessions, jurisdictions, authorities, immunities, liberties, privileges, 
prerogatives, and rights whatsoever, - all such provisions have been and are of right, and shall perpetually be, null and 
void, invalid, iniquitous, unjust, condemned, rejected, frivolous, without force or effect, and no one is to observe them, 
even when they be ratified by oath.' (Reprinted P. Limm 1984, p. 107.]
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princelings to make a l l i a n c e s .  2 5  In Bull's broad sense, both internal and external sovereignty 
were recognized. The matter cannot rest there, however, for an intriguing inconsistency creeps 
into the orthodox account at this point.
It is generally recognized that 'the first systematic statement of the theme' of sovereignty is that 
of Jean B o d in .  26 Given this, it is perhaps surprising that in the Anglo-American discipline of 
IR we find so little discussion of the Six livres de la republique. Indeed, for the most part 
Bodin is only ever mentioned as a prelude to invoking the far more familiar icon of Realist 
theories of sovereignty - Thomas Hobbes. The inconsistency involved here cannot be seen 
unless we take some measure of the societal distance between the two formulations of 
sovereignty involved. An illuminating account of this distance has recently been advanced by 
Ellen W o o d .27
Bodin's formulation was a defence of an absolutizing monarchy confronting a parcellization of 
the state due to the persistance of feudal corporate forms. This reflected the structural basis of 
French Absolutism: 85-90% of cultivated land was in the direct possession of the peasantry, 
with the consequence that the mechanisms of surplus extraction were heavily concentrated in 
the local jurisdictional prerogatives of the nobility, forming an immediate barrier to juridical 
c e n t r a l i z a t i o n .  28 Bodin's argument therefore takes the form of a plea for a superordinate 
power to join together
the corporate constituents of the polity, and especially the three Estates, into an 
organic unity, a balanced hierarchical order based on 'harmonic justice', the 
justice of'proportional' equality among unequal corporate e n t i t i e s .29
This is in strong contrast to Hobbes' method, which seeks to derive the need for a sovereign 
power from the self-destructive effects of the liberty of individuals in a state of nature - the 
famous 'warre of every man against every man'. As Wood points out, although this response to 
the turmoil of the Civil War wears French clothing (English political thought is notable for its 
lack of an indigenous tradition of theorizing about 'sovereignty'),30 the body of the argument
23As with most historical references cited in IR, it is remarkably difficult to find any systematic research - even of chapter 
length - into the actual context, provisions and significance of Westphalia. A valuable recent exception is K. J. Holsti's
discussion in Chapter 2 of Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order, 1648-1989, Cambridge 1991.
2%.H. Hinsley, 1966, p. 121. 'Although the word 'sovereignty1 had gained currency by the beginning of that century, Bodin
in his Six Livres de la republique of 1577 was perhaps the first man to state the theory behind the word.' ibid. p.71.
27See Wood 1991.
2 8 ibid. p.25.
2 ^ibid. p. 54-5.
30The same is true, as Wood notes, of that other liberal great power, the US. The reason is the same in each case: I t is not 
at all as paradoxical as it may seem that the concept of the state has been least well defined precisely where the formal
separation of state and civil society characteristic of capitalism occurred first and most 'naturally'...' (ibid. p.34) Exactly the 
same could be said with respect to the geopolitical definition of the state. It is remarkable that Britain and the US - the 
only two truly world powers there have ever been - both had to import the idiom of raison d'etat from abroad.
144
reflects the strongly divergent path of English social development. For the English state did 
not face the same obstacles of feudal parcellization confronted by its French counterpart. Not 
only had it achieved effective juridical and legislative centralization at an early stage;-* 1 but 
also, the much wider direct ownership of land by the nobility facilitated a lesser dependence on 
jurisdictional mechanisms of surplus extraction. Under these conditions, the way was more 
open for a unitary state to become not a competing form of politically-constituted property, 
but rather - through the formula of the 'Crown in Parliament' - the public 'political' corollary of 
an incipient private 'economic' mode of surplus extractions^
While Wood's argument can be given only the briefest and most partial of summaries here, the 
conclusion to which it points for the place of Hobbes (and Westphalia) in IR theory is 
remarkable. For it suggests that insofar as the English Civil War was fought over control of 
the centralized state apparatus (rather than being a contest of particularism and centralization) 
the issue was precisely not sovereignty in the continental sense. Rather, Hobbes uses the 
language of sovereignty to elaborate what is becoming a very different problematic, namely 
that of order in a 'purely political' state:
In transplanting the idea of absolute and indivisible sovereignty to English 
conditions, Hobbes was obliged to impose it not on Jean Bodin’s collection of 
'families, colleges, or corporate bodies' but on Sir Thomas Smith’s 'multitude of 
free men collected together' in a unitary state. This did not mean that Hobbes's 
conception of sovereignty was any less absolute than Bodin's. If anything, it 
seems even more unlimited and uncompromising, perhaps because no corporate 
mediations stand between the individual and the sovereign state.^3
More absolute precisely because it was not Absolutist? Here, surely, we begin to pick up 
echoes of the modem form of sovereignty discussed earlier in this chapter.
But what has all this to do with Westphalia? Quite simply this: one major state was not 
represented at that Europe-wide convocation of powers - England. And yet it was Hobbes's 
England, not Bodin’s France, which was to go on to play the leading role in extending the 
sovereign form of rule beyond Europe and defining the institutional form of the global states- 
system of today - England, followed by the United States, an even more thoroughgoing liberal 
polity, even further removed from the spirit of Westphalia. As Sayer puts it:
31'...the truth is that legal sovereignty, exercised by the ’Crown in Parliament', was becoming a reality in England long 
before it existed even as a gleam in the eyes of French legal scholars.' Wood 1991, p.48.
32ibid,p.28.
3 3 ibid. 1991, p.55.
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...a political form that was, much later, to become general throughout Europe 
(and the world), was sucessfiilly pioneered [here] rather earlier than 
elsewhere.34
Could it be, then, that when we talk about sovereignty in IR, we are really, without being fully 
aware of it, assuming this new and very special form of state - even if we hold formally, with 
Bull, to the Absolutist definition? Certainly this would help explain the ambiguity of the term 
in IR. For the concept of sovereignty, which under Absolutism really did add up to a kind of 
despotism, now means something else which the Absolutist (and hence by extension Realist) 
doctrine of sovereignty could never grasp.35 It would also explain why we do not read Bodin.
But in that case, we should also be somewhat sceptical of the orthodox claim that the modern 
states-system came into being in 1648 - or 1713, 1515, 1494, much less the maverick 1414.
An absolutist states-system was intitialed. But this is not modem politics. The definition of the 
state in Absolutist terms (accepting the Absolutist definition of sovereignty) misses the 
specificity o f’purely political' institutions under capitalism. Modem sovereignty is only allowed 
to be so absolute because it involves restricting much more closely what is to count as the 
legitimate domain of politics. To miss this is, in Augustine Thierry's words, to 'lack the 
comprehension and sentiment of great social transformations' - which for Thierry at any rate 
was such a powerful lever of sociological insight.
5.6 Historicizing the Balance of Power
As we round this bend of our argument, something else comes into view, something which 
perhaps ought to have been visible all along. It was hinted earlier that a comparison might be 
drawn between the 'hidden hand' of the market and the balance of power. At that point the 
suggestion was that both of these phenomena appeared as impersonal, 'automatic' mechanisms 
needing to be translated back into the historically specific social relations which give rise to 
them, in order to rediscover the human agency which must lie at the heart of the social world. 
It was not noted at the time that this suggestion flies in the face of conventional wisdom about
-^Sayer 1992, p.1393. Sayer, like Wood, goes so far as to suggest a direct reversal of the (sociological) assumptions of 
historical research in this matter: Trom the point of view of its contribution to the rise of capitalism, there would appear to 
be every reason for regarding such a polity as paradigmatic rather than peculiar.' [ibid. p. 1411 ] For a detailed comparative 
history of European state-building written in the spirit of these observations, see C. Mooers, The Making o f  Bourgeois 
Europe, London 1991.
35In other words, the Absolutist doctrine of sovereignty as the centralization of political power would be unable to explain 
its disaggregation into public and private spheres. One writer who has recognized very clearly the disjuncture between the 
Absolutist and the liberal versions of sovereignty is Roy Jones: 'An achievement of the liberal tradition is to have 
constructed a notion, and a structure, of statehood which is the antithesis of sovereignty. The liberal state was inspired by a 
passion to regulate, even do away with, sovereigns.' [Jones,1981, p.6 ] The implied suggestion that the term itself should 
also be done away with is logical enough. However, since this is unlikely to happen in IR, the alternative path of 
theoretical and historical redefinition has been preferred in this thesis.
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the balance of power, which understands the latter precisely as an automatic function of a 
plurality of competing decision-making centres in the absence of superordinate coercive power 
- a necessary function, that is, of anarchy. On this view, the emergence of a balance of power 
under such circumstances derives from a timeless logic, and history merely provides 
illustrations of this. This, the fans et origens, if ever there was one, of Realist theory, has 
always seemed unsatisfying and suspicious to its critics - not so much in its internal logic (the 
mathematics is flawless, even if the exponents of game theory have pressed it to absurd 
lengths) but rather with respect to how much it does not tell us, or illuminate, about the 
balance of power as an historical institution. Yet the problem always was: what else is there to 
say about it? We now have the beginnings of an answer to this problem.
If the line of argument developed in this chapter is valid, then the balance of power is not just 
like the hidden hand. It is its other half the equivalent in the public political realm of the 
alienated social form of the hidden hand in the private political realm of'the economy'. This 
can be seen more clearly once we recognize that what is distinctive about the modem balance 
of power is actually not the plurality of armed actors. It cannot be that, for history is awash 
with geopolitical systems which fit this criterion. The twenty-odd taifa kingdoms which 
emerged from the 11th century break up of the Caliphate of Cordoba spent over 300 years 
wheeling and dealing their way into oblivion - weaving, no doubt, a moving tapestry of 
alliance, calculation and counter-alliance which would gladden the heart of any game theorist. 
During the 100 Years' War, Edward III played his hand of coalitions with a cynicism and 
manipulative skill that might have made Machiavelli b lu s h . 3 6  Yet these cases - and the many 
hundred others like them - are rarely, if ever, discussed in IR. Why?
Perhaps the answer is that the modem balance of power is indeed different from either the 
grasping of empire or the contending of princes. And what is so distinctive about it is not the 
number of players. It is its impersonality, its emptiness, its abstraction, its anonymity, its 
almost scientific technicism. Indeed, this mechanical quality was an object of fascination for 
Enlightenment observers; it encouraged discussion of a political arithmetic of equipoise, and 
suggested the spread of Newtonian Reason to the affairs of states.
By contrast, feudal geopolitics was anything but impersonal: it revolved around personal 
(dynastic) claims to property in land, and wars were fought by armies levied through ties of 
personal allegiance. While everyone, no doubt, calculated their own advantage, there was no 
sense in stabilizing the system territorially through a military balance, for war and political 
expansion were a major mechanism of surplus appropriation. This reflected feudal relations of 
production in which economic ownership and political jurisdiction were fused in the heritable
^S ee  G. Holmes 1975, pp.28-47.
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fief. Just as there was no sense of the state standing outside, over against civil society, so too 
there was no abstraction of the geopolitical system. In feudalism we find not an impersonal 
balance of power compelling its members to adjust levels of military preparedness internally, 
but rather a militarily defined struggle over surpluses expressed in the form of territorial 
competition between political units. In feudalism, the last thing anyone wanted was a balance; 
that would have stopped the game.
For contemporary capitalist societies, however, war plays a different role because imperial 
processes of expansion (or, rather, those connected directly with surplus extraction) are now 
accomplished principally in the private sphere. Under these circumstances, war and military 
competition in general become instruments for managing the international public political 
realm - which is itself now empty of the material sources of wealth that used to be the object 
of war, namely property in tied labour, trading monopolies and so on.
As a result of this emptying out, when modem Western states contend it is not because one 
has what another wants - like Louis XIV enviously eying the Dutch monopoly in Baltic 
shipping. They contend over public policy, that is over the collective, linked organization of 
public international and private transnational spheres. Advanced capitalist states do resort to 
military means in order to prosecute policy, where this is judged necessary. But because the 
use of military force is no longer itself the means of surplus appropriation, it takes on a ’pure' 
'technical' character, in line with the abstracted, sovereign form of the state as a whole.
The balance of power is a pressure system which shows an unmixed, 'purely political' aspect to 
the world. By this is meant that the immediate goals pursued through it are not plunder of 
wealth or territorial expansion, but rather the bending of other states to one's own will. The 
pursuit of power does not come any purer than this. As Morgenthau famously put it,
'statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power'.37 gut this purity is not a 
function of some timeless essence of statehood. The 'pure' power of the political scientists, the 
medium of the balance of power is in fact the power of the 'purely political' state, the 
sovereign state, the state which stands outside production and is therefore abstracted from the 
particularities of civil society - in short, the capitalist state.
But for what purposes should one state wish to bend others to its will if it is not going to 
invade and plunder them? What is all the power-mongering/or? There is simply no answer to 
this question unless one can point to those political functions which have been shuffled off into 
the private sphere, where the business of surplus extraction now takes place. But Realist IR 
has twice forbidden itself to look in this direction; once, because the private sphere is formally
■^Morgenthau 1985, p. 5.
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non-political, and a second time because it subsists in the domestic realm. This is why, 
whenever Realism tries to theorize the international system it can see only an empty, purely 
political, struggle for domination. The fruits of power lie elsewhere. All that breaks surface in 
the public political sphere is the mechanics of domination; and no amount of mapping the 
patterns and rehearsing the internal logic of these mechanics will ever tell us either what the 
balance of power is about at any given point, or why modem geopolitics assumes this 
distinctive, impersonal form. In this sense, strange as it may sound, and precisely because it 
takes it for granted, Realism has no theory o f the balance ofpower. Since Realism rests its 
entire claim to authority on the assertion that the balance of power is the only international 
theory possible, this is a remarkable failure.
Yet a theory of the balance of power must be able to do more than identify the historically 
specific character of the states making up a geopolitical system. To say that the goals of 
geopolitical competition lie outside the formally demarcated sphere of geopolitics is almost to 
give a hostage to fortune. Such a claim could even reinforce further the notion of a discrete 
logic operating within that realm, irrespective of the ends to which policy is turned. Thus if we 
really wish to lay the ghost of Realism, we have not only to insist that a full understanding of 
the international system requires us to look beyond the realm of the purely political; we have 
also to show that the abstracted competitive logic which haunts the purely political sphere, a 
logic which seems to derive precisely from the absence of society, is itself a social form whose 
surface appearance belies the reality of what it accomplishes. We need, in short, a social theory 
of anarchy.
5.7 Karl Marx's Theory of Anarchy
(i) An unexpected discovery
It is often remarked that the same absolute character of the sovereignty of the modem state 
which is the foundation of order within national borders simultaneously dictates the 
persistence of an external condition of anarchy among states. Where no higher authority is 
recognized, an underlying ’war of all against all', whether violent or not, must endure. Against 
those who condemn this arrangement as a chaos which must be mastered, two points in 
particular are usually urged. First, it is suggested that the condition of anarchy does not 
actually promote the random behaviour of states. Rather it gives rise spontaneously to a 
distinctive, decentralized form of regulation - namely the balance of power - which tightly 
constrains the multilateral relations of states like an objective law of their existence. Despite 
having no centralized agency of enforcement, this regulation continuously ’socializes’ states
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into the common norms and practices of the states-system. Second, the defenders of anarchy 
point out that the only conceivable alternative to this dispersed form of authority would be its 
centralization in a World State (or empire); and since this global Leviathan could exist only by 
overriding the sovereign independence of individual states (and with it the self-determination 
of nations) it would perforce consititute a kind of global despotism. In this respect, the 
balance of power, by automatically producing coalitions against hegemonial pretenders, 
preserves the states-system and with it the liberty of the individual states. Such are the 
differentia specifica of ’the international', properties which distinguish this environment from 
the society which exists in the domestic realm.38
It might therefore come as something of a surprise to a student of IR, innocently leafing his or 
her way through the pages of Vol 1 of Capital, to encounter the following set of reflections:
Division of labour within the workshop implies the undisputed authority of the 
capitalist over men... The division of labour within society brings into contact 
independent producers of commodities, who acknowledge no authority other 
than that of competition, of the coercion exerted by the pressure of their 
reciprocal interests, just as in the animal kingdom the 'war of all against all' 
more or less preserves the conditions of existence of every species. The same 
bourgeois consciousness which celebrates the division of labour in the 
workshop... denounces with equal vigour every conscious attempt to control 
and regulate the process of production socially as an inroad upon such sacred 
things as the rights of property, freedom and the self-determining 'genius' of the 
individual capitalist. It is very characteristic that the enthusiastic apologists of 
the factory system have nothing more damning to urge against a general 
organization of labour in society than that it would turn the whole of society 
into a factory... [I]n the society where the capitalist mode of production 
prevails, anarchy in the social division of labour and despotism in the 
manufacturing division of labour mutually condition each other...39
What would make this passage doubly arresting is perhaps not just the uncanny detail of the 
parallels between the condition of states and the condition of firms - internal authority coupled 
with external anarchy, the Hobbesian state of nature, the nexus of competition, equilibrium 
and freedom, even the nightmare vision of a world state/factory. Rather, diligent readers of 
Capital would have another, more compelling reason to linger over the passage quoted above. 
For they would recall that the anarchy in production to which Marx refers is not only central
^Bull's work, The Anarchical Society, [1977] probably provides the most explicit and consistent version of this account.
39Marx 1976, p.477. Italics added. In the discussion which follows, numbers in square brackets indicate page references to 
this edition of Vol. I of Capital.
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to his whole conception of capitalism as a kind of society - 'The point of bourgeois society', he 
says in a famous letter to Kugelmann, 'consists precisely in this, that a priori there is no 
conscious, social regulation of production'40 - it is also, albeit under a different heading, the 
subject of detailed theoretical exposition in the earlier chapters of the work. The remarkable 
parallels between the condition of states and the condition of firms have not gone unnoticed in 
orthodox IR. For the most part, however, they have been used to legitimate either a 
conception of anarchical systems sui generis., or the importing of theoretical frameworks from 
neoclassical economics into IR theory.41 Since there exists such a powerful methodological as 
well as substantive contrast between these idioms and that of Marx's social theory, the 
question naturally arises whether an elaboration of Marx's theory of anarchy in production 
might suggest an alternative way of understanding the interaction of states which we call 
anarchical.
The case may be stated more broadly than this, however. For if there is an overall historical 
schema in Marx's oeuvre, then it is arguably not that of the succession of five modes of 
production so often inferred from The Communist Manifesto and the 1859 Preface, with its 
suggestion of the transhistorical continuity of class struggle.42 Rather, in Capital Vol. 1 (and 
in the Grundrisse, which includes Marx's longest discussion of precapitalist societies)43 the 
emphasis is much more on the ^continuity of modem world history, the fundamental rupture 
with all previous forms of human society which capitalism is held to comprise. Nor is this 
discontinuity registered in terms of a new pitch of social oppression contrasting with the more 
humane modes of society which went before.44 Its characteristic formulation strikes a quite 
different note:
Relationships of personal dependence... are the first forms of society, in which
human productivity develops only to a limited extent and at isolated points.
Personal independence based upon dependence mediated by things is the
second great form, and only in it is a system of general social exchange of
4011 July 1868, reproduced in The Correspondence o f  Marx and Engels, London 1934, p.245. It would be wrong to 
suggest that it is more central than the better known analysis of the despotism of the workplace; as suggested in the earlier 
auotation, they are two sides of the same coin.
41 Well-known instances of these include R. Gilpin 1981 and the work of Kenneth Waltz. Indeed, Waltz uses the analogy 
to justify the traditional Realist segregation of domestic and international politics: With lx)th systems-level and unit-level 
forces in play, how can one construct a theory of international politics without simultaneously constructing a theory of 
foreign policy? The question is exactly like asking how an economic theory of markets can be written in the absence of a 
theory of the firm. The answer is 'very easily.' [R. Keohane [ed], 1986, p.60].
42For a critique of this traditional view, see Wood 1984.
43The so-called Tormen', pp.471-514.
^ O n  the contrary, Marx is quite clear that '[ejquality and freedom presuppose relations of production as yet unrealized in 
the ancient world and in the Middle Ages' [1973 p.245]. And his condemnation of the 'undignified, stagnatory and 
vegetative life' of the Indian village is well known. [See Marx 1980, p. 36]
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matter, a system of universal relations, universal requirements and universal 
capacities, formed.45
'Dependence mediated by things’ constrasts here with all earlier forms of social organization, 
which rested 'on blood ties, or on primeval, natural or master-servant slave relations'.46 In 
place of 'direct relations of domination and servitude', [173] we now see an unending 
'collision of unfettered individuals who are determined only by their own interests... the mutual 
repulsion and attraction of free individuals.'47 However, as Marx almost immediately goes on 
to warn, this new condition does not mark the abolition of relations of dependence. It 
constitutes rather 'the dissolution of these relations into a general form', a structural dispersal 
as a result of which they now 'confront the individual as external necessity'48 With this shift 
from personalized domination to impersonal necessity as the organizing 'form of social 
connectedness' we enter the paradoxical world of anarchy in which, to borrow Wight's 
characterization of the international anarchy, social 'action is most regularly necessitous'49 - 
despite (or precisely because of) the fact that it remains formally unco-ordinated by any 
overarching authority.
Whether or not this contrast suppresses the historical diversity of human societies, (as Sayer 
suggests),50 its relevance to IR theory should be apparent. For Capital, as is well-known, 
contains no theory of the state, no explicit account of'the relation of the different forms of the 
state to the different economic structures of society'.51 This is generally taken to rule out the 
possibility of a Marxian theory of international relations, where the requirement is to explain 
not the exploitative relations between persons and classes, but rather the anarchical relations 
between states. Yet in the passages cited above we seem to have a contrast which installs 
anarchy - conceived not as a technical feature of the economy but as a constitutive social form 
- as central to Marx's overall conception of capitalist modernity. And while Realism argues 
that an anarchical order will always be something less than a 'real' society in the traditional 
sense (meaning one raised out of the state of nature by the operation of superordinate 
government) the implication of Marx's account seems to be that this anarchical order is already 
much more than a society in the traditional sense.
^Grundrisse, cited by Sayer 1991, p. 13-14. This translation is here preferred over the Nicolaus version which substitutes 
'objective dependence' for 'dependence mediated by things'. [Marx 1973, p. 158]
4 6 ibid. p. 161-2.
47Marx 1973, p.649.
4^Marx 1973, pp. 164 & 85 respectively.
49Butterfield & Wight [eds] 1966, p.26.
^®See his discussion of these points in Sayer 1991, pp. 13-22.
-^Marx to Kugelmann, referring to the Grundrisse, cited by Nicolaus in his introduction to the Penguin edition... 1973 
p.59.
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It might be argued that such a contrast does not entail the possibility of a Marxian theory of 
anarchy, because the single term 'anarchy' is being used to describe distinct phenomena in the 
two cases: the bare fact of independent, competing units in the Realist case, as against some 
much more specific condition in that of Marx. This involves us in a methodological question 
which Marx addresses directly in the General Introduction of 1857, and it may therefore be 
worth recalling his discussion here.52
In Marx's discussion, the category in question was 'labour in general', a deceptively simple 
abstraction which provided one of the conceptual foundations for the tradition of classical 
political economy. This abstraction was derived as a straightforward generalization: all acts of 
production must involve labour (though in practice its form differs in each case); therefore 
labour is a general precondition of all production. For Marx, the objection to such a method 
lay partly in the fact that it was doomed to barren circularity:
There are characteristics which all stages of production have in common, and 
which are established as general ones by the mind; but the so-called general 
conditions of all production are nothing more than these abstract moments with 
which no real historical stage of production can be grasped.53
Beyond this, however, the abstraction 'labour' as a descriptive generalization across history not 
only ignored differences between modes of production, it also persistently obscured the way in 
which the abstraction of labour as an actual social process (which in turn forms the historical 
condition of being able to think the category 'labour in general') is unique to capitalism. In this 
society the abstraction of useful labour, its reduction to an homogenous 'abstract labour', is a 
key mechanism of social reproduction, and one which differentiates this society from all 
others:
The simplest abstraction, then, which modem economics places at the head of 
its discussions, and which expresses an immeasurably ancient relation valid in 
all forms of society, nevertheless achieves practical truth as an abstraction only 
as a category of the most modem society.54
There are likewise two senses in which the term anarchy may be applied to the modem 
international system. First, it lacks superordinate government. But this has almost always been 
true. There has never actually been a world government, so there has always been an element 
of'Thucydidean realism'. However, this very general point (like 'labour in general') is
^M arx's method here is very clearly elaborated by Sayer in Sayer 1987, Chapter 6 , Tlie Historicity of Concepts'.
531973, p.8 8 .
54ibid.,p.l05.
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persistently conflated with a second sense of the term anarchy: when it is used to denote the 
dynamics of power characterising the modem states-system. For what distinguishes the 
modem form of geopolitical power is not that it is exercised by a plurality of independent units 
(anarchy in general), but that it no longer embodies personalized relations of domination 
(which cancel the formal independence of the dominated) but is impersonal, mediated by 
things. It is this structural shift which explains why the units are no longer empires but 
bordered, sovereign states. This anarchy, anarchy as a structurally specific social form, is 
persistently obscured by being conflated with the transhistorical generalization 'anarchy in 
general'. So mystifying was the concept of 'labour in general', (obscuring even, or perhaps 
especially, the historicity of its own formulation) that Marx’s eventual discovery of'abstract 
labour' as a real historical form appeared, in Engels’ words 'like a thunderbolt out of a clear, 
blue sky*. But Marx's method here, the deciphering of the historicity of concepts, is fit for 
wider use. And we must turn it now on the Realist concept of anarchy.
(ii) The clear, blue sky
Where, then, do we find 'the anarchical society' in the work of Marx? It is to be found 
principally in part one of Volume I of Capital, where the analysis of the commodity as a social 
form is initiated.55 There we encounter a community made up of isolated individuals who 
secure their diverse material needs and desires by exchanging the products of their own private 
labour with those of others. This recourse is dictated by the conjunction of a significant 
division of labour with the private character of their production (which renders each individual 
the proprietor of all he produces). Individuals therefore are constrained to produce social use- 
values for the purpose of exchange: that is, they secure their own subsistence by producing 
commodities.
This immediately distinguishes this community from most societies known to history. For as a 
rule the process of production is directly social: the total labour carried on by the society is 
organized through personal relations of dependence which authorize command over labour 
and its product.56 Here, however, such relations are not to be found, and seem to be ruled out 
by the formal equality and independence of individual proprietors. Yet all collectivities with 
any degree of division of labour must have some means of co-ordinating their divided labours 
in order to accomplish the overall task of social reproduction. As Marx put it, 'this necessity of 
distributing social labour in definite proportions cannot be done away with by the particular 
form  of social production, but can only change the form it assumes. . ' 57 How, then, do the
^T he other key site of analysis is the chapter on money*, and the discussion of competition in the Grundrisse.
^Either that, or products are consumed directly by their producer.
^Letter to Kugelmann, Marx and Engels Correspondence, p.246.
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private labours of these individuals become social? How are they assimilated into the overall 
labour of collective reproduction? Or, to recall the formulation current within the problematic 
of IR: in what way do they constitute a society? The answer is that in this case, the private 
labours of individuals become social only through the exchange of products as commodities. 
And this in turn gives a unique role to exchange-value as a central mechanism of overall social 
co-ordination:
...the form in which this proportional division of labour operates, in a state of 
society where the interconnection of social labour is manifested in the private 
exchange of the individual products of labour, is precisely the exchange value 
of these products.58
Thus, where other collectivities constitute themselves as societies through direct 
(personalized) relations of authority, this one is reproduced through exchange-relations 
between things. This mediation of human social relations by exchange relations between things 
has three principal effects. First, it depersonalizes the processes of social reproduction such 
that the individual confronts his material incorporation into society in the form of external, 
quantifiable relations between the prices of things.
Second, because the exchange-value of a commodity is not inherent in it but is rather a 
function of the totality of relations among the whole world of commodities, the actual 
mechanism which determines price and hence organizes the distribution of social wealth is not 
under the control of any individual. It is alienated onto a dispersed or anarchical property of 
the society as a whole - the market. How this mechanism operates 'behind the backs of the 
producers'59 to bring order to their collective labours is truly a thing of wonder:
It has been said and may be said that this is precisely the beauty and the 
greatness of it: this spontaneous, this material and mental metabolism which is 
independent of the knowing and willing of individuals, and which presupposes 
their reciprocal independence and indifference.60
Finally, the perceptual corollary of this linked objectification and alienation is a recurrent 
mystification of the processes of social life in the minds of their authors, an unavoidable 
tendency to lose the constitutive social relations between persons beneath the price relations
8^ibid.
^Grundrisse. p. 135.
60ibid., p. 161.
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between commodities which mediate them and are their only visible expression: commodity 
fetishism:61
Their own movement within society has for them the form of a movement 
made by things, and these things, far from being under their control, in fact 
control them. [167-8]
Marx has some striking observations to make about the connection between the role played by 
the exchange of things in this anarchical order and the bases of individual human freedom. This 
connection centres on the formal character of the act of exchange itself, which makes no 
distinction of status or right between the actors involved. On the contrary
As far as the formal character is concerned, there is absolutely no distinction 
between them... Each of the subjects is an exchanger, i.e. each has the same 
social relation towards the other that the other has towards him. As subjects of 
exchange, their relation is therefore that of equality.62
The variety of specialized labours in which individuals are engaged, which might be expected 
to endanger this equality, in fact only reinforces it by compelling all producers to enter 
continuously into acts of exchange which posit their mutual formal equality.63 Moreover, 
because the individuals involved do not simply take what they want by force, but rather 
implicitly recognize one another each as the sovereign proprietor of the product of his own 
labour,64 they also thereby posit each other as free, formally not subordinate to the will of 
another. This line of reasoning is pressed to a startling climax:
Equality and freedom are thus not only respected in exchange based on 
exchange values but, also, the exchange of exchange values is the productive, 
real basis of all equality and freedom. As pure ideas they are merely the 
idealized expressions of this basis; as developed in juridical, political, social 
relations, they are merely this basis to a higher power.65
One further dimension of these relations may be noted here. The formal properties of the act 
of exchange as positing equality and independence may be seen as constitutive of the
M arx describes precapitalist social relations as 'much more transparent and simple' than those organizing generalized 
commodity production, [ibid. p. 172]
62Grundrisse, p.241.
6 3 ibid. p.242.
^ O r  as Marx puts it they recognize one another reciprocally as proprietors, as persons whose will penetrates their 
commodities', ibid., p.243.
6 ^ibid. p.245. Marx goes on to note that this marks off sharply the character of modem freedom from its predecessors in 
history: *Equality and freedom as developed to this extent are exactly the opposite of the freedom and equality in the world 
of antiquity, where developed exchange value was not their basis...'
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distinctively modem conception of ‘the individual'. For as Marx elsewhere observes, far from 
being the natural starting point of social evolution, part of the explicans of social theory, this 
individual apparently existing in 'dot-like isolation'66 is an historical outcome:
The more deeply we go back into history, the more does the individual... 
appear as dependent, as belonging to a greater whole... Only in the eighteenth 
century, in 'civil society1, do the various forms of social connectedness confront 
the individual as a mere means towards his private purposes, as external 
necessity.67
The above discussion suggests that the organization of social reproduction via exchange 
relations does not simply accord greater recognition to individual rights. It actually constitutes 
the individual as a novel social form. Take away the anarchical form of regulation and the 
individual as ideal must go with it; for then the members of the society must submit once more 
to direct relations of domination.68 The predominance of exchange relations thus actively 
creates the boundaries around the person which other societies do not recognize. As Marx 
puts it:
The less social power the medium of exchange possesses... the greater must be 
the power of the community which binds the individuals together, the 
patriarchical relation, the community of antiquity, feudalism and the guild 
system... Each individual possesses social power in the form of a thing. Rob the 
thing of this social power and you must give it to persons to exercise over 
persons.69
Personal independence (hence the category of the individual) is based on relations of 
dependence (individuals depend upon mutual exchange) mediated through things (the 
exchange-relations established between their commodities).
Here then we have an anarchical society: the plurality of independent individuals; the lack of 
superordinate direction; the emergence nonetheless of an impersonal mechanism of social 
organization which lies beyond the control of individuals; the paradoxical role of this collective
6 6 Grundrisse, p.485. Marx describes the predecessors of this new social form of the individual as 'rooted to the spot, 
ingrown...' ibid. p.494.
6 'ibid. p.85.
6 ^The caveat to this proviso is a third social form, lying beyond 'dependence mediated by things': 'Free individuality, based 
on the universal development of individuals and on their subordination of their communal, social productivity as their 
social wealth...' Grundrisse, p. 158.
69Grundrisse, p. 157-8.
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alienation as the basis of individual freedom; and the peculiar objectified form in which 
individuals confront their relations with each other.
Now let us look again at the parallel conception of anarchy encountered in IR. It clearly 
belongs to the same genus: the plurality of sovereign independent states lacking superordinate 
direction; the emergence nonetheless of impersonal mechanisms of social organization (the 
balance of power and the hidden hand of the market) which escape the command of individual 
states; the paradoxical role of this collective alienation as the precondition of sovereign 
independence; and the novel forms of international power which characterize such an order.
It now becomes clear that Realism and Idealism, on whose opposition the discipline of IR was 
founded, are variations on this single theme, emphasizing respectively its public and private 
articulation. When Cobden predicted the reversion of the international environment to a 
municipal form of government,70 and when Palmerston insisted, against Cobden, upon the 
efficacy of the balance of power,71 they advanced against each other the claims of rival, 
differentiated public and private political spheres. But it is striking that the mechanisms they 
invoked (the hidden hand and the balance of power) bore the same stamp for all that - namely 
that of personal independence based on dependence mediated by things. And the pragmatic 
interdependence of these mechanisms was clearly recognized on both sides. If Cobden and 
Bright saw non-intervention as the other side of free trade - ’God's diplomacy', Cobden called 
it72 - then arguably Palmerston himself saw free trade (and the consolidation of the liberal 
political institutions which went with it) as a necessary condition of the doctrine of non­
intervention.73 In fact it was the memorable boast of the British state in the age of Palmerston 
that it gloried in the anarchy of both spheres. Two quotations from that ebullient statesman 
will perhaps, in their combination, serve to make the point:
Why is the earth on which we live divided into zones and climates? Why, I ask, 
do different countries yield different productions to people experiencing similar 
wants? Why are they intersected with mighty rivers - the natural highways of
7®1 believe that the desire and the motive for large and mighty empires; for gigantic armies and great navies... will die 
away, I believe that such things will cease to be necessary, or to be used when man beomes one family, and freely 
exchanges the fruits of his labour with his brother man. I believe that, if  we could be allowed to reappear on this sublunary 
scene, we should see, at a far distant period, the governing system of this world revert to something like the municipal 
system...' (1846) Extracted in Bourne [ed] 1970, p.269-270.
71 For example, in the House of Commons Debate on Russia and the Porte', 16th August, 1853: '...We went to war, not for 
the purpose of increasing the export of our commodities, but in defence of the liberty and independence of nations, and for 
the maintenance of that balance of power, which, however the hon. Gentleman may treat it with contempt and sneer at it, 
because he does not understand it - everybody else considers to be a point deserving of assertion, and essential to the 
liberty and well-being of mankind.' [Bourne [ed], p.329]
72Cited in Bourne [ed] p.85.
73See also Palmerston's response to the overthrow of the French Restoration monarchy in 1830: We shall drink the cause 
of Liberalism all over the world... This event is decisive of the ascendancy of Liberal principles throughout Europe; the 
evil spirit has been put down and will be trodden under foot.' [Cited in Bourne [ed] 1970, p.29.
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nations? Why are lands the most distant from each other, brought almost into 
contact by the very ocean which seems to divide them? Why, Sir, it is that man 
may be dependent upon man. It is that the exchange of commodities may be 
accompanied by the extension and diffusion... multiplying and confirming 
friendly relations. It is, that commerce may freely go forth, leading civilization 
with one hand, and peace with the other, to render mankind happier, wiser, 
better.74
Therefore I say that it is a narrow policy to suppose that this country or that is 
to be marked out as the eternal ally or the perpetual enemy of England. We 
have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are 
eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.75
And if the hidden hand and the balance of power are not the stark opposites which they are 
often presented as being, this suggests that their doctrinal antagonism, consolidated in the 
disciplinary opposition of liberal utopianism and political realism, might be equally misleading. 
Although it coloured the language of British foreign policy debates throughout the nineteenth 
century, the contrast nonetheless reflects an oscillation wholly internal to the problematic of an 
emergent liberal international order. Given this, it is hardly suprising that these anarchical 
themes have a definite historical anchorage. Far from being timeless, they are announced from 
the last quarter of the 18th century, and their development is anticipated as the geopolitical 
corollary of the broader social transformation which we associate with the emergence and 
spread of capitalism as a kind of society.
(ii) The Thunderbolt
Thus far, liberalism. Yet Marx's unravelling of these social forms has only just begun.76 For 
despite its appearance as a presocial state of nature, this anarchy entails a very advanced form 
of society, in which the direct producer is separated from the means of subsistence and obliged 
to sell his or her labour-power as a commodity in exchange for money-wages:
74House of Commons Speech on the Com Laws, 1842, extracted in Bourne [ed] p.255.
7 5Palmerston, 1 March 1848, extracted in Bourne [ed], p.292-3. Here we see adopted, as the very watchword of foreign 
policy, that presupposition of Yeciprocal independence and indifference' which Marx noted above as fundamental to his 
anarchical society.
76If our argument were following the rhetorical structure of Capital, we would have reached no further than the fifth of 
thirty-three chapters in the first of three volumes.
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Only where wage-labour is its basis does commodity-production impose itself 
on society as a whole; but it is also true that only there does it unfold all its 
hidden potentialities. 77[733]
Thus Marx's anarchical society reviewed above has no historical existence except on the basis 
of wage-labour. Wage-labour however, as we know from our previous discussion, is the 
strategic relationship of capitalist society. Generalized commodity-production, it turns out, is 
thus not the idyllic precursor of capitalist society: it is its surface form.
Let us look a little further into this. In the last section above, we noted that individual freedom 
consists in not being formally subordinated to the will of another, a condition avoided by 
relating to others through the exchange of things. In addition, mutual recognition of property 
(meaning the ownership of things) was in turn the basis of equality in the relation of exchange. 
Now we are told that human labour-power (whose expenditure previously established the 
ownership of the things produced) has itself assumed the social form of a 'thing' (i.e. has been 
commodified). And as we work through the implications of this new fact, we see, before our 
very eyes, the 'laws based on the production and circulation of commodities become changed 
into their direct opposite through their own internal and inexorable dialectic.' [729]
First, anyone who relates to another through the alienation of this thing in exchange has 
contracted to make himself subordinate to the will of another, since labour power as a 
commodity is not physically separable from the living activity of its owner. Thus we have an 
exchange-relation which entails (albeit beneath the realm of circulation where the exchange 
takes place) precisely what relations mediated by things were supposed to avoid: direct 
relations of power by one person over another. At the same time, the law of property which 
was the bulwark of equality at the anarchical surface now sanctifies the right of the new owner 
of this commodity to consume it as his own. But consuming labour-power means setting it to 
work in production. And labour power, conjoined with the means of production, can be made 
to produce a greater sum of values than comprise the cost of its reproduction. (This is indeed 
the only reason for purchasing it in the first place.) So long as this holds good, the formally 
equal relation between buyer and seller of this commodity, though they exchange equal values, 
becomes one of actual appropriation. For the product of labour no longer belongs to the direct 
producer but rather to the owner of the commodity whose consumption produced it. 'The 
separation of property from labour thus becomes the necessary consequence of a law that 
apparently originated in their identity.' [730]
77The quotation cited earlier from the Grundrisse which eulogized the 'spontaneous interconnection' of the market goes on 
to insist: *But it is <m msinid notion to conceive of this merely objective bond as a spontaneous, natural attribute inherent in 
individuals and wuioaparaWe*from their nature... This bond is their product. It is a historic product.' Marx 1973, p. 162.
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So anarchy is based on 'dependence mediated by things' - hence both its impersonality and the 
new forms of freedom and subjectivity associated with it. But, in turn, 'dependence mediated 
by things' is based on the commodification of labour-power, a strategic relationship between 
the direct producer and the owner of the conditions of production: in short, a relation of 
surplus extraction - hence the new forms of social power.
When this is first realized, it might seem to imply that the play of anarchy is mere appearance, 
'the surface process, beneath which, however, in the depths, entirely different processes go on, 
in which this apparent individual equality and liberty disappear'.78 Should we therefore ignore 
it, and concentrate on the underlying processes? To do so would be to miss the real power of 
Marx's social theory. For if, instead, we now reverse the direction of our explanation and work 
our way back up from 'the depths' to 'the surface', we find that in this society, relations of 
exchange between things (anarchy) are not the opposite of relations of domination and 
appropriation between persons (hierarchy): they are the social form through which this kind of 
hierarchy is reproduced.79 As Isaac Rubin put it:
Marx did not only show that human relations were veiled by relations between 
things, but rather that, in the commodity economy, social production relations 
inevitably took the form of things and could not be expressed except through 
things.80
Thus when St Simon anticipated that 'The government of men would give way to the 
administration of things',81 he was at best only half right. What capitalist society has actually 
given us is more like the government of men through the administration of things. When social 
relations are routed through things in this way, those things themselves become suffused with 
social determinations. Marx calls this the secret of the commodity. What is then required is a 
theory which can show us the actual social relations between persons which underlie this form 
without either abbreviating their sociology to the visible relations between things or denying 
the effectivity of the anarchical character of their reproduction. For this reason, vulgar marxist 
attempts to play down the importance of anarchy because it seems to dilute the explanatory 
power of'class' are as wide of the mark as their inverse: the liberal/realist apprehension of 
anarchical liberties at face value. In the end, a class analysis of anarchy needs also to embrace 
the anarchical constitution of class. This is the unique achievement of Marx's theory of value, 
which is grounded in a distinction between value (as a relation between persons) and
7 ^ibid. p.247.
79For this reason, Marx also chides the foolishness of those socialists... who demonstrate that exchange and exchange- 
value etc. are originally... or essentially... a system of universal freedom and equality, but that they have been perverted by 
money, capital etc.' Marx 1973, p.248.
Essays on Marx's Theory o f  Value, F. Perlman [ed], Montreal 1968, p.6 .
81Cited in Origins and Growth o f  Sociological Theory, A. Donini and J. Novak [eds], Chicago 1982, p.59.
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exchange-value (as the relation between things which mediates the value-relation). And, as the 
reader of Capital soon discovers, in the space opened up between these two emerges a 
sociology of burgerliche Geselleschaft which is simply beyond the analytical reach of the 
orthodox disciplines of economics and politics.
The very least that can be said, then, is that this anarchy is no state of nature: it has 
'ontological depth' - and the depths powerfully subvert any understanding drawn 
straightforwardly from observation of the surface appearance.
Marx's analysis is conducted at the level of'domestic' social reproduction. Yet it is full of 
implications for IR. These implications may be grouped into two categories: formal and 
substantive. An immediate formal implication can be seen if we recall that in IR anarchical 
social forms and hierarchical structures are emphasised by competing schools of thought 
(Realism and Structuralism) which supposedly represent incommensurable paradigms. It 
follows from our discussion that this is a false dichotomy. And just as the earlier discussion of 
public and private political spheres resolved the contradiction between Realism and Idealism, 
so here Marx's theory of anarchy provides a means of overcoming this so-called 'paradigm 
debate.' Theoretically, after all, the supposed incommensurability is simply an elaboration of 
the formal theoretical challenge set up by Marx at the end of chapter 5 of Volume I: namely, 
to understand how an anarchical interaction of independent individuals resolves into systematic 
class relations of subordination and appropriation without introducing either unequal exchange 
nor any formal qualification of individual freedom and equality. It might be added that our 
broader discussion suggests also that the third, 'pluralist' paradigm is really just a descriptive 
encounter with the differentiation of state and civil society. And there the redefinition of 
sovereignty advanced above would hence seem to have much greater explanatory power.
Satisfying though this formal, disciplinaiy clarification may be, the real excitement must attach 
to the new possibilities for substantive theoretical explanation of international phenomena 
which now come into view. Could it be then that with the international anarchy too, beneath 
the realm of'Freedom, Equality, Property and Bentham', the domain of'the free trader 
vulgaris', [280] 'entirely different processes go on, in which this apparent individual equality 
and liberty disappear'? Is it true of the international anarchy that there is an 'ontological depth' 
to the structures of social reproduction which must be plumbed before their apparently self- 
evident surface appearance can be understood?
In one respect, such a speculation might seem inappropriate: states are not biological 
individuals who buy and consume each other's labour power. There can thus be no simple 
mapping of the condition of states onto that of persons. But this is not the point. What holds
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for both is the condition of social relations mediated through things, rather than through 
personalized relations of domination. It is this difference which underlies the historical shift 
from empire to states-system. But, by the same token it is this same alienation of social 
relations onto impersonal mechanisms - the balance of power and the hidden hand of the 
market - which provides the social forms through which the law of value asserts itself in the 
international system. There is therefore a determinate task of sociological recovery yet to be 
undertaken, in order to resolve the actual workings of these anarchical mechanisms of the 
international system back into their constituent social relations. It is a task which needs to be 
addressed both as theoretical explication and historical reconstruction. The major obstacle 
standing in the way of such a project has always been the Realist definition of anarchy as a 
presocial state of nature.82 For insofar as the international system could not attain the settled 
properties of a society, it was for the same reason held to be resistent to sociological analysis: 
the rules of existence in the state of nature are unforgivingly brief. Anarchy has therefore 
always represented the strongest argument for those resisting the intellectual integration of IR 
into the broader social sciences. But if anarchy is not presocial, if it can be shown to be the 
geopolitical form of capitalist modernity, then this last, most basic argument for Realism need 
no longer hold us back.
At a certain point in the Grundrisse, Marx asserts that 'The analysis of what free competition 
really is, is the only rational reply to the middle-class prophets who laud it to the skies or to 
the socialists who damn it to hell'.83 Something very similar may be suggested concerning our 
subject here: namely, that the analysis of what anarchy really is, is the only rational reply to the 
Realists who laud it to the skies or to the Idealists who damn it to hell. It would be difficult to 
imagine a more decisive affirmation of the structural unity of social forms and geopolitical 
systems - unless it be the writing of that alternative history of the emergence of the 
international system to which the considerations developed in this chapter now point.
82Indeed, Wight's 'Why is there no international theory? might equally well have been written as *Why is there no 
international history?
83p.652.
VI Tantae Molis Erat:
Prospectus for an Alternative History of the International System
Tantae molis erat to unleash the 'eternal natural Ians' 
of the capitalist mode of production... 1
6.1 The Method
Towards the end of Capital Vol. I, Marx breaks off from the detailed analysis of the dynamics 
of capitalist production and devotes the last eight chapters to the subject of'So-Called 
Primitive Accumulation'. Classical Political Economy had recognized that the preconditions of 
a capitalist 'economy' - in particular, the conjunction of some individuals possessing money and 
means of production with a much larger group who possess no means of subsistence and are 
hence compelled to sell their labour-power in order to survive - were not naturally eocuring.
In order to explain this conjunction which makes capitalism possible they therefore posited a 
preceding phase of social development in which the diligence and frugality of a few enabled 
them to accumulate sufficient wealth to employ others, while a much larger number failed to 
husband their resources so well and, having squandered their property, came to maintain 
themselves by hiring out their labour. The deepest inadequacy of this account of'primitive 
accumulation' is not so much its 'nursery tale' naivety'.^ It is rather that by representing the 
emergence of capitalism as a quantitative accumulation o f money rather than a qualitative 
transformation o f social forms it reads back into what is supposed to be a 'state of nature' the 
very differentiation of politics and economics which constitutes capitalist society. It offers an 
explanation of the emergence of capitalism which unwittingly presupposes the existence of 
capitalist social relations as part of the e x p l a n a t i o n . - *  In the typical 'state of nature' of Classical 
Political Economy, the labour of modernity is already accomplished, and it remains only for
tccu.fi ftwe,
the multitude of naturally securing 'unencumbered selves' to sign the requisite contracts - that 
is, the social contract and the labour contract.
It is not difficult to see the parallels with the supposed 'state of nature' of IR theory, and its 
nearest equivalent to the 'civil state', namely 'international society'. There too, the sovereign
1Capital Vol. 1, London 1976, p.925n: The full quotation is Tantae molis erat Romanam condere gentem'('So great was 
the effort required to found the Roman race1), from Virgil, Aeneid, Bk I, line 33.
^Capital, Vol I, p.874.
^One of the most effective interrogations of this form of reasoning can be found in Robert Brenner's critique of Sweezy, 
Frank and Wallerstein. See The Origins of Capitalist Development: a Critique of Neo-Smithian Marxism', New Left 
Review 104, July/August 1977. The analytical core of the argument is set out more briefly in The Social Basis of 
Economic Development', in Analytical Marxism, ed. Roemer. More recently, Brenner has argued that Marx himself fully 
escaped the Smithian model of capitalist origins only in the mature writings, from the Gntndrisse onwards. See 'Bourgeois 
revolution and the transition to capitalism' in The First Modem Society etc., A. L. Beier [edj, Cambridge 1989.
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individuality of the state is read back into the state of nature, hence suppressing the labour of 
its historical emergence, and leaving only the signing of treaties to make the difference 
between a state of nature and international society. This is very clear in Bull's work, which, as 
we saw in Chapter 2, draws a contrast betweeen international system and international society, 
the latter obtaining by virtue of formal, mutual recognition and shared rules and practices 
among the states i n v o l v e d . ^  The injunction pacta sunt servanda may not be as law-inspiring as 
the gaze of the Leviathan, but they have this much in common: each is a contractual solution 
to a problematic of anarchy which is assumed to be natural but which actually requires 
historical explanation. How then do we get at this history?
To return to the main argument, Marx did not reject outright the 'nursery tale' of primitive 
accumulation. Instead, he reworked it into an empirically open category for charting the entire 
series of actual historical processes and transformations which comprise the emergence of 
capitalist society. Exactly what these processes are cannot be specified in advance: this is a 
matter for empirical research. Indeed, Marx later objected vigorously to any attempt 'to 
metamorphose my historical sketch of the genesis of capitalism in Western Europe into an 
historico-philosophical theory of the marche generate imposed by fate upon every people, 
whatever the historic circumstances in which it finds itself.5 What can be said, however, is that 
since for most of history most humans have been peasants in possession of the means of 
subsistance, the emergence and spread of capitalist society must be brought about by an 
historical process of expropriation which reconstitutes them as propertyless individuals 
compelled to sell their labour:
So-called primitive accumulation, therefore, is nothing else than the historical 
process of divorcing the producer from the means of production. It appears as 
'primitive' because it forms the pre-history of capital, and of the mode of 
production corresponding to capital.^
We should add that since over the same period most appropriating groups have been 
politically-constituted elites extracting a surplus by extra-economic coercion at the end of the 
production process, the consolidation of the capitalist property form must also involve an 
historical process of internal pacification or state-building, by which their personalized 
political/military power is broken and reconstituted in the impersonal form of the sovereign 
state, leaving them with predominantly 'economic' forms of power. In other words, state-
^The Anarchical Society, p. 13-14.
^Letter to the editor of the Otyecestvenniye Zapisky, reproduced in Marx 1934, p.352. 
6Capital Vol. I, p.874-5.
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building is an integral part of primitive accumulation. ? These things do not come about 
spontaneously or without violence. They form a history which, as Marx put it, 'is written in the 
annals of mankind in letters of blood and fire'.** They are the object of fierce struggle which 
'assumes different aspects in different countries, and runs through its various phases in 
different orders of succession, and at different historical epochs'.9
The question arises: can we extend the scope of this reworked category of primitive 
accumulation beyond individual societies in order to recover the emergence of the capitalist 
international system as a determinate set of historical processes of structural change? The 
core assertion of this thesis has been that there is a connection between the strategic relation 
of production and the social form of the geopolitical system. And this, of course, does entail 
that the generalizing of a new strategic relation would be associated with a transformation of 
the geopolitical system.
As we noted in Chapter 4, Marx himself was by no means insensible to the international 
components of primitive accumulation, nor to their association with a sequence of leading 
'national' centres:
The different moments of primitive accumulation can be assigned in particular 
to Spain, Portugal, Holland, France and England, in more or less chronological 
order... ^
Nor did he assume that these were merely developments within 'civil society', having nothing 
to do with the state. Of the same processes he writes:
These methods... all employ the power of the state, the concentrated and 
organized force of society, to hasten, as in a hothouse, the process of 
transformation of the feudal mode of production into the capitalist 
mode...Force... is itself an economic power. 11
The Grundrisse shows Marx projecting a huge, multi-volume critique of political economy 
which, from the evidence of his correspondence,12 was to have included a volume on the state,
^Marx hints at this political dimension but does not develop it here: The industrial capitalists, these new potentates, had 
on their part not only to displace the guild masters... but also the feudal lords...’ p.875. Sayer develops the argument much 
more clearly in The critique of politics and political economy etc.’, concluding: '...state formation is an essential facet of 
bourgeois society1, [p.234]
3Capital, Vol. I, p.875.
^Capital, Vol.I, p.876.
^Capital, Vol. I, p.915.
11 ibid. p.915-6.
12Marx 1934, pp. 105 & 119.
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and which singles out the themes of war and the 'influence... of international relations' on 
internal social development.13
These observations are scattered and incomplete in Marx's work. They certainly do not 
comprise an explicit theory of the international system. But taken together with the discussions 
of the British in India and some eight hundred pages of journalism on the Eastern Question, ^  
they might make one think twice before endorsing a claim that 'international relations did not 
particularly interest the two founders of marxism'.^
But how can Marx's insistence that 'the expropriation of the agricultural producer, of the 
peasant, from the soil is the basis of the whole process'16 be used to think about the emergence 
of the modem international system?
6.2 The Data
It is a curious feature of IR theory that the nineteenth century seems largely to have dropped 
out of view. Wight's academy of'international t h o u g h t '^  is fully staffed by the end of the 
eighteenth century, while the locus classicus of the political Realism imported by Morgenthau 
into the US after World War II is Max Weber's 1918 lecture 'Politics as a Vocation'. ^  In the 
first case, the implication must be that the experience of the nineteenth century did not add 
anything significant which was not available at the end of the eighteenth.19 As for the second, 
by 1918 the international world of the previous century was already a distant, shattered 
memory. If Churchill looked fondly back on it - 'The old world in its sunset was fair to see'20 - 
Weber's eyes were fixed sternly on the world ahead. And all he saw was 'a Polar night of icy
13Marx 1973, p. 109.
^T he Eastern Question, ed. Eleanor Marx & E. Aveling, 1897.
1 ^ Kubulkova and Cruickshank, Marxism and International Relations, Oxford 1987, p.27.
16Marx 1976, p. 876.
1 Avight sets out the trilogy of Hobbes, Grotius and Kant as comprehending, albeit schematically, the range of approaches 
available within political theory for thinking about international relations. See ’An Anatomy of International Thought', 
Review of International Studies. 13 (1987).
1 %or the claim that 'more than any other figure Weber established the discourse of the realist approach to international 
relations', see M. J. Smith, Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger, Louisiana State University Press 1986, chpater two. 
[Quotation from p.53]
19It is in fact a remarkable selection. For Hobbes, as we saw above, articulated philosophically the social forms of agrarian 
capitalism; Kant's universalism is the very signature of liberal ideology. Meanwhile the inclusion of Grotius, virtually all of 
whose work is now inaccessible except to the specialist, mystified even Bull. Bull suggested that Grotius played the role of 
a via media in this trilogy between the other two extremes. Another possibility is suggested by the fact that what is drawn 
from Grotius (or rather from the Prolegomena) is the feasibility of an (international) society of sovereign individuals 
(states) based upon the observance of contract: could Grotius be a front for Locke here? Whatever the answer, all three 
figures antedate the industrial revolution. For this reason, their 'modernity' which in fact derives from the specificities of 
their historical locations, is made to seem evidence rather of a timeless spectrum of political possibilities, not associated 
with any particular kinds of society.
2077ie World Crisis 1911-1914, [ 1923] extracted in M. Wright [ed], Theory and Practice o f  the Balance ofPower, p. 137.
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darkness and severity’.21 Moreover, such extended treatments of the nineteenth century as we 
do possess in IR tend to focus on the eruption of European nationalism, the evolution of 
international institutions among pre-existent states, or the alternation of Concerts and 
Balances within Europe. 22 To be sure, these are all important themes. Yet it was the 
nineteenth century which saw the incorporation of nearly the whole of the earth into a single 
geopolitical system, thus inaugurating the era of world history. And this did not come about 
through the progressive entry of more and more pre-existing political entities into balances and 
concerts. 23 On the contrary, its main dynamic was visibly the expansion - not to say explosion 
- of European societies outwards, an explosion which eventually brought the larger part of 
humanity under the formal or informal rule of European states and the white settler states of 
the Americas. The path to the modem, global states-system lies through the construction of 
the greatest colonial empires the world had ever seen.
At the same time, the nineteenth century was also, as Hobsbawm described it, 'a great 
machine for uprooting countrymen'.24 If we could visualize the European social formation and 
its connections with the wider world early in the second half of that century, the most striking 
feature would undoubtedly be the gigantic movement - local, regional and intercontinental - of 
populations. This 'greatest migration of peoples in history'25 in fact comprised three distinct 
but crucially related movements: from the European countryside to the towns, from Europe to 
the Americas and other regions of white settlement, and (by non-Europeans) between Asian 
and African regions under European political control. These three movements, each made up 
mostly of dispossessed direct producers, were dynamically and structurally related. To 
understand how this is so is to begin to appreciate something of the vast labour of social 
transformation which the emergence of the capitalist world market entailed at its birth - not to 
mention its continuing development. 26
When we referred a moment ago to the 19th century in terms of the explosion of European 
societies, this may have seemed like a colourful exaggeration. But in fact the metaphor is apt
2 Politics as a Vocation', in Runciman [ed], Weber Selections, p.224.
^ S e e  for example Kinsley's Power and the Pursuit o f  Peace, Cambridge 1963 and Ian Clarke's The Hierarchy o f  States: 
Reform and Resistance in the International Order, Cambridge 1989.
^5Only one major non-European polity, Japan, fully succeeded in organizing its entry in such a manner - and this was only
by virtue of a self-imposed crash programme of Westernization. For a brief account of the Meiji Restoration, see E.
Hobsbawm, The Age o f  Capital, London 1977, Chapter 8, section H.
24Hobsbawm 1977, p.231.
^ib id . p.228 
96In most countries of the modem world much of this labour of 'modernity' is yet to come, even though the formal 'external 
marks' of sovereign statehood are in place. Declarations of sovereignty and legal recognition cannot magic away the 
gruesome reality of what state-building involves, or overleap the trauma of expropriation which the commodification of 
social reproduction entails. Eric Hobsbawm has observed that: the period from 1950 to 1975... saw the most spectacular, 
rapid, far-reaching, profound and worldwide social change in global history... [This] is the first period in which the 
peasantry became a minority, [not merely in industrial developed countries, in several of which it had remained very 
strong, but even in Third World countries]'. Cited by Giovanni Arrighi in World Income Inequalities and the Future of 
Socialism', New Left Review 189, September/October 1991, p.39.
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in at least three ways, each one of which relates to one of the vectors of migration listed 
above.
First, an alternative phraseology such as the 'expansion' of Europe would miss the extent to 
which European societies themselves were in a turmoil of transformation, visible above all in 
the 'flight from the land' and the periodic revolutionary crises which formed the aftershocks of 
the great earthquake of 1789-1815. Between 1600 and 1800 the urbanised population of 
Europe showed no significant increase as a proportion of the (expanding) t o t a l .27 After 1800 
it shows a continuous heady ascent: newly unified Germany crowded its people into towns at 
such a rate that the proportion doubled from one third to two thirds in four and a half 
d e c a d e s .  28 i n  mid-19th century Manchester, more than two thirds of the population over 20 
years of age had been bom e ls e w h e r e .  29 As Colin Murray suggested, 'the study of migration is 
the study of processes of structural t r a n s f o r m a t i o n ' . ^  And certainly, this migration to the 
towns involved far more than a simple physical relocation of population.
The dynamo here at the heart of all three movements was the capitalist industrialization of 
Europe. Having said that, the actual process was uneven in the extreme. And it would be 
misleading to say simply that all over Europe, the introduction of liberal property laws on the 
land was rapidly expropriating the peasantry, raising agrarian productivity to feed the towns 
and creating a supply of landless labourers to work in the expanding industrial sector. The 
French peasantry remained more or less intact.^ 1 The Russian 'Great Reform' of 1861 did not 
generalize private property in la n d . ^  2 The peasants of Southern Italy, 'privatised' in the early 
part of the century were not actually dislodged till after the 1860s, when the conjunction of 
agrarian recession with new cheap imports of grain from the US began suddenly to turf them 
out almost by the million. In fact it is arguable that the only country which followed the 
'classical' road to capitalist industrialization was Britain - and that Britain itself could do this 
only by dint of being the first to industrialize. England's priority was more fundamental than 
this, however. For when the early cotton mill owners of Lancashire looked out into the 
countryside they beheld an advanced agrarian order unlike anything in any other major 
country: no peasantry clinging tenaciously to the land or bolted to it by legal subordination to 
semi-feudal landed elites. On the contrary, the processes of expropriation of the direct peasant 
producer and the parallel consolidation of private property in land had already been largely
27Wolf 1982 p.360.
^Woodruff, op. c it p.666.
29Wolf, p.276.
^C ited in Shula Marks and Peter Richardson [eds.], International Labour Migration: Historical Perspectives, Hounslow 
1984, p. 17.
^Hobsbawm 1963, p.91. See also Fohlen, The Industrial Revolution in France 1700-1914' in C. Cipolla [ed], pp.28-31. 
For a general survey of European land reform between 1789 and 1848, see Hobsbawm 1963, Chapter 8.
^2For a brief discussion of the 'Great Reform', sec Gregory Grossman's account in C. Cipolla [ed], The Emergence o f  
Industrial Societies, Vol. H, Glasgow 1973, pp.493-6.
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accomplished, leaving behind a capitalist agrarian economy dominated by the triad of private 
landowner, tenant farmer and landless labourer. By contrast, every other state that wished to 
compete with the world’s first industrial power confronted an ’agrarian problem’ which often 
reached into the heart of the state itself. The imperative to industrialization entailed the 
transformation of property relations on the land in order to raise productivity and liberate 
labour for redeployment into the urban industrial sector. But these property relations were the 
foundation of the political power of landed classes who were strongly represented within the 
state. Thus industrialization spelled not only population movement and social transformation 
but also political contradiction and crisis. Partly for this reason, much of the geopolitics of 
19th century Europe was preoccupied with managing the tensions between old and new 
classes, the constitutional struggles of liberalism and Absolutism, and the territorial and 
political consequences of the divergent strategies pursued by different states to produce 
industrial economies.
Thus the Europe which plunged into the catastrophic general crisis of 1914-45 was no longer 
the same kind of social formation which the legitimists had vainly attempted to restore a 
century earlier.33
Europe's societies were also exploding in a second sense. The period saw a massive outflow of 
population from the continent. Most crossed the Atlantic, forming an 'enormous and 
continuous flood of humanity driven year in, year out, onto the shores of A m e r i c a ' .34 But 
others travelled to areas of white settlement elsewhere. Over the century up to 1914 some 50 
million people left Europe. These people were almost all peasants shed by the revolution on 
the land gathering pace across Europe. As Wolf notes:
The main factors pushing these people out of Europe were the spread of
industrial capitalism and the commercialisation of agriculture. 35
Indeed it is possible to observe successive national waves of transatlantic migration 
corresponding to 'the timing of the industrialising process in the various countries... a process 
which initially liberated labour power on a massive scale in the agricultural and handicraft 
sectors e v e r y w h e r e . ..'36 Thus Britain provided 3/4 of European emigrants between 1821-50, 
something over half between 1851-80 (when numbers were swelled by other North European
33 Just how different has been the subject of an important debate on the uneven social and political development of 19th 
and 20th century Europe. See in particular, Amo Mayer's The Persistence o f  the Ancien Regime, 1981 - an argument 
carried forward into the interwar period by Why Did the Heavens Not Darken?, 1990. Mayer has also elaborated his 
account of uneven political development into a stimulating treatment of the character of European warfare in the same 
period. See Mayer 1977.
34Capital Vol. I, p.940.
35Wolf, p.364.
3^Potts, p. 131.
170
states) and just over a quarter between 1881-1915 - by which time the outflow from South- 
Eastern Europe comprised over half the total. There are partial exceptions to this pattern, 
such as the exodus in the middle decades of the century from Ireland and Germany, spurred 
not by industrialisation but by famine. Moreover, as the century wore on, cyclical downturns 
in international trade displaced cohorts of workers from European industry itself.-*** However, 
as Kenwood and Lougheed aver, 'most European migrants during the 19th century were rural 
workers'.-*^ And although it was land-hunger which drove them out, they too were mostly 
reconstituted as (unskilled) industrial wage labour.40
In 1800 the United States was 'a small agricultural nation settled along the Atlantic 
seaboard,'^  numbering some five million people. By 1914 it was a leading industrial power of 
over one hundred million.42 In the intervening years it had absorbed some two thirds of the 50 
million people who left Europe for the areas of white settlement overseas.
Now, it is a commonplace that European emigration underwrote American industrialisation. 
But this formulation drastically understates the extent to which Europe and America were 
caught in a single explosion. For Europe's role in shaping the new society was not only 
demographic. Woodruff suggests that the westward movement of the US frontier was itself 
paced in part by the expanding European demand for American products,4-* a demand which 
multiplied as European industrial production expanded. This was certainly the case in the 
South. It was the mechanical tempo of the Lancashire mills which (absorbing a 1500-fold 
increase in US cotton production between 1790 and 1860) beat out the westward march of the 
planters, leading to the Indian wars and political expansion of the p e r io d .44 (indeed at this 
time, cotton comprised some two thirds of US exports^ and was, overall, 'the most important 
proximate cause of expansion' in the US economy. )46 But in the North too, later on in the 
century, European demand for wheat played its part in bringing areas newly accessible by rail 
under the plough. This latter development, in turn, had further important consequences. For, 
as Wolf notes, the 'massive inflows of American and Russian wheat' which came on stream 
during the Great Depression 'shook the foundations of European agriculture and intensified 
the outward flow of migrants to the Americas.' Indeed in some cases it seems that the very
3^See the table in Kenwood and Lougheed, p.60.
38See Wolf, p. 364.
3^The Growth o f  the International Economy, London 1983, p. 62.
40ibid. p.67.
4 ^  Woodruff, Impact o f  Western Man: A Study o f  Europe's Role in the World Economy 1750-1960, London 1966, p.64.
42Woodruff 1973, p.704.
431973, p.664.
44Wolf p.280-4.
45Woodruff 1973:659.
46Wolf279.
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ships which brought the American grain to Europe, carried on the return run Italian peasants 
dislodged by the trade. 47
The stimulus of external trade should not be exaggerated. The expanding internal market of 
the North soon became the principal dynamo of expansion. But the deeper relevance of these 
observations lies elsewhere: they remind us of what the United States actually is, historically. 
Far from being just another great power,48 this great, defining fixture of postwar international 
relations is the child o f the industrial-capitalist transformation o f Europe.49 Indeed, having no 
formal ethnic definition, its national (constitutional) identity is practically indistinguishable 
from the purest ideological expression of capitalist relations of production. The truths declared 
to be self-evident in the Declaration of Independence are, as Marx might have put it, '...the 
idealized expression of this basis; as developed in juridical, political, social relations, they are 
merely this basis to a higher power.'50 Nor could it be said that the geostrategic location of the 
United States dictates any overriding geopolitical obsession with, say, encirclement or 
submersion by powerful neighbours.51
Thus when Max Weber sought to characterize 'the spirit of capitalism', he quoted (citing its 
'almost classical purity') not a tract of German Protestantism but a pamphlet by a signatory of 
the American Declaration of Independence, Benjamin F r a n k lin . 52 Similarly, when, in 1845, 
Marx singled out what he called 'the most perfect example of the modem state', he chose not 
France - the birthplace of the Absolutist idea of sovereignty and site of the revolution regarded 
as the very fount of modernity, not even Britain - pioneer of agrarian and industrial capitalism, 
but rather 'North A m e r i c a ' .^  For here was
a country where bourgeois society did not develop on the foundation of the 
feudal system, but developed rather from itself; where this society appears not 
as the surviving result of a centuries-old movement, but rather as the starting- 
point of a new movement; where the state, in contrast to all earlier national 
formations, was from the beginning subordinate to bourgeois society, to its
47See Wolf pp. 313 and 319.
4^As Bull regards it in The Anarchical Society, Chapter 9: The Great Powers and International Order'.
4^1he economic development of the United States is itself a product of the large-scale industry of Europe, or, to be more 
precise, of England.' Marx 1976, p.580n.
50Grundrisse, p.245.
51T w o  qualifying points should be made here. First, the preindustrial emergence of the English colonies was already a by- 
blow of the emergence of English agrarian capitalism. The US was thus, as it were, bom twice. Second, the discussion 
above is not meant to diminish the importance of either Southern slavery or Northern homestead fanning in the making of 
the United States. However, since the latter was based on private property and exchange relations, it did not constitute the 
structural block on capitalist development which European peasant production did. And the alternative ideological identity 
promoted by the Southern slave-based mode of production was submerged by the outcome of the Civil War.
^T h e  Protestant Ethic and the Spirit o f  Capitalism, Max Weber, introduced by Anthony Giddens, London 1985, p.48-50.
^T h e  German Ideology, New York 1947, p.60. In the Grundrisse, Marx describes the US as the most modem form of 
existence of bourgeois society, [p. 104]
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production, and never could make the pretence of being an end-in-itself; where, 
finally, bourgeois society itself, linking up the productive forces of an old world 
with the enormous natural terrain of a new one, has developed to hitherto 
unheard-of dimensions and with unheard-of freedom of movement....54
This is the power which (with the assistance of its liberal forbear, England) was to remake the 
institutional framework of the international system in the 1940s and after. Is it any wonder 
then that, whatever the enormous diversity and uneven development of human societies in the 
world today, the dominant institutions of the international system reflect the distinctive social 
forms of capitalism?
The third and final way in which the metaphor of'explosion’ is apt concerns the direct co­
ordination of Europe's internal transformation with its external reorganization of the non- 
European world outside the areas of white settlement. For the non-European societies which, 
as it were, caught the force of the blast and came under European rule were not only shattered 
militarily. Nineteenth century imperialism was not simply what is referred to generically as 'the 
imperialism of great powers'. Almost everywhere they went, the Europeans sought either to 
transform the social order directly (sometimes by abolishing traditional forms of land- 
ownership and replacing them with private property) or at least to reorientate production in 
order to integrate it directly or indirectly with the needs of European industry. Again, practices 
varied considerably between the different imperial powers. But what holds for all of them is 
that European external expansion was not just an external, geopolitical process. It always also 
involved a forcible reorganization of social life in order to facilitate commercial extraction of 
resources. And whatever the amnesia of later generations, the sheer immensity of what this 
involved was not lost on those involved at the time. As Lord Lytton, Viceroy of India, 
expressed it in 1878, in a justly famous passage:
It is a fact which there is no disguising... and also one that cannot be too 
constantly or too anxiously recognized that... we have placed, and must 
permanently maintain ourselves at the head of a gradual but gigantic revolution 
-the greatest and most momentous social, moral, and religious, as well as 
political revolution which, perhaps, the world has ever witnessed.'^
54Marx 1973, p.884.
-^Cited in T. Von Laue, The World Revolution o f  Westernization, Oxford 1987, p. 15. Or as Marx put it of the British in 
India, 25 years earlier: They are the defenders of property, but did any revolutionary party every originate agrarian 
revolutions like those in Bengal, in Madras, and in Bombay? The Future Results o f  the British Rule in India, in K. Marx 
and F. Engels On Colonialism, Moscow and London 1980, p.81.
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The colonial echo of Cobden's irenic hymn to free trade was thus a crash programme of 
compulsory social transformation.56 This rolling upheaval contributed in turn to large-scale 
migrations within and between these non-European societies as labour was redeployed out of 
traditional forms of life onto plantations and European-owned farms or mobilized for the 
infrastructural projects that would facilitate the material integration of the regions into the 
expanding world market centred on Europe. In the hundred years after the British abolition of 
slavery in 1833, this new system of bonded labour, or 'coolieism', organized the international 
movement of between 12 and 37 million people. 5? And when the colonial empires withdrew - 
the last step in the formal emergence of a global states-system - they left behind not only 
political apparatuses commanding demarcated territories, but also a pattern of economic 
linkages by which the societies were partly integrated into the transnational structures of the 
world market.
One must be careful not to overstate the immediate impact of European colonialism, in 
particular the speed and scale of the social transformations wrought by it. The latter were 
highly uneven, and, as Kieman has observed, Marx's own journalism on India tended 'to pull 
out the thread of history faster than the Three Sisters were weaving it'. 58 That said, we need 
to retain a sense of the overall sociological content of imperialism. And if we take Marx's 
formulation as an empirically open tool for thinking about this, then it surely remains the best 
way of sidestepping empty debates about whether nineteenth century imperialism was 
primarily 'economic' or 'strategic':
England has to fulfil a double mission in India: one destructive, the other 
regenerating - the annihilation of old Asiatic society, and the laying of the 
material foundations of Western society in Asia.59
Outflow of population, internal transformation and external conquest and upheaval: the 
intellectual challenge of IR is to grasp these several dynamics as a whole. For what we witness 
in these linked processes of geographical expansion and structural transformation is nothing 
less than the dawn of the modem international system - the object of study of IR.
56Cobden had predicted that the speculative philosopher of a thousand years hence will date the greatest revolution that 
ever happened in the world's history from the triumph of the principle (of free trade]'. Bourne [ed] 1970, p.270.
^ c f  Potts p.71-3.
^'M arx and India', Socialist Register 1967, p. 164. Kieman continues: Even before the unsuccessful revolutions of 1848 he 
was writing as if the bourgeoisie were already firmly in the saddle in Europe at large. He remembered the blight that had 
fallen on the hand-weavers of England, he watched English manufactures creating a 'latent proletariat' in backward 
Germany, and in his mind's eye, rather than in any statistical mirror, he saw the same process not merely at work, but 
completed, in India.’
^Future Results etc. in On Colonialism, p.77.
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6.3 The Result
If we now step back from the turmoil, we can see this emergence more clearly by observing 
the basic historical shift in the form of imperial power which has been associated with this 
world-wide 'uprooting of countrymen'. In the 16th century Spanish empire, accumulation of 
resources could not have been accomplished without territorial expansion. This was clearly not 
a 'purely political' state. Whether in the Hapsburg domains of Europe^ or in the lands of the 
Aztecs and Incas, the scale of Spain's imperial structure could be measured by the extent of its 
formal jurisdiction. Not so with the British some three hundred years later. Taking British 
material expansion as a whole, the bulk of it was concentrated in Europe and the Americas, 
where it did not involve formal political command. So much so, that it may even be that the 
vast formal empire ran at a loss.61 The postwar Pax Americana was different again: no 
territorial expansion this time, but pressure on the colonial powers to grant sovereign 
independence, and considerable military intervention to stabilize the emerging system internally 
and preserve it from the Soviet threat from without. No map of sovereign jurisdictions could 
show us the extent of US international power. For its rise went hand in hand with the 
globalizing of the sovereign states-system.62
When do the interests of a rising imperial power promote not political subjection but political 
independence? - When the political independence in question is not substantive political 
possession of resources by an autarchic state (in either communist or radical nationalist forms) 
but rather the consolidation of sovereignty. This breaks the political link with the former 
imperial power, while opening the fomally demarcated sphere of'the economy' to the private 
power of foreign capital,63 that is, to the social form of dependence mediated by things. 
Historically, the US fought communism and anti-Western radical nationalism and supported 
the emergence of sovereign independence, irrespective of whether it took a democratic 
political form. In other words it promoted the separating out of private and public spheres at 
the international level.
Like Lord Lytton before them, US foreign policy planners during World War II, many of them 
associated with the think-tanks of the Council on Foreign Relations, showed themselves quite
^T h e  effectiveness of Hapsburg power in Europe varied hugely. The point, however, is the form: the stubbornness of 
Aragon was legendary, nonetheless it did not break away.
See Patrick O'Brian, The Costs & Benefits of British Imperialism 1846-1914', Past and Present number 120, August 
1988. Gallagher & Robinson [1953: p. 1 ] suggest that studies of the Empire which are concentrated on the areas under 
formal rale may be compared to 'judging the size and character of icebergs solely from the parts above the water-line'. 
Something similar must apply to O'Brien's calculations in this article, empirically sound though they may be.
62As Stedman Jones observed, US imperialism has been distinctive on two counts: 'its non-territorial character... and its 
possession of a formally anti-imperialist ideology*. See Blackburn [ed] 1973, p.212.
6^ Barraclough, writing perceptively but too close to the events, mistook decolonization for a decisive reversal of power in 
the world: *Never before in the whole of human history had so revolutionary a reversal occurred with such rapidity.' [An 
Introduction to Contemporary History, London 1964, p. 148].
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aware (albeit in a more pragmatic sense) of the historical specificity, and hence the necessary 
institutional form, of their coming ascendancy. As recorded in the first chapter above, by May 
1942 it was recognized that 'the British Empire as it existed in the past will never reappear and 
that the United States may have to take its place'. Since at the same time it would have to 
'avoid conventional forms o f  i m p e r i a l i s m ' ,64 America could step into Britain's shoes only if it 
innovated (and dominated) institutions which internationalized the exercise of formal political 
power. Such were the reflections of Isiah Bowman, reflections which fed directly into the 
drafting of the US proposal for the establishment of the United Nations. In this strategy, 
implying a determination to universalize the exercise of geopolitical power through the control 
of things, we see the attempted global extension of the anarchical social form of capitalist 
geopolitics - for all that it was hedged about by the Soviet system on the one hand and the 
actual recalcitrance of non-captialist social formations on the other.
But why then was British empire part formal and part informal? Gallagher and Robinson long 
ago pressed this question with great insistence. They argued that where, as in the 'import- 
export sectors' of the regions of white settlement, the movement of commodities and 
investment could proceed without either meeting political resistance or generating new social 
instability, there was no need for direct rule. The institutionally demarcated sphere of the 
economy, presided over by local 'satisfactory political frameworks'^^ facilitated the expansion 
of private political power. The British foreign secretary, Canning, referred to the new form of 
international power which would be deployed in this expansion when he commented in 1824: 
'Spanish America is free, and if we do not mismanage our affairs sadly she is English'P& in the 
decades which followed British capital built the railroads and the cattle ranches of Latin 
America. And 1913 over a quarter of [all British] investment abroad was invested in that
r e g i o n ' , 6 7  Of course this was not a socially harmonious process and the public political power 
of the British state was repeatedly required to intervene on behalf of the private stockholders 
against expropriating nationalist r e g i m e s .  6 8  But so long as the separation of public and private 
was maintained (partly accomplished here, as elsewhere, by 'purely political’ pressures), 
imperial expansion (the widening command over productive resources) could assume a 'non­
political' form.
The main factor which prevented non-European societies from being treated in the same way 
was the very different social structure of those societies, in which labour was not a 'thing' able 
to be commanded by money, production was oriented towards subsistence, and financial
^Quotations taken from CFR deliberations exerpted in Shoup and Mintner, ’Building a New World Order etc.', in Holly 
Sklar [ed], Trilateralism, Boston 1980, pp. 146 & 149.
^ T h e  Imperialism of Free Trade’, Economic History Review, 2nd Series, VI, I, 1953, p.6.
^C ited  in J. Gallagher and R. Robinson, p.8.
67ibid, p.9-10.
^Gallagher & Robinson, p. 9.
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investment was therefore unable to lay hold of the means of wealth creation. Thus, as already 
mentioned, although much of imperialism was devoted to straightforward plunder, a great deal 
of effort was also made, in particular by the British, to bring about social changes which would 
integrate these populations into the expanding realm of the world market - whether by 
compelling a shift to export crops or by forcibly changing the institutional forms of authority 
and ownership in order to open the society to commercial penetration. As Ronald Robinson 
summarized it elsewhere:
Afro-Asian economies, being largely undifferentiated from their socio-political 
institutions, were more or less invulnerable to the play of the international 
market. The institutional barriers to economic invasion proved intractable; 
economic reform was subject to the political veto of social conservatism...
In white colonies the international economy worked through neo- 
European attitudes and institutions which enabled their export-import sectors 
to convert British economic power into colonial political collaboration with 
empire. In most Affo-Asian examples, institutional gaps kept industrial imputs 
too small to empower such a mechanism. Small as they were, they had to be 
driven in by the hammer of European intervention. External political pressure 
had to supply the lack of economic leverage on the indigenous political 
economy before a measure of economic collaboration could be o b ta in e d . 6 9
These contrasts may be viewed in one further aspect. For the changing political form of the 
imperialist states was paralleled over the same period by an equivalent shift in the form in 
which surplus labour was extracted by the agencies of imperialism from the foreign direct 
producer. The Iberians used slave and forced draft Amerindian labour, followed by African 
slaves. The British were the principal overseers of the peripheral coolie migrations of bonded, 
or semi-free labour. The internationalisation of American production has depended for the 
most part on the availability of free labour forces and private property rights upheld by alien 
state authorities.70
In the course of his discussion of primitive accumulation, Marx observes that
...the historical movement which changes the producers into wage-labourers 
appears... as their emancipation from serfdom and from the fetters of the 
guilds.. .71
^^'Non-European Foundations of European Imperialism: Sketch for a theory of Collaboration' R. Robinson in Owen & 
Sutcliffe [eds], Studies in the Theory o f  Imperialism London 1972, p. 129.
7®See Potts 1990, Chapter 7: 'Elements of a Theory of the World Market for Labour Power*.
711976, p.875.
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Similarly, the historical movement of 'geopolitical' expropriation (imperialism) which brought 
about the partial integration of non-European peoples into the world market (in some cases 
effected by a forced 'liberation' of labour) appears in its outcome, the world of independent 
'nation-states', as the sovereign emancipation of the peoples. What we actually see emerging 
here is the geopolitical corollary of capitalism: sovereign independence based on dependence 
mediated by things. Behind the contemporary world of independent, equal states stands the 
expropriation of the direct producer.
It is in this respect, then, that the spread of the world market, the emergence of a global 
sovereign states-system, the internal explosion of Europe, and its tumultuous impact upon 
peripheral societies - in short, the linked processes of geopolitical expansion and social 
transformation which created our modem international system - must all be seen as parts of a 
single enormous upheaval: the ongoing world-historic upheaval of capitalism.
* * *
Every historical episode of imperial expansion elaborates its own distinctive ideological 
legitimation according to the specific forms of domination and surplus appropriation involved 
in its reproduction. For 16th century Castile this meant theories of kingship and theological 
disputes about the rights of non-Christian Amerindians. For the 20th century United States it 
means the liberal idea of freedom, and a discipline of IR which concentrates on the purely 
political world of sovereign equality and anarchical competition in which the imperial character 
of American world power is least visible.
If we want to understand the modem international system we cannot take this purely political 
world at face value. For the formal shift from territorial empire to sovereign states-system 
does not mean that direct political command over persons no longer extends across borders. 
Rather it means that this extension of command assumes a different form  as a result of the 
disaggregation of political functions between public and private spheres, coupled with the 
organization of material relations between persons through social relations between things.
Any theory of international relations therefore needs to begin by grasping the historical 
uniqueness of both sovereignty and anarchy as social forms arising out of the distinctive 
configuration of social relations which Marx called the capitalist mode of production and 
reproduction of social life. Only then will it be able to see its object for what it is: a set of 
social relations between people.
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Arguably, it is in this determined rediscovery of our own collective human agency in the 
anonymous social forces and processes around us that social theory finds both its surest 
methodological and its deepest political premise.
IR has not been without its mavericks and principled oppositionists. (Morgenthau himself 
opposed the Vietnam War.) Nor has it lacked for writers and teachers possessed of a sincere 
revulsion against war and injustice. But it has failed to reappropriate the fantastical forms of 
states and markets, and thereby to explain what the great modem drama of our international 
system has actually been about. Surveying the systematic character of this failure, one is driven 
to conclude that the US has found in the modem clerisy of this ’American Social Science1 a 
rather more serviceable ideologue than Charles V was able to command in the Dominican 
Order of his day.
— 000—
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